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ABSTRACT 
 
CONCEPTIONS OF LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 
 
Anna Stevenson 
 
This thesis investigates the underlying assumptions Athenians had about their 
laws: it seeks to ask what Athenians assumed their laws were for, and where they 
thought those laws got their authority. It neither answers nor seeks to answer the 
difficult question of how Athenian juries made decisions, but by focussing on 
Athenian conceptions of their laws it offers a tool for those who would study 
Athenian litigation and legislating. 
 
These questions are first explored through a study of the responses of the restored 
democracy to the remnants of the Thirty’s attempts at legislating. The various and 
inconsistent responses made help to frame jurisprudential questions within the 
actions of democratic Athens. 
 
The modern jurisprudential theory of interpretativism is used to access Athenian 
ideas on the principles assumed to underlie Athens’ laws, and the thesis argues 
that Athenians were equally likely to present arguments which rely on polis 
expediency as the principle underlying Athens’ laws as they were to present 
arguments relying on justice as that principle. 
 
The same theoretical framework is used to explore the accepted role of morality as 
the principle underlying Athens’ laws and the thesis argues that though morality 
could be used for this purpose, such uses were rare. The thesis then explores 
Athens’ weak enforcement of laws and weak ideal of obedience to law as law and 
concludes that the enforcement of morality did not form a large part of Athenians’ 
6 
assumptions about what their law was supposed to achieve or from where it drew 
its authority. 
 
How far Athens recognised the authority of law via the authority of the person or 
body which made that law is then explored. Fourth-century Athenians are shown 
to have held ambivalent views about democratic law making and law makers, and 
the thesis concludes that democratic Athens’ respect for its ancient lawgivers came 
to affect its ability to fully realise its own institutions’ legislative authority. 
 
Finally, the thesis looks at Athenian idealised views of Spartan law to clarify the 
questions raised in the study of Athenians’ conceptions of their own laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Kim, who asked questions.  
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PREFACE 
 
Translations are those of the Loeb series unless otherwise stated. 
 
In general, Greek terms are transliterated while names are Latinised. The 
adjective drakontian has been used to refer to the laws attributed to Draco to 
avoid confusion with the English draconian. Similarly, I have used sykophant and 
sykophancy to avoid confusion with the English sycophant. 
  
12 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
 
The title of this thesis, Conceptions of Law, carries within it a large and by no 
means uncontroversial claim – that Athenian law is a legitimate topic for study, in 
that it is a system which holds some degree of internal coherence and is not a set 
of unrelated rules.1 After many years of comparative neglect, when Greek law was 
studied primarily in terms of either substantive law using concepts drawn mainly 
from Roman law, or by philologists,2 Athenian law has in the past thirty years 
become the subject of increasingly polarised academic argument. On the one 
hand, scholars such as Humphreys, Osborne, Todd and Cohen have, to varying 
degrees, emphasised anthropological and sociological studies of Athenian 
litigation, and this has to some extent allowed the study of law qua law to become 
marginalised.3 On the other hand, Harris and Carey have argued that Athens can 
be considered to have set their law apart from other political or societal concerns. 
Such work on the nature of Athenian law as has previously been undertaken has 
drawn primarily on the work of philosophers and did not attempt to understand 
popular understandings of law.4  
 
1 This is argued by Sealey (1994) p. 55. See Chapter 3 for an exploration of this in Athenian sources. 
2 See Todd and Millett (1990) for a useful summary of studies of Greek law up to that date. 
3 See below p. 2. 
4 Vinogradoff (1922), Jones (1956), de Romilly (1971). Wolf (1956) included the orators within 
Griechisches Rechtsdenken, but his work is hard to use. He understands the orators as a ‘school’ in 
their own right, rather than a way to access popular ideas. His work is primarily a linguistic study 
of appearances of the words nomos and dikē in different authors across Greek history. Wolff (1970), 
through a study of the graphē paranomōn and graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai, proposed his 
own version of Athenian law, whereby initially tight boundaries of what was and was not a proper 
law were allowed in the fourth century to loosen thanks to law’s growing authority, but where law 
both guarded the polis against the demos and was itself guarded by that demos. Wolff’s book, while 
often cited, is rarely referred to for his attempts to understand the system of Athenian law.  Sealey 
(1994) attempts a study of the ‘underlying body of thought’ for all of Greek law across a huge span 
of history. He grounds his work in the theories of Austin (1832) and Savigny (1814) (Sealey 1994 p. 
6-10). Austin’s work has long been abandoned by legal theorists. Savigny’s work was born out of 
nineteenth century German romanticism, and was based on the idea that the law of a nation must 
reflect the ethos of that nation’s Volk. His work, while influential, is also no longer of primary 
importance. Sealey gives no explanation of why he chooses these two theorists, and does not stick 
14 
 
Law and society approaches have provided stimulating and often enlightening 
work which uses the evidence provided by laws and the legal process to provide 
new insights into the priorities and thought-worlds of ancient societies. These 
studies have tended to focus on litigation in Athens, looking at its role in Athenian 
society and at the basis on which Athenian juries made decisions. Given the nature 
of our sources, this is in part to be expected, since no cohesive body of Athenian 
law has survived5 and instead most of our knowledge of Athenian law has been 
drawn from law court speeches. Humphreys urged that law should be studied as a 
‘discourse about the state of society’.6 Osborne proposed that Athenian law 
provided a framework for dispute settlement which allowed both litigants and 
juries to take account of individuals’ status as well as of the substantive offence 
committed.7 Todd (1993) enlarged on this, proposing that Athenian law should be 
viewed as procedural rather than substantive, with laws used to create processes 
by which disputes could be brought into court, and that classical Athenian law was 
based more on status than on contract.8 He suggested that in a non-professional 
system such as Athens’, the question of how to get a dispute into court was 
probably more pressing than questions of substantive law.  
 
The procedural model proposed by Todd has been misunderstood by some 
scholars, who have attempted to rebut it by arguing that Athenian laws did contain 
substantive provisions. The core of a procedural model of law is the understanding 
that rights exist only subsequent to there existing some process by which those 
 
to his methodology in the book. His work is at times confused and often seems to have lacked the 
space which was needed for so large a study.  
Other studies, such as those by Gernet (1917), Glotz (1904) and Ostwald (1969), treat the fourth 
century as the end point of a period of development, where it is the period of development itself 
that they are interested in studying. Rather than interrogate Athenian law of the fourth century for 
what it meant to fourth-century Athenians, they mine it for remnants of the older laws they are 
interested in studying. 
The series of Symposion conferences and publications, owing in part to their format, focus generally 
on details of substantive law or process, with little exploration of the systems these details 
illuminate.  
5 For the controversy on whether such a body ever existed, see chapter 5.3. 
6 (1985), (1988). 
7 (1985) p. 43. 
8 Todd drew this model from Maine (1883) and Milsom (1969), see Todd (1993) p. 65. 
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rights might be enforced or used. The fineness of this distinction can make it 
difficult to apply this model or understand the consequences of such an application 
for our understanding of a society and its law. I hope that by exploring in more 
detail in this thesis how Athenians viewed their laws, I may be able to develop 
Todd’s work on the different role Athenian law played in Athenian society, 
compared to the role of law in modern democracies.  
 
As part of his argument that Athenian law was primarily procedural, Todd argued 
that in Athenian judging, law was only one piece of evidence, to be weighed along 
with all other evidence in the case.9 Cohen has gone much further, proposing that 
in Athens’ highly agonistic society, court action was used not to resolve disputes 
but to pursue them, and that the role of law in these judgements was often 
negligible.10 Lanni offers an alternative, whereby Athens’ loose rules of relevance 
in most areas of law allowed juries to make decisions which might have been 
viewed by Athenians as just, even where those decisions did not adhere closely to 
the law, while in tightly limited areas of law stricter rules of relevance compelled 
decisions which adhered more closely to the law.11 By examining in more detail 
how law is used and presented in court speeches, I hope to further the 
understanding of how Athenians used law when making decisions in courts. 
 
 
9 Todd (1990a) p. 32. 
10 (1995) p. 183-95. 
11 (2006). Rhodes (2004) also examines the degree to which litigants kept their speeches relevant to 
the point at issue. He takes a broad approach to relevance, which allows him to conclude that the 
majority of speeches in the corpus of forensic oratory are mainly devoted to matters which are 
relevant to the accusation. Rhodes’ broad approach to relevance includes character evidence which 
is used to show the likelihood of a defendant having done or not done the wrong of which he is 
accused, and, where the speech forms part of an ongoing dispute, the full history of that dispute, 
as well as material relating to a person’s political profile where the speech concerns public policy. 
Rhodes’ broad approach to relevance allows him to conclude that jurors were generally expected to 
vote ‘on the matter to which the prosecution pertains’ (Rhodes 2004 p. 137, translating Dem. 24.151). 
Lanni instead sees this as jurors being allowed to take into account matters which, while strictly 
irrelevant to the matter at hand, were relevant to coming to a just decision. The line dividing these 
two positions is extremely fine. In this study I will be looking specifically at the legal arguments in 
speeches and examining how material which might initially seem irrelevant is used to guide 
interpretation of law (Chapters 2 and 3). 
16 
All this work, while of course closely related to law, had as its focus Athenian 
litigation.12 This approach is explicitly argued for by Johnstone, who considers that 
in the Athenian context it is impossible to separate law from litigation.13 By this, 
Johnstone means that in the absence of legal experts, the interpretation of law was 
always done in the course of litigation, and in the absence of clear rules of 
precedent each set of jurors in each case could adopt different interpretations of 
the law. Johnstone’s view that law in Athens was not subject to a single correct 
interpretation is accepted in this thesis, but his opinion that this makes the study 
of law and the study of litigation inseparable is not.14 Athenians did ascribe value 
to their laws and had aspirations for what their laws should achieve which mean 
that the study of Athenian understandings of their law holds value. This tendency 
to treat law and litigation as one and the same, and to allow litigation to dominate 
questions about the nature of law, has meant that Athenian understandings of 
their own law have been neglected in modern scholarship. This is not to say that 
Athens’ laws can or should be studied outside of the context of litigation. Not only 
is most of our evidence on Athenian law drawn from court speeches, litigation 
 
12 A further strand of research which touches on Athenian law is the research on the problem of 
Athenian order. Athens seems to have enjoyed a relatively high level of public order despite a legal 
system which looks ill-suited to achieving this. Ober (1989a; pp. 305-6) approached this through 
the institutions of Athens, including the Athenian law courts, and considered the need for the elite 
to subject themselves to the judgement of the masses to be one of the elements which allowed 
Athenian democracy to remain relatively stable. Hunter (1994) attempted to explain it by proposing 
a polis in which high levels of informal surveillance by friends, family, neighbours and slaves 
contributed to social order. Allen (2000) studied the distinction in Athenian thought between 
punishment and revenge, and considered it to lie in the authority of the punisher, who in her model 
primarily remained an individual. Allen’s work touches on the role of the law in constructing this 
authority, but she considers law not to have been binding on jurors and thinks that it was used in 
litigation as a ‘guideline that jurors could use to assess a prosecutor’s arguments about anger and 
justice’ (p. 175). Allen seems mostly to imagine the laws of Athens as drawing authority from the 
moral norms they express. Lanni (2016) is the latest work to examine it, and proposes a system of 
deterrence based on the high level of litigation at Athens and the possibility that any past misdeed 
might be used against you in court (pp. 119-149). 
In addition to these works, there is a large amount of research on specific areas of Athenian law. 
Hansen’s large body of work on details of Athenian process, for example, is invaluable to any 
researcher. Hansen presents himself as writing without any ideological framework – though see 
Ober (1989b) for a critique of this. 
13 Johnstone (1999) pp. 1-2. 
14 Johnstone does not refer to Dworkin’s work (see Chapter 2), but many of his views appear to have 
been shaped by it. The close link between law and litigation and the importance of studying law 
through litigation forms the core of Dworkin’s work. 
17 
held, as shall be explored in Chapter 2, an important position for allowing 
Athenians to discuss and shape their laws. 
 
In response to the law and society work, and particularly to that of Cohen, Carey15 
and Harris16 have pointed out that Athenian orators do seem to have expected 
jurors to make judgements according to the laws. Carey draws attention to the way 
in which law is privileged as a guide to decision making in Athenian courts through 
the law that citing a non-existent law in court carried the death penalty.17  
 
As a prolific scholar on Athenian law, and the scholar who has most forcefully 
argued that Athenians made judgements according to the laws, Harris has 
produced the body of work most significant for our study. In The Rule of Law in 
Action in Democratic Athens Harris adopts a number of concepts from modern 
legal theory and philosophy of law. Prime among these is the concept of the rule 
of law, a diffuse idea the strong positive ideological overtones of which make it a 
phrase which must be used with caution when applied to a historical society.18 In 
general, the rule of law is analysed by legal theorists as either ‘thick’ or ‘thin’. Thin 
rule of law is essentially procedural: trials are fair, laws are transparent and not 
retroactive. Thick rule of law carries with it not only the procedural rules of thin 
rules of law but also a range of protections for human rights.19 In Harris’s analysis, 
he accepts that Athens had only thin rule of law, but then seems to expect Athens’ 
rule of law to carry at least some of the benefits of thick rule of law. He claims that 
Athens’ laws had two ‘purposes’ – promoting equality before the laws, and shaping 
individuals’ behaviour.20  
 
 
15 (1996). 
16 Particularly Harris (2013) and (2006c). 
17 (1996) p. 34. Our evidence for this is Dem. 26.24. In contrast, other false information in court 
could be challenged only through the dikē pseudomarturion, which could not be used against the 
original litigant. 
18 Harris is far from the only academic to make use of the idea of the rule of law in studies of classical 
Athens. E.g. Ostwald (1986), Sealey (1987), Canevaro (2017). 
19 Bingham (2010) offers a useful introduction to this difficult concept in the modern world. 
20 Harris (2013) acknowledgement of Athens’ ‘thin’ Rule of Law: p. 10; law having as its purpose the 
promotion of equality before the laws: p. 5 and 15; law having as its purpose the shaping of 
behaviour: p. 12 and 16. 
18 
Harris’s championing of the rule of law for democratic Athens is surprising. 
Though, as Harris points out, Athenian orators did on occasion make grand claims 
for their polis’s respect for its laws, the law and society studies have shown 
convincingly that in practice, to judge by the arguments which were used in court, 
Athenians seem not to have lived up to these ideals. Harris rejects the case for the 
Athenians not living up to these ideals by putting more emphasis on the laws 
themselves, and on references to those laws in court, than on the broader run of 
court arguments. He places a great deal of emphasis on the role of the jurors’ oath 
in requiring jurors to judge according to the laws. He observes that statistically 
litigants refer to the clause of the jurors’ oath requiring jurors to judge according 
to the laws far more often than they refer to the clause requiring them to judge by 
their own best judgement.21 He also argues that the oath required jurors to make 
their decision on the charge contained in the engklema or graphē, and that since 
this charge had to have been approved by the magistrate responsible and had to 
specify the law under which the case was being brought, this ‘compelled them to 
prove that the defendant had broken a specific law’.22 Harris rejects 
characterisation of Athenian law as procedural, though he does so based on a 
practising-law definition of procedural law, rather than the legal-historical 
definition used by Todd.23  
 
Harris dedicates two chapters of Rule of Law in Action to what he terms ‘open 
texture’ in Athenian law.24 The term ‘open texture’ comes from Hart’s The Concept 
of Law,25 and was introduced into the discussion of Athenian law by Osborne 
(1985).26 Hart argued for a model of positivist law (law which is law because of how 
it was made) based in popular acceptance of the authority of that law. In positivist 
models of law, the discretion exercised by judges when making judicial decisions 
is a problem, since that discretion to interpret law does not come from the 
 
21 ibid, p. 104. But see chapter 4.3.2.1 below. 
22 ibid, pp. 114-136. 
23 ibid. p. 139. 
24 Harris (2013) pp. 175-246.  
25 Hart (1961) 
26 Though Osborne seems to use it simply to designate the procedural flexibility offered by Athenian 
law. 
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authority of the law itself. Open texture is the answer Hart came up with to explain 
how it is that judges can legitimately interpret law. He argues that it is impossible 
to have laws which govern all possible situations, and as such law must be 
understood to have some degree of ‘open texture’, which allows judges to be able 
to apply discretion when applying laws in difficult cases, without this causing 
damage to the system of laws as a whole. Open texture, then, is an answer to a 
question, but whether this was a question Athenians might have been likely to ask 
will be explored in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Harris seems to attempt to use open 
texture to explain such difficult cases as Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates, where it is 
not entirely clear that Leocrates has committed any breach of Athens’ laws. For 
Harris, open texture allows court decisions to be based on law even where the 
correct interpretation of the law is in doubt. That Athenian juries were expected 
to interpret the law cannot be doubted27 but whether Hart’s model of open texture 
is a valuable one to apply to Athens is more questionable. The anxiety around 
judges interpreting law is a problem only if you consider the authority of law to 
depend on the means by which it was made. I shall discuss where Athenian law got 
its authority from at greater length below, but it is sufficient here to point out that 
although Harris relies heavily on the work of Hart, a positivist, Harris seems to 
expect Athenian law to have depended for its authority on moral ideals. Harris’s 
work on ‘open texture’ exemplifies the risks inherent in attempting to study 
Athenian law without thoroughly questioning the assumptions brought to that 
study by the models adopted.  
 
The division of scholarly opinion as to what jurors took into consideration when 
they made their decisions has become increasingly entrenched, with persuasive 
arguments on both sides. This thesis seeks to address only a small part of this 
difficult question; by investigating how Athenians saw their law, the tensions 
inherent in their images of law, and the goals they seem to have had for it, it offers 
a tool for those who would further explore how the law, understood in Athenian 
 
27 See Chapter 2. 
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terms, might be used in decision making in court, or the nature of the work 
Athenian legislators understood themselves to be doing. 
 
In modern legal-theory scholarship, there is an ongoing debate on the authority 
and nature of law. Arguments can be broadly separated into positivist28 and natural 
law models. Positivist models argue that law derives its authority from the means 
by which it was made. In its simplest, and now long-outdated form, it was treated 
by Austin as the command of a sovereign, backed by force.29 Though Austin’s 
formulation has been abandoned, his central argument, that law is a matter of 
social fact, has held. The most influential legal theorist of the twentieth century, 
Hart, was highly critical of Austin’s ‘command’ model of law, especially in its failure 
to take into account the social fact that within British society, as he saw it, people 
recognised not so much a compulsion to obey the law, as an obligation. People, in 
Hart’s version of the law, do not obey the law out of fear of the sanctions, but 
because they recognise that they ‘ought’ to do so.30 Rather than attribute this to 
any connection with the moral content of the law, Hart treated this social fact as 
the basis of the authority of law. Law is law because it is recognised as such by the 
people who use it. Hart described this as the Rule of Recognition. Hart maintained 
that a morally bad law might still be valid law, though since in Hart’s model the 
obligation to obey is social fact, and not moral obligation, a person living within 
that legal system is still morally free to refuse to obey that law.31   
 
This refusal within positivism to recognise the moral role of law within modern 
societies has been criticised. Hart’s claim that the obligation to obey law is a 
custom, and not a true obligation, was disputed by Fuller, who viewed the 
obligation to obey laws as a true obligation.32 The question of whether the 
obligation to obey law is a real obligation has come to divide positivists from those 
who consider that morality has a part to play in the nature of law. 
 
28 Within this thesis, the term positivist will always refer to this model of law. 
29 (1832). 
30 (1961: 1994) pp. 18-25. 
31 ibid. p. 268. 
32 (1958). 
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The most prominent modern criticism of positivism comes from Dworkin, who 
rejects the whole premise that law is social fact divorced/divorceable from its 
moral content.33 Dworkin considers the legal system to be a use by the state of 
coercive force against its citizens, and on this basis argues that such use of force 
has to be justified by moral principles. Dworkin looked at how judges decide cases, 
and identified their use of principles in making judicial decisions. Whereas within 
a positivist model, this use of judicial discretion is something which needs to be 
explained away, for Dworkin it is a central element of the law. 
 
These theories seek to expound a truth of modern law. This is not my goal in this 
thesis, which instead seeks to understand some of the attitudes and expectations 
which Athenians might have held towards their own laws.34   However, these, as 
the most important modern theories on the nature of the law as we know it today, 
give useful tools to help modern scholars to unpick our attitudes on the nature of 
law. Dworkin’s methods were designed to understand Anglo-American courtroom 
judging, whereas Hart’s methods are far more focused on statutes. As such, 
Dworkin’s work, used sensitively, is remarkably appropriate to studying Athenian 
law, given that our sources for Athenian law come primarily from Athenian courts. 
By bringing Dworkin’s insights into play in a field where Hart’s have previously 
been the only ones used, we are able to acquire a more rounded view of how 
Athenians understood their laws. 
 
The first chapter of the thesis looks at the Thirty’s attempts at law-making and the 
response of the restored democracy to these attempts. By focusing on this crisis-
point in the Athenian democracy, it aims to highlight some of the difficulties 
Athenians had with their own law. Although the Amnesty enabled Athens to avoid 
some of the self-examination that was seen in  Europe immediately after the 
 
33 (1998). 
34 Though these attitudes have significance for the working of the legal system. Law is a social 
construct, and Athens, lacking legal experts and relying on idiotai for both legislating and judging, 
gave more scope than most societies for popular attitudes towards the law to shape decisions within 
the polis. 
22 
Second World War,35 especially when trying to deal with people who had acted in 
ways considered by the new government to be wrongful but which were lawful 
under the previous government, the restored democracy’s reactions to the law-
making of the Thirty are nonetheless indicative of some of the ambiguities and 
difficulties in Athenians’ understanding of their law.  
 
Chapter Two uses Dworkin’s ‘interpretativism’ model to explore some of the 
principles which Athenians appear to have used to guide interpretation of laws. 
The chapter focuses on the use of arguments based on justice for the individual 
and arguments based on community expediency. By concentrating on these two 
arguments, the chapter aims to bring into focus the distinction between modern 
conceptions of the purpose of laws and Athenian conceptions. Chapter Three 
continues with the use of interpretativism to look at how Athenian litigants used 
arguments based in morality to guide interpretations of laws, and interrogates how 
widely Athenians accepted that the laws had as their purpose the shaping of citizen 
behaviour in accordance with popular morality.  
 
Following on from the exploration of morality in Chapter Three, Chapter Four 
further explores how far morality was accepted as the source of authority for 
Athenian law by studying Athenian attitudes towards the obligation to obey law. 
By highlighting some of the problems and controversies within Athenian thinking 
about the enforcement of law and the obligation to obey law, the chapter aims to 
show that there existed in Athens no strong sense of duty to obey law, and no 
strong interest in the enforcement of law, thus further undermining arguments 
that Athenian law was primarily imagined as a natural law system.  
 
Chapter Five moves on to consider how far Athenian law can be treated as 
positivist. The chapter looks at the nature of the imagined character of the 
nomothetēs in classical Athens. It explores the stories about Solon current in the 
classical period and examines the different versions these offer of the sources of 
 
35 As best exemplified in the series of articles published in 1958 that have come to be known as the 
‘Hart-Fuller debate’ (Harvard Law Review 1958). 
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the authority of Solon’s law, and how these sources affect our understanding of 
Athenians’ conceptions of their law. It then looks at the figure of the law-giver 
within a law-making democracy, and highlights the problems Athenians had with 
identifying their contemporaries as legitimate law-givers. By questioning how far 
law made through the proper procedures was accepted and acceptable as law, the 
chapter brings to the foreground the dangers inherent in assuming modern 
positivist theories of law are applicable to Athens.  
 
Chapter Six looks through Athenian eyes at the law of Sparta. By highlighting the 
ways in which Sparta’s laws differed from those of Athens and Athenians’ responses 
to those differences, it explores the flexibility of conceptions of law.  
 
In a short conclusion, I summarise the original arguments of the thesis and 
comment on their implications for other areas of study of Athenian law. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE THIRTY, THEIR LAWS AND THEIR 
FOURTH-CENTURY RECEPTION 
 
 
At the end of the fifth century, the Athenian democracy was twice overthrown and 
replaced by oligarchic regimes, first in 411 by the Four Hundred, and again in 404 
by the Thirty. Neither of these regimes was long lived, but the experience of them 
appears to have triggered a process of legal reform which began after the fall of the 
Four Hundred, was interrupted by the Thirty, and was resumed under the restored 
democracy. The Thirty ruled the city for only around eight months, but in the 
space of that time they expelled all but three thousand citizens from the city, 
installed a Spartan garrison, and killed possibly as many as 1,500 citizens as well as 
many metics and confiscated their property.1 The exiled democrats fought an 
armed resistance against the oligarchs and seized the Piraeus. The privileged 
citizens remaining in the city then expelled the Thirty, but did not return the city 
to democracy, and in 403 the Spartan king Pausanias was instrumental in 
negotiating a settlement between the democrats and those in the city. After a 
period of about two years when Athens was democratic and the oligarchs ran 
Eleusis as an independent polis, Athens invaded Eleusis and Attica returned to 
being a single democratic polis. 
 
By focusing on the response to the Thirty’s attempts at making law it is possible to 
highlight key areas of interest in Athenians’ perceptions of what gave law its 
authority and where the limits of a government’s power to make law lay. The rule 
of the Thirty brings up a range of questions about Athenian law: how far was law 
merely the orders of the body in the polis which was kurios, and how far did it have 
 
1 According to Ath. Pol. 35.4. Though statistics from the ancient world are hard to rely on, the large 
number of deaths forms a part of the perception of the Thirty, regardless of its truth. 
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to comply with popularly accepted standards of morality? How far was law given 
its authority by the limited coercive role of the polis? Does a government have to 
be legitimately appointed if it is to have the capacity to create laws?  
 
The legal reforms at the end of the fifth century have attracted a great deal of 
scholarly interest, but the law of the Thirty has been comparatively neglected. 
Writing in 2003, Osborne summarised the ‘orthodox view’ of the Thirty as rejecting 
the idea that the Thirty made any attempt at genuine constitutional reform.2 One 
contributing factor to this may be the ambivalent approach taken by our sources 
to the use the Thirty made of the law. Another aspect is almost certainly the effects 
of the Amnesty which ended the civil war and which was so wide in its scope that 
it prevented fourth-century Athenians for the most part from having to deal with 
the difficult question of whether people who acted on the orders of the Thirty had 
in fact been breaking the law or whether they had been complying with it.3  
 
Sources for the rule of the Thirty are relatively plentiful. The Aristotelian 
Athenaion Politeia devotes a section to their rule over Athens, the civil war, and 
their downfall.4 Xenophon also writes about the Thirty, most likely from first hand 
experience.5 Diodorus Siculus includes an account of their rule probably taken 
from neither Xenophon nor the Ath. Pol.6 In addition, the Thirty are mentioned in 
many court cases. They are especially prominent in the work of Lysias, whose own 
family suffered persecution under the Thirty. These sources, however, need to be 
used carefully, since, despite the Amnesty, the question of one’s behaviour under 
the Thirty remained so important that how to interpret the actions of the Thirty 
was a matter of live debate during the fourth century. Pamphleteers seem to have 
 
2 Osborne (2003) p. 262. 
3 The Amnesty has been much discussed. For the most recent in-depth work, see Carawan (2011), 
who gives a history of scholarship on the Amnesty (pp. 21-42) – Joyce (2008) has argued forcefully 
against many of Carawan’s conclusions on the effects of the Amnesty. Lanni (2011) identifies the 
Amnesty as a form of transitional justice. 
4 Ath. Pol. 34.3-41.1. 
5 Xen. Hel. 2.3.1-3 and 2.3.11-2.4.33. 
6 Diodorus Siculus Book XIV. The Oxyrhynchus Historian via Ephorus is the most likely source for 
Diodorus. Since the Oxyrhynchus Historian seems to have had a particular interest in 
constitutional matters, they might have given the Thirty special attention.  
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attempted soon after the restoration of democracy to rehabilitate Theramenes, one 
of the Thirty, as a moderate and restrained oligarch who wanted only the good of 
the city, as opposed to the other oligarchs whose greed and brutality caused their 
downfall, and Diodorus Siculus and the Ath. Pol. seem to have depended at least 
partly on these revisionist accounts.7 Certainly it is difficult to fix the chronology 
of when the brutality of the Thirty began.8 Speeches in court cases similarly serve 
the ends of the speaker and must be read with caution. 
 
The appointment of the Thirty is one of the areas where the pro- and anti-
Theramenes traditions lead to confusion. Whereas Lysias (12.71–7) has Theramenes 
participating in a plot to keep the Assembly from meeting until a Spartan garrison 
was in the city, and records Theramenes as urging the Athenians to adopt the 
proposal of Dracontides and establish the rule of the Thirty, the Ath. Pol. (34.3) 
presents Theramenes as leading a moderate third faction separate from the 
oligarchs and the democrats.9 Both Lysias and the Ath. Pol. agree that Lysander 
was present at the Assembly meeting, and that his support on behalf of the 
oligarchs was decisive, and in Diodorus Siculus the appointment of the Thirty was 
entirely the fault of Lysander. Lysias deliberately distances the Athenians from the 
decision of that Assembly, claiming that at first the people in the Assembly 
protested at Theramenes’ insistence that the proposal of Dracontides be adopted, 
and then, after Lysander made his threats, ‘those members of the Assembly who 
were honest citizens recognised conspiracy and compulsion’ and some of those 
stayed silent and some left. Those who voted the motion through are described as 
‘a few evil minded ponēroi’.10 The Ath. Pol.’s account, while recognising the effect 
of Lysander’s support for the oligarchs, does not attempt to split the citizen body 
into honest men who stayed silent and wicked men who voted, but does report 
 
7 Rhodes (1981) pp. 415-22 notes that the Ath. Pol. compiler did also seem to make use of 
documentary evidence, as shown by the use of the names of decree proposers and, perhaps, by the 
claim that the Thirty initially ruled mildly. 
8 Rhodes (1981) p. 416-19 contains a useful table contrasting the order of events under the Thirty 
according to the different sources.  
9 Whereas Diod. Sic. 14.3.6 has Theramenes actively oppose the establishment of the oligarchy. 
10 Lys. 12.75. Trans. Todd (2000a) adapted. 
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that the demos was forced (ēnagkasthē) to vote for the oligarchy.11 Xenophon’s 
account mentions none of this, only that the Assembly decided to elect Thirty men, 
and that after their election Lysander left Athens.12 Clearly an Assembly meeting 
was held, and it seems likely that Lysander did attend, or at the very least 
overshadow it. Nonetheless, the Thirty’s seizure of power was not achieved entirely 
outside of the laws of the polis;13 a meeting was held and a vote passed to establish 
their authority. Despite this, the vote was not free but occurred in a situation of 
threat from the Spartans and internal paranoia.14 Though it could subsequently be 
partially disowned, as Lysias shows at 12.71-74, while the Thirty were in power they 
could have claimed to have been validly appointed under the laws.15   
 
 
1.1 Legislative acts of the Thirty 
 
It will be observed in this chapter that I take a broad approach to what I treat as 
‘law’. In part, this is a reflection of the fact that the distinction created in Athens 
between nomoi and other legislative acts post-dates the Thirty. There are also 
questions to be asked about what the Thirty would have imagined themselves to 
be engaged in. As I explore below (chapter 5.2), it is not entirely clear that fifth-
century Athenians fully acknowledged themselves as lawgivers. From what we 
know of the Thirty, it would be highly surprising if they recognised themselves as 
creating new laws. More likely, they would have presented themselves as 
 
11 Ath. Pol. 34.3. 
12 Xen. Hel. 2.3.2. 
13 Contrast the Four Hundred, the rule of which was established by an Assembly which met at 
Colonus rather than on the Pnyx, probably bearing weapons, and whose first act was a knife attack 
on the boulē, Thuc. 8. 67, 69. 
14 Lysias 13.6-35. 
15 The response of the restored democracy to the appointment of the Thirty is notable in its attempts 
to shift blame away from those present at the Assembly, but as Thucydides’ Diodotus complains in 
the Mytilenean debate (3.43.5), Athenians are usually quick to hold the proposer responsible, but 
unwilling to allow the demos to carry any blame for its decisions. This can be seen in the probole 
passed against those who proposed the execution of the Generals at Arginusae (Xen. Hel. 1.7.35). 
Perhaps the scale of Athenians’ cooperation with the regime of the Thirty contributed to a greater 
need to shift blame than could be satisfied by placing all responsibility on the individual proposers. 
Though there are other occasions where it seems some Athenians might have felt uncomfortable 
to express dissent in the Assembly (e.g. Thuc. 6.13.1), this is due to pressure from other Athenians 
and not threats from an occupying military force. 
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correcting a legal system which had become corrupted, and returning it to its 
original, Solonian state.16 Their opponents would of course have disputed that the 
Thirty’s vision for Athens accorded with Solon’s, as both democrats and oligarchs 
at this time seem to have claimed Solon’s support for their own vision for Athens.17 
The subsequent treatment of the Thirty’s attempts at legal change merit interest, 
since though the Thirty may not have presented or imagined themselves as 
legislating, our sources all date from after the fall of the Thirty, when the fourth-
century democracy had to grapple with the effects of the legislative activities of the 
Thirty, without being in any position to treat this activity as a rectification of 
Athens’ laws. 
 
Xenophon claims that the Thirty did not write, or at any rate publish, any laws, but 
in context he seems to mean rather that they did not write or publish any 
‘constitutional’ laws.18 Indeed Krentz identifies from Xenophon two laws which he 
considers to have been laws of the Thirty.19 The Ath. Pol. mentions the Thirty 
reforming Solonian inheritance law and destroying the laws limiting the powers of 
the Areopagus.20 Fingarette considers the erasures on the wall of the stoa basileios 
to have been made by the Thirty in order to make space for their new lawcode.21 
Osborne argues that the Thirty set out initially to achieve constitutional reform, 
and only later adopted the violent tyranny for which they are remembered.22 
Krentz even considers the Thirty to have been in the process of trying to establish 
in Athens a constitution modelled on that of Sparta.23 One could question whether 
it would have been possible for them to rule at all without making laws of some 
 
16 Ath. Pol. 35.2  
17 Hansen (1989a). 
18 Xen. Hel. 2.3.11 ‘Though they were elected to write down (sungrapsai) laws according to which 
they would govern, they delayed writing down and displaying them; and they appointed a boulē 
and magistrates as they saw fit.’ – translation my own. For the difficulty in interpreting sungraphein 
in the context of legislative activity, see chapter 5.3.  
19 Krentz (1982) p. 60 - Xen. Hel. 2.3.51 – the ‘new laws’ concerning the list of three thousand citizens 
and the powers of the Thirty cited by Critias at the trial of Theramenes, and Xen. Mem. I.2.31 – a 
ban on the teaching of techne logon. 
20 Ath. Pol. 35.2. The Solonian inheritance law is particularly singled out for its vagueness at Ath. 
Pol. 9.2. 
21 Fingarette (1971). 
22 Osborne (2003). 
23 Krentz (1982) p. 61. 
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sort, let alone to attempt the constitutional reforms they appear to have embarked 
on.  
 
When considering the legislation of the Thirty, it is important to remember that 
the reign of the Thirty predates the creation of a distinction in Athenian law 
between laws (nomoi) and decrees (psēphismata), though the process of law 
reform had begun before the Thirty took control.24 This lack of distinction means 
that under the fifth-century democracy, decisions of the Assembly might be 
referred to interchangeably as laws or decrees.25 The Thirty purported to be the 
legally appointed government of Athens, and regardless of the merits of this 
appointment, were the de facto government, so their decisions should, at the time, 
have been considered to have the same legal force as those of the Assembly under 
the democracy.  
 
Although the Thirty quickly made themselves unpopular, both Ath. Pol. 35.3 and 
Lysias 25.19 record that at the beginning of their regime they had the support of 
much of the city.26 Though their rule was subsequently viewed as illegitimate, at 
the time it seems that the irregularities in their establishment did not prevent their 
governmental authority at Athens from being accepted. Krentz assumes a high 
level of cooperation with the rule of the Thirty, based on the fact that it is 
remarkable that Socrates limits himself to failing to obey an order, without ever 
 
24 Lysias 30.2. 
25 Hansen (1978a). 
26 Lys. 25.19 argues that he should not now be convicted, because under the Thirty people initially 
consented to the oppression of the sykophants and those who had robbed the treasury, but then 
became angry when the whole population was held to be responsible for the crimes of a few, and 
yet by prosecuting the defendant for complicity in the rule of the Thirty that is exactly what the 
prosecutor in the case is doing. 
The Ath. Pol. 53.3 similarly comments on the early oppression of sykophants, along with other 
unsavoury (but not specifically criminal) people, and adds that the polis was delighted at this, until 
the Thirty began to kill the wealthy to prevent opposition and steal their estates. 
Christ (1992) argues that the Thirty used sykophancy as a catch-all term of abuse under which to 
persecute their enemies, but his argument is not entirely convincing. Xen. Hel. 2.3.12-13 very clearly 
separates the first stage of persecution of sykophants (with which people agreed) from the 
subsequent descent into brutality. Moreover it is doubtful whether, if sykophant had been used as 
a catch-all term of abuse by the Thirty to allow them to persecute citizens generally perceived as 
good, it would have retained the power it still appears to have held in the fourth century. 
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attempting to resist it.27 On the other hand, Lysias 12.14-17 claims that Damnippus 
was willing to help Lysias flee to safety, and that Archeneos not only sheltered him 
and helped his escape, but also went into town to find out what had happened to 
Lysias’s brother; so a few citizens may have been willing to offer the Thirty some 
limited resistance. Socrates himself may have refused the order to arrest Leon, but 
he did obey the Thirty’s instruction to attend the tholos, thus perhaps suggesting 
that he acknowledged their authority to give some orders.  
 
 
1.2 Responses of the restored democracy to the Thirty 
 
After the Thirty were deposed the restored democracy responded in various ways 
to the consequences of the regulatory and legislative decisions made by the Thirty. 
Some acts of the Thirty seem to have been wiped out and assumed to have been 
invalid ab initio. Others were deliberately annulled, and still others appear to have 
been respected by the restored democracy. 
 
One example of the restored democracy assuming a decision of the Thirty to have 
been void ab initio is the claim, made by both Diodorus Siculus and Xenophon,28 
that the Athenians considered the year the Thirty were in power to have been a 
year without an eponymous archon, as the archon appointed by the Thirty was not 
subsequently recognised. Similarly, we see the demand made by the restored 
democracy that those who had served in the cavalry under the Thirty return the 
equipment allowance they had been granted, presumably because the Thirty were 
not recognised to have the authority to disburse public funds.29 Though this 
implies an attitude that the legislative acts of the Thirty were void ab initio, since 
the Thirty never possessed the authority to make such decisions, it does not show 
clearly why the Thirty could be portrayed as lacking this authority. A consideration 
of the legislative acts of the Thirty which were not merely disregarded by the 
 
27 Krentz (1982) p. 83. 
28 Diod. Sic. 14.3.1, Xen. Hel. 2.3.1.  
29 Lys. 16.6, though some motivation for this decision may also lie in the resentment against the 
cavalry shown by the restored democracy – Xen. Hel. 3.1.4. 
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democracy might give us more of an idea of how the restored democracy viewed 
the Thirty’s attempts to make law. 
 
After the Thirty had left the city and the treaty had been made to allow the return 
of the men from the Piraeus, we are told it was decided that a committee of twenty 
men was to govern the city until such time as laws should be made (tetheien),30 
and that in the meantime the laws of Solon and Draco should be used.31 This at 
least suggests that at the time the democrats returned to the city it was not certain 
whether there was any law operative at all. The important fact here is that a 
decision needed to be made as to what law governed the city. The laws of Solon 
and Draco are generally considered to have been the foundation of Athens’ law;32 
had the restored democracy simply continued as if the Thirty had had no capacity 
to make or change laws at all, one might presume that no such decision would 
have been needed. The fact that it was suggests the restored democracy 
recognising that the rule of the Thirty had had some effect on the laws of Athens. 
Though the returning democrats can be presumed to have considered that effect 
to have been entirely negative, they did not deny that it existed. Here we see the 
democracy making decisions to ensure that the laws of the Thirty should be voided, 
rather than simply assuming them always to have been void. The Thirty was 
recognised to have had the capacity to have some effect on the laws, despite being 
a non-democratic government which was not validly appointed. 
 
30 Tithemi verbs in relation to Greek law are difficult to translate well, given the significance in this 
area of both the nomothetēs and thesmos.  
31 Andoc. 1.81 δόξαντα δὲ ὑμῖν ταῦτα εἵλεσθε ἄνδρας εἴκοσι: τούτους δὲ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς πόλεως, ἕως 
ἂν οἱ νόμοι τεθεῖεν: τέως δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς Σόλωνος νόμοις καὶ τοῖς Δράκοντος θεσμοῖς. This passage 
is subject to some textual uncertainty. In Dobree’s edition, the an is placed in square brackets, and 
it is not translated in the Loeb edition’s translation. Stahl proposed instead emending the an to alloi 
and this was followed by MacDowell (1962). This emendation changes the meaning of the sentence 
somewhat. Without alloi the implication is that at the time the decision was made, it was at least 
arguable that Athens had no laws. With alloi the implication is that Athens already has the laws of 
Solon and Draco in place to rely on, but also needs other laws to be made. MacDowell (1962) p. 120-
121 suggests that the use of alloi might imply that at the time the provision was made the Athenians 
envisaged that the new laws would come to supersede the laws of Solon and Draco. See Chapter 5 
for an exploration of why it is unlikely this was ever intended by the Athenians. 
Xen. Hel. 2.4.42 claims that on returning to the city, Thrasybulus urged the citizens, both from the 
Piraeus and from the city, to use the arkhaioi nomoi, which may be a reference to the same decision 
to use the laws of Solon and Draco.  
32 See 5.1 
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From a series of inscriptions, it appears that the Thirty tore down the stelai 
recording various proxeny decrees awarded by the democracy and after the 
restoration of the democracy these decrees were reinscribed.33 The reinscription of 
the decrees, however, did not follow normal democratic process34 but instead 
appears to have been handled entirely by the Council. The most complete surviving 
reinscription, IG II2 6 (RO 177B), makes it clear that this is a reinscription to replace 
the stele destroyed by the Thirty. It appears that though the reinscription does not 
take the form of a new proxeny decree, Eurypylos, one of the recipients is 
nonetheless invited for dinner at the prytaneion tomorrow, as is common in new 
grants of proxeny. Whether this is simply a formulaic repetition of the contents of 
the original decree, or whether it is a genuine invitation is unclear. The degree to 
which the invitation is genuine could have importance in asking whether this is a 
copy of the old proxeny decree, or whether it is a new proxeny decree granted to 
replace the one annulled by the Thirty. The reinscription could be portrayed as an 
assertion by the restored democracy of continuity with the pre-404 democracy, but 
the use of a special procedure and the explicit reference to the Thirty draws 
attention to the disruption as much as it asserts continuity. Had the Thirty been 
generally acknowledged never to have had any effect on the law at all, the proxeny 
decrees could simply have been reinscribed by a workman, but as it is what we see 
is a new decree, paid for by one of the recipients and not attempting to be a replica 
of the original decree, which reasserts the validity of the original grant of proxeny. 
The attempt by the Thirty to annul the grant of proxeny is thus denied any effect, 
but this denial has to be made explicit. As such, the capacity of the Thirty to create 
valid law remains in question. Clearly this legislative act has been voided, but that 
does not mean that all legislative acts of the Thirty are void, nor does it mean that 
the Thirty never had the capacity to perform any valid legislative acts. 
 
 
33 IG II2 6, IG II2 52, IG II2 9, IG II2 66c. Here the fifth-century failure to distinguish between laws and 
decrees is again worth remembering. 
34 Fourth-century proxeny decrees still went through the Assembly – IG II3 1 390. 
34 
The law of Diocles35 takes a slightly different approach to the problems caused to 
the democracy by the Thirty’s attempts to create law. This law, which Hansen36 
identifies with the law cited by Andocides in On the Mysteries that Andocides tries 
to use to establish a clean start in the law from the archonship of Eucleides,37 seems 
to have been intended to annul all legislative acts of the Thirty, but rather than 
doing so explicitly it instead asserts ‘that laws enacted under democratic 
government before the archonship of Eucleides and all laws that were enacted 
during the archonship of Eucleides and are on record shall be in force.’ This 
strange, roundabout formulation effectively allowed the restored democracy to 
annul the laws made by the Thirty while simultaneously ignoring the existence of 
those laws.38 Although in the context of modern law the annulment of valid laws 
by a newer, contradictory law is unremarkable, Athenian legal procedure generally 
gave priority to the older law. Indeed, at around this time, a new procedure was 
introduced which required anyone who wished to propose a new law which 
contradicted an older law first to have that older law specifically annulled.39 The 
situation prior to the creation of a distinction between laws and decrees, and the 
corresponding distinction between the graphē paranomōn and the graphē nomon 
mē epitēdeion theinai, is not clear, but the graphē paranomōn did exist during the 
fifth century and may have been used to prosecute new laws or decrees which 
contravened existing ones.40 The restored democracy, however, did not annul the 
laws of the Thirty individually, but instead asserted that they were not and had 
 
35 Dem 24.42. 
36 Hansen (1990). 
37 Andoc. 1.88. 
38 Shear (2011) p. 239 instead interprets the law as intended to reinstate those laws which had been 
destroyed by the Thirty. If this is the case it would suggest that the restored democracy was able to 
completely ignore the existence of those laws passed by the Thirty. Carawan (2002) claims that the 
law given in Andocides does not apply to the existence of laws, but to their enforcement, such that 
the stipulation that laws should only be applied from the archonship of Eucleides acts as a sort of 
statute of limitations.  Carawan’s characterisation of the law does not fit with its use by Andocides, 
nor does it accord with the failure to make use of the law in Isoc. 18 when defending alleged acts 
committed before the restoration of the democracy. It seems likely the law was generally 
understood at the time to relate to the validity of laws and not to their applicability. 
39 Dem. 20.89, 93 – Though this is presented by Demosthenes as Solonian, the distinction between 
laws and decrees it assumes is a part of the reforms of the end of the fifth century. The implications 
of this law are explored in Chapter 5. 
40 Ath. Pol 29.4 and Thuc. 8.67.2 – the Four Hundred abolished the suit, so it must have existed 
prior to 411. See Canevaro (2015). Hansen (1974) p 28-29 identifies Andoc. 1.17, 22 as a graphē 
paranomōn which can be dated to 415. 
35 
never been laws. One might argue that the formulation of the decree shows the 
restored democracy asserting that only democratic regimes could be legitimate 
governments of Athens capable of making laws. This argument would be stronger 
had the law specified the post-Eucleides regime as democratic, but this might have 
seemed so self-evident to Athenians at the time that there was no need to include 
it within the decree. This, then, at least suggests an identification of legislative 
authority with governmental authority – only a legitimate government is capable 
of making laws, and only a democratic government can legitimately rule at Athens. 
 
A few governmental acts of the Thirty do seem to have received some recognition 
from the democracy. Carawan considers there to have been a relatively peaceful 
handover of the treasury from the tamiai appointed by the Thirty to the democratic 
tamiai,41 and Lewis even suggested that the oligarchic tamiai may have remained 
in post longer than usual until conditions in the city were sufficiently settled to 
manage an orderly transfer.42 Unlike the response to the Thirty’s appointment of 
an eponymous archon, this implies a degree of recognition of the legitimacy of the 
oligarchic tamiai, but it may reflect a simple practical need; the new tamiai needed 
a record of what they had taken into their control in order to be able to pass their 
own euthynai at the end of their term of office. 
 
The fragmentary speech Against Hippotherses43 shows a clause in the Amnesty44 
which gave at least some recognition to the governmental acts of the Thirty. The 
Amnesty provided that property confiscated by the oligarchs from exiled 
democrats should be returned as long as it was still in public hands, but if it had 
been sold on it could not be recovered. In effect, this meant that the contracts 
which had been entered into under the Thirty remained valid, but the confiscation 
itself was rendered invalid. This clause appears to attempt a compromise between 
 
41 Carawan (2013) p. 41. 
42 Lewis (1997) p. 210. 
43 frag. 165 lines 38-43 [Carey]. 
44 See below. 
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on the one hand denying validity to the original confiscation and on the other 
avoiding bringing the ownership of property now in private hands into debate.  
 
The Thirty are commonly characterised as ruling by force.45 As we shall show at 
4.3.3, the difference between rule by force and rule by law was significant in fourth-
century Athens, with rule by force rejected as illegitimate. In the fifth century, 
however, the debate as to the role and value of force in undermining authority 
seems to have been less settled, with nomos and phusis more often contrasted. This 
rejection of force as an aspect of law may play a part in how the rule of the Thirty 
is presented in fourth-century court cases. Though the defendant in Lysias 12 on 
trial for his actions under the Thirty claims to have acted out of fear,46 he does not 
impute any legitimacy to the orders he claims to have been given. As we have 
noted, Socrates, who was depicted as so law-abiding that he chose to accept the 
death sentence rather than flee into exile, was happy to disregard an order of the 
Thirty which commanded him to arrest a citizen.47 The rule of the Thirty came to 
be characterised as achieving the opposite of what any just rule should achieve, in 
that it rewarded the wicked and punished the good.48 When Athens set up a decree 
honouring the heroes at Phyle, inscribed on it was the following epigram: ‘the 
ancient people of Athens rewarded these men with crowns for excellence, because 
they first began to stop those ruling the city with unjust statutes (adikois thesmois) 
risking bodily danger.’49 The use of thesmos rather than nomos is interesting. 
Ostwald has shown that thesmos had mostly fallen out of use by the fifth century, 
to be replaced by nomos.50 Ostwald considers thesmos to designate law which is 
handed down and which depends for its authority on the person of the lawgiver. 
Nomos, by contrast, he interprets as an essentially democratic form of law, 
dependent on community acceptance. The use of thesmos in this inscription, 
 
45 Consider, for example, the claim in Xen. Hel. 2.4.21 that the Thirty killed more Athenians in eight 
months than the Spartans did in the whole war, or the Ath. Pol. 35.2 assertion that the Thirty killed 
1500 people. 
46 Lys. 12.25-6, 50, 90-91. 
47 Pl. Cri, Xen. Mem. 4.4.1-3, Pl. Ap. 32c-d, though he did respect the oligarchy’s order to attend the 
tholos to be given the order to arrest Leon. 
48 Isoc. 18.16-17. 
49 Aeschin. 3.190. 
50 Ostwald (1969). 
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coupled with adikos, may underline the element of force in the rule of the Thirty; 
rather than ruling by consent as is implied by nomos, they ruled by force, and what 
little authority their orders held came from the fear of repercussions, not from 
popular acceptance of the law. All of this combines to undermine the authority of 
the Thirty’s rule over Athens.51 
 
Some answer to how it is we have so little understanding of the law under the 
Thirty may lie in the terms of the Amnesty. The Amnesty took the form of an oath 
sworn between the men of the Piraeus and the men of the city, and forbade anyone 
to mnēsikakein, or remember wrongs.52 The exceptions to this amnesty can be 
roughly summarised as the Thirty themselves,53 the Eleven, the Ten, and those who 
had killed by their own hand. Though court speeches from the fourth-century 
democracy show that Athenians did not hold perfectly to the Amnesty, they did so 
well enough to allow Athens to return to political stability. This Amnesty may have 
limited our understanding of the law under the Thirty for the simple reason that 
those who had done harm on the orders of the Thirty and who might otherwise 
have had to claim that they were following the law, thus forcing Athens to confront 
whether the Thirty really had made law or not, were protected by the Amnesty. 
 
51 It may be observed against this that the Athenians chose to use the thesmoi of Draco alongside 
the nomoi of Solon- Andoc. 1.81. Draco’s laws were, however, conventionally referred to as thesmoi 
and notorious for their harshness. The passage of time may have lent them respectability, but they 
are not a product of the democracy and Draco is never co-opted as a proto-democrat as Solon is. 
52 Carawan (2013) argues that me mnesikakein was never an overriding amnesty agreement, but 
rather part of the oath sworn to uphold the reconciliation agreements. Carawan considers there to 
have been a patchwork of agreements, treaties and laws which together allowed Athens to return 
to peace and democracy, but which never offered blanket forgiveness (his term) for all wrongs 
committed in the past (pp. 43-65). In this way, Carawan hopes to address the fact that reconciliation 
itself was a multi-stage process, first allowing the oligarchs to retreat to Eleusis and establish a 
separate community there, before then reintegrating those who had fled to Eleusis back into the 
citizen body after Eleusis was invaded by Athens two years later. While Carawan's work does well 
to ground the Amnesty in legislation, the evidence seems to suggest a wider Amnesty than he will 
allow for. Andocides’ already thin (yet successful) defence in On the Mysteries would be barely 
comprehensible outside of an agreement which forbade prosecution for all past wrongs, and while 
Carawan may be right to argue that forgiveness as a virtue would have been alien to the Athenians, 
this does not mean that the pragmatic advantages of forgetting were lost to them. See Joyce (2014) 
for further criticism of Carawan’s argument. 
53 Carawan (2013) p. 74 denies that this is a valid term, on the basis that the reconciliation must 
have been agreed with the Thirty, and it would be odd to see them agree to a term which specifically 
excluded them from any protection. This overlooks the fact that at the time the reconciliation 
occurred, the city party had already expelled the Thirty to Eleusis, and it is not at all clear that the 
Thirty would have had any significant input into the reconciliation agreement. 
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Only those who were high ranking enough in the oligarchy to be themselves 
responsible for the laws were excluded from the Amnesty. The exceptions to this 
would be the Ten and the Eleven, who were magistrates appointed by the Thirty, 
and any idiotai who killed with their own hand on the orders of the Thirty.54 
 
In addition to the role of the Amnesty in muting discussion about the nature of 
law, it seems that although the fifth-century democracy had been engaged in 
legislative activity for a long time, Athenians at the time may not have 
acknowledged this activity. This is discussed in detail at 5.2. As such, the authority 
of the Thirty to create law could be doubted, not because of their wickedness or 
the irregularities in their appointment, but simply because they were not Solon. 
We are told by Xenophon that the Thirty were supposed to sungraphein the 
ancestral laws by which they were to govern.55 This suggests that the work of the 
Thirty was imagined to be collating law, rather than writing it. Despite this, by 
attempting to, in their words, rectify the law, it is likely the Thirty would have 
raised questions for the restored democracy about what law should and should not 
do, who could make and unmake it, and the role law played in the polis. 
 
What, then, does this tell us about Athenian perceptions of law? The chronology 
of the Thirty is difficult to fix,56 and of course we have only the testimony of the 
triumphant democracy. It is impossible to say whether their rule became 
commonly seen as illegitimate as they became more brutal, or whether it was only 
with hindsight that their rule was seen as illegitimate, and most Athenians under 
 
54 There is, however, no evidence of this occurring. The usual process seems to have been for private 
citizens to be ordered to seize the condemned (Pl. Ap. 32c) and take him to the Eleven, where he 
would then be forced to drink hemlock (Lys. 12.17, 18.24, Andoc. 3.10). See Todd (2000b) on how 
Athens’ non-contact execution methods may have been intended to avoid Athenians having to kill 
one another ‘by their own hand’, which may mean that these quasi-judicial murders would not have 
been excluded from the Amnesty. The only hint that it might have been otherwise is Socrates’ claim 
that the Thirty tried to ‘infect as many people as possible with responsibility’ by ordering them to 
arrest other citizens – Pl. Ap. 32c, but it is possible this attempt was defeated by the magnanimity 
of the restored democracy. 
55 Xen. Hel. 2.3.2. 
56 This is mostly because those who defended Theramenes did not allow the reign of terror in their 
narratives to begin in earnest until after his death. Shear (2011) pp. 180-85 offers a useful contrast of 
the different chronologies for the Thirty’s adoption of violence. 
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the Thirty, that is, more or less anyone other than Socrates, would have felt just as 
strong an obligation to obey the commands of the Thirty as to obey the laws of the 
democracy. The Three Thousand in the city did eventually expel the Thirty to 
Eleusis, but since this happened following military success by the democrats and 
since the city remained oligarchic this is not a clear statement against the 
legitimacy of oligarchic rule, and cannot tell us anything clearly about the degree 
of popular acceptance of the laws and government of the Thirty.  
Though we have little information about the degree to which people accepted the 
rule of the Thirty, we can identify the democratic response to the Thirty. Following 
the fall of the Thirty the democracy denied legitimacy to the majority of the 
legislative acts of the Thirty, either by ignoring them completely or by deliberately 
overruling them. Though the majority of Athenians in the city must have 
cooperated to some degree with the rule of the Thirty, that cooperation is 
deliberately forgotten in the fourth century,57 and all responsibility for the acts of 
the Thirty put only on the Thirty themselves and the small number of officials who 
served under them. This distancing of the mass of Athenians from any 
responsibility for the Thirty further saved Athens from having to think about the 
Thirty as making law. The Thirty were remembered, not as a government,58 but as 
an external, occupying force. So Wolpert interprets Thrasybulus’ burial in the 
public cemetery – ‘the victory over the oligarchs was a victory for Athens. Thus 
they rendered the democracy the lawful constitution and the actions of the Thirty 
illegal’.59 The Amnesty, by preventing the Athenians from having to think about 
whether or not people obeying the orders of the Thirty were obeying law, obscured 
the question of what made law law.60 Rather than a single approach to the laws of 
the Thirty, Athenian actions display a range of approaches, from decrees which 
appear to assert that only a democratic government can be a legitimate 
government of Athens, to Socrates’ moralist decision that he cannot legitimately 
 
57 Wolpert (2002) pp. 75-99. 
58 Isoc. 21 manages various linguistic tricks to avoid using governmental terms about the Thirty. 
21.2, 3, 11 and 12. 
59 Wolpert (2002) p. 89. 
60 How far Athenians recognised an obligation to obey law is also questionable – see Chapter 4. 
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be ordered to assist in the killing of an innocent citizen. What is clear, however, is 
that the restored democracy was extremely reluctant to acknowledge that the 
Thirty had ever really made law.  
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CHAPTER 2: INTERPRETATIVE ROLE OF JURIES – 
POLIS GOOD 
 
 
Athens’ system of litigation asked jurors to perform an enormous task. In a single 
vote, without any independent judicial guidance, without time or space for 
deliberation, and with not only no requirement but no opportunity to give reasons 
to explain their decision, Athenians had to pass judgement on the actions of their 
peers.1 These juries could at times be very large.2  In their judging, jurors were 
required to decide not only which version of facts to believe, but also, with only 
the legal guidance offered by the litigants themselves, how the law should be 
applied. Jurors were presented by the litigants with laws which were often 
unclearly phrased,3 quoted in part,4 and which might appear to conflict with other 
laws.5 How far jurors based or were expected to base their decision solely on the 
laws presented to them is disputed, but no one disputes that the laws were 
supposed to play some role in their decision-making.6 Given the breadth of the 
 
1 The social make-up of juries has been subject to dispute. Jones (1956) imagined juries to be 
populated primarily by the wealthy. Ober (1989a p. 142-4) considers it more likely that juries were 
dominated by poorer citizens for whom the three obol jury pay was valuable. Todd (1990b) argues 
that jury service may have been particularly attractive to farmers who worked their own land. It 
seems persuasive that juries were not dominated by the wealthy, and can be considered to be at 
least a somewhat popular body. Since the purpose of this study is to explore the attitudes of jurors 
towards the law not popular attitudes more generally, the degree to which juries were truly 
representative of the Athenian male citizenry as a whole is not of vital importance. Cases of 
homicide prosecuted using the dikē phonou and dikē traumatos ek pronoias were heard by the 
Council of the Areopagus, a body made up of former archons. For the possible effect on cases heard 
by the Areopagus in contrast to those heard by popular juries, see Lanni (2006 p. 75-114). For a full 
study of the process of litigation at Athens, see MacDowell (1978) pp. 235-60. 
2 Todd (1993) p. 83 n. 9 suggests 500 people as a normal number for judging public suits, with juries 
of 1,000 and 1,500 securely attested. A reference to a jury of 6,000 (Andoc. 1.17), which would 
represent the entire pool of sworn jurors, is probably not reliable. Private suits were judged by juries 
of 200 or 400 people. 
3 e.g. Dem. 21.47 – see below p. 47 n. 17. 
4 e.g. Dem. 18.121. 
5 e.g. Aeschin. 3.35, and see below Chapter 2.3.2.10. 
6 Cohen (1995) p. 190 argues that Athenian juries did not engage in legal interpretation, but made 
their decisions only on their perception of the respective moral positions of the litigants. While we 
cannot say for certain how juries made their decisions, the appearance of arguments on the 
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interpretative task facing the jurors, understanding the ways in which litigants 
sought to have the jurors interpret laws in the litigants’ own favour is essential for 
our understanding of Athens’ laws and legal system. 
 
Gagarin has proposed this interpretative role of juries as a ‘source’ of Athenian law.7 
He supposes that an Athenian, if asked about the source of their law, would say 
the dēmos, because of the legislative activity of democratic bodies,8 but he notes 
that although Athenians were able to say what the law was, they had less access to 
information on what the law meant. For this reason, Gagarin proposes that we 
should recognise not only jury decision-making but also litigants’ speeches as 
sources of Athenian law. This seems to overstate the power of litigants’ speeches. 
Though litigants could and did argue for particular interpretations of Athens’ laws, 
those proposed interpretations, at the time they were made, are unlikely to have 
been considered authoritative, and were probably competing against alternative 
interpretations offered by the opposing litigants.   
 
Gagarin seems to suppose that these interpretations could in time become 
authoritative if the interpretation proffered was accepted by the jury, and then 
came to be used again and again by other litigants. The problem with this 
argument is that juries did not, indeed could not, give reasons for their decision. 
Gagarin gives as an example the arguments made by Euphiletus in Lysias’ On the 
Murder of Eratosthenes on the interpretation of the laws on adultery and homicide. 
He supposes that, were the case to have been decided in Euphiletus’s favour, and 
to have become a cause célèbre, the interpretations Euphiletus offered of the laws 
might come to be accepted as authoritative. Euphiletus offers two laws in his 
defence: the first is the Athenian law on adultery, which he claims prescribes death 
as the penalty9 and the second is the law on homicide, which states that those who 
 
interpretation of laws in the orators suggests that speakers expected that interpretation of laws was 
at least taken into consideration by jurors. 
7 Gagarin (2014). 
8 Questions about how far the Athenian democracy recognised itself as the source of its law are 
addressed at 5.4. 
9 Lys. 1.29 and 1.33. 
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kill adulterers caught in the act are not to be convicted of homicide.10 It appears 
the reason Euphiletus needs to make use of the law on adultery is because he is 
being accused by Eratosthenes’ family of having killed Eratosthenes for other 
reasons, and of having lured him into the house with the intention of killing him.11 
The Areopagites judging the case have no means by which to signal how or why 
they have made their decision. If they acquit Euphiletus, it could be because they 
decided he did not kill at all (a question of fact), or because they did not think the 
killing was unlawful (a question of law). They might decide the killing was not 
unlawful because they accept Euphiletus’ interpretation of the law on adultery, and 
consider that all adulterers should be subject to extra-judicial killing. Alternatively, 
they might accept Euphiletus’s interpretation of the homicide law and decide that 
the law does not require that the killing happened in the heat of the moment, but 
allows the husband to kill the adulterer he catches with his wife, no matter the 
circumstances of that encounter. None of this will be given in their verdict. As 
such, the best the case could give as an example for future adulterer-killers would 
be a suggestion that it may, under certain circumstances, be acceptable to kill an 
adulterer. Since this was also the situation prior to On the Murder of Eratosthenes 
no step towards an authoritative interpretation can be considered to have been 
made.12 
 
 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
 
In Law’s Empire13 Dworkin argued that within the Anglo-American common law 
system, interpretation of law must be understood as ‘constructive interpretation’,  
that is, interpreting the law in its best possible light, and not as ‘conversational 
interpretation’, interpreting in line with the intentions of the author of the law. 
 
10 Lys. 1.30. See Todd (2007) for commentary on both these provisions. 
11 Lys. 1.37. 
12 In cases which focus more closely on the issue of interpretation of law, there might have been a 
little more room for interpretations to become authoritative. Lys. 10 focuses entirely on the 
interpretation of the law, so the outcome of this case could potentially become first an example and 
eventually an accepted interpretation of the law on the aporrhēta, but this speech’s focus on law is 
highly unusual. 
13 (1998). 
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This constructive interpretation, Dworkin then argues to be taking place within an 
interpretative community of lawyers and judges who recognise themselves as part 
of an ongoing tradition of interpretation. This community of constructive 
interpretation Dworkin argues is based on what he terms ‘integrity’. ‘Integrity’ 
allows for consistent decision-making which is nonetheless capable of change in 
response to changing social attitudes, since ‘integrity’ requires that judgements 
should be made on the basis of the principles which underlie existing laws and 
legal decisions. Dworkin gives as an example the famous case of Brown v Board of 
Education, in which the Supreme Court determined that segregation (separate but 
equal) was unlawful. This case contradicted previous cases in which the concept of 
separate but equal had been permitted, although it was based on the same laws 
that had informed the decisions in the prior cases. In Dworkin’s analysis of the 
case, the law was interpreted in accordance with the principle of equality which 
informed the laws in question, so although the Supreme Court’s decision overruled 
pre-existing court decisions, the community continued to maintain its integrity.  
 
Dworkin argues that some element of morality is a necessary aspect of law. If the 
state is to be justified in exercising force against its citizens, this force must have a 
moral basis. Morality, for Dworkin, enters into play when laws come to be 
interpreted by the people who use law. Dworkin’s questions about the 
permissibility of use of force against citizens are not directly relevant to the 
Athenian context, since it is not my goal here to defend or destroy the legitimacy 
of Athens’ laws, but it might be noted that Athenians had qualms about the 
intersection between law and force, and I will explore those qualms in Chapter 
4.3.3. 
 
 
2.2 Dworkin’s model’s relevance for Athenian law 
 
2.2.1 Role of Athenian juries  
 
In an Athenian context Dworkin’s model must be applied with care, since it is born 
out of, and seeks to explain, a legal system which would be deeply alien to an 
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Athenian. The first barrier to using Dworkin’s model to understand Athenian law 
is that Dworkin is writing about a world of judge-made law. Common Law judges 
do not simply apply the law; they also state authoritatively what the law is. As such, 
their interpretative role is at first glance quite different from that of Athenian 
jurors. While Athenian jurors could be, exceptionally, invited to act as nomothetai, 
and while the extent to which the jurors’ oath left jurors free to supplant their own 
best judgement in areas where there were no laws is controversial,14 jury decisions 
had no formal way to become law. There was no strong doctrine of precedent in 
Athenian courts,15 and no system by which juries’ decisions could become part of 
Athens’ laws. Despite this, Athenian jurors were commonly called upon to 
interpret laws – sometimes in what Dworkin refers to as ‘easy cases’, where ‘since 
the answers to the questions [the interpretative model] puts are … obvious, or at 
least seem to be so, we are not aware that any theory is at work at all’,16 and 
sometimes in much harder cases.  One of the accusations which is most often 
adduced against Dworkin is that his model applies only to so-called ‘hard cases’ – 
cases where the application of the law to the facts in hand is in some way uncertain 
or liable to lead to a manifestly unjust outcome. Dworkin rejects this on the basis 
that even in ‘easy’ cases, the work of interpretation is still being done, it is just 
simple enough that we do not appreciate the fact. In Athens, an argument could 
be made that most cases were ‘hard cases’. Athenian laws were often imprecisely 
phrased,17 and Athenian juries had no authoritative guidance on how the laws 
 
14 see Chapter 4.3.2. 
15 Lanni (2006), opposed by Harris (2013). See 2.2.4.1 for an alternative approach to the use of 
precedents in Athenian judicial decision making. 
16 Dworkin (1998) p. 354. 
17 The law against hubris (Dem. 21.47 ‘If anyone commits hubris against another… let anyone who 
wishes bring a graphē before the thesmothetai’) is often given as an example of imprecisely phrased 
Athenian laws. Though the quoted nomos is likely to have been inserted by some later writer (see 
Harris in Canevaro (2013b) p. 224-232), the formulation ‘if anyone commits hubris there shall be a 
graphē’ also appears in Aeschin. 1.16. The Ath. Pol. 9.2 explicitly rejects claims that Solon 
deliberately phrased his laws imprecisely to give more scope to juries’ decisions, which suggests 
that the power juries held to interpret laws was recognised by the fourth century. In the Rhetoric 
1373b-74a, Aristotle explores how a litigant can make use of this vagueness. He claims that while a 
litigant might accept having done the wrongful act in question, he might then dispute the 
applicability of the relevant law to that act. Aristotle explains that this is why it is important that 
laws be properly defined. In practice, as with other of the recommendations of the Rhetoric, this is 
not a strategy we see litigants using often (though it is not unheard of. It is, of course, impossible 
for Ctesiphon to deny that he made a decree honouring Demosthenes (Dem. 18), and the same is 
true of all graphai paranomōn and nomon mē epitēdeion theinai. The speaker of Lys. 9 admits that 
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presented to them should be interpreted.18 Even the rule that an older law should 
be considered to overrule a newer one must have been difficult to apply in court, 
since as far as we know the prescripts to laws were rarely read out.19 While it does 
seem that jurors might, in some cases, have allowed a sense of fairness to prevail 
over applying the law, it is unclear whether or not this was viewed by Athenians as 
a legitimate use of jurors’ discretion.20 We will explore specific examples of jurors 
being called upon to tackle interpretation of laws at 2.3.  
 
 
2.2.2 Constructive interpretation in Athens 
 
Dworkin’s constructive interpretation at first glance appears problematic for 
understanding Athenian interpretation of laws. The ‘intent of the lawgiver’ is one 
of the most important tools used by litigants to guide jurors’ interpretations of 
laws.21 What must be remembered, however, is that in all the instances in which 
we see it used, the intent of the lawgiver is fictional. It is most often used to impute 
 
he insulted the official, but claims that under the circumstances his insult was not in breach of the 
law). It is high risk, since it commits them to a single line of argument, and it is much more common 
to see litigants arguing both that they did not commit the act, and that anyway the act is not against 
the law.  This belief that imprecisely phrased laws empowered juries is also likely to be the reason 
the Thirty acted to replace the Solonian inheritance laws – Ath. Pol. 35.2. Inscribed laws of the 
fourth century show more concern for precision. The Law Threatening the Areopagus RO 79 seems 
to attempt to offer an exhaustive definition of the offence it governs (ll11-15, repeated ll15-18: ‘And 
it shall not be permitted to any of the councillors of the Areopagus, if the people or the democracy 
at Athens is overthrown, to go up to the Areopagus or to sit together in the meeting or to deliberate 
about anything at all’). Though some degree of imprecision is unavoidable in law-making (see 
Endicott (2000)), in the fourth century Athens does seem to have cared to reduce it. 
18 Against this, one might argue that we see relatively little legal argument in the Athenian courts. 
This is probably best explained by a combination of the facts that, first, we are usually missing one 
or two stages of legal argument, since we do not see the arguments that take place before the 
arbitrators, or when persuading the relevant magistrates to introduce the case; and second, the use 
of highly legalistic arguments seems to have been off-putting to Athenian juries. See Chapter 
4.3.2.4. 
19 We only see this rule referred to in graphē paranomōn and graphē mē epitēdeion theinai suits. In 
Against Ctesiphon Aeschines has to deal with two contradictory laws, and he implies that the law 
which favours his opponent is newer than the law he claims should govern the situation, but the 
comparison is implied, not explicit: 3.33 the law in Aeschines’ favour is referred to as having been 
made by ho nomothetēs – generally understood to mean Solon – whereas 3.44 the law cited by 
Demosthenes is attributed to tis nomothetēs – some lawgiver, and is placed in a more recent 
historical context. The relative age of the two laws is not used by Aeschines to argue that the law 
cited by Demosthenes is not a valid law, but to claim that Demosthenes must be misinterpreting 
the law. 
20 See Harris (2013) pp. 274 ff. 
21 See Chapter 5.1.4. 
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intentions to Athens’ ancient lawgivers, whose intentions could, by the fourth 
century, no longer be reliably ascertained. Even where it is used in reference to 
contemporary lawgivers,22 it is not clear that the speaker’s version of the legislators’ 
intentions gives any true indication of the actual intentions of the legislators. 
Although some fourth-century laws bore purpose clauses of a sort,23 no litigant in 
the surviving speeches refers unequivocally to the inscribed purpose clause when 
presenting a law.24 Given that the intentions imputed to the lawgivers are fictional, 
what these arguments actually amount to is an attempt to persuade jurors that the 
interpretation of the law presented by the litigant is the law in its best possible 
light.25 This is certainly a rhetoric that relies on the conventions of ‘conversational’ 
interpretation, but this does not in itself prevent it being, in fact, constructive 
interpretation. 
 
 
2.2.3 Interpretative community  
 
Dworkin examines the Common Law system as an interpretative community, in 
which judges and lawyers are aware of themselves as part of a community and a 
tradition of interpretation which they have inherited and which they will hand on 
to others. Similarly, Johnstone26 identifies Athenian juries as interpretative 
communities, aware of themselves as a distinct and separate democratic institution 
with its own rituals, customs and modes of argument: ‘In the courts, male citizens 
learned and shared certain kinds of knowledge, creating a commonality of interests 
 
22 Most prominently in Aeschin. 1.33. 
23 e.g. RO 25 ll. 2-4 ‘to accept Attic silver coin when it is found to be silver and bears the public 
stamp’; IG II3 1 429 ll. 2-4 ‘and those at Etioneia and the rest [of Piraeus] . . . . . . and the defects in 
the stone walls . . . . . . may be repaired, and the [long walls] may be repaired’; IG II3 1 447 ll. 5-6 ‘so 
that the sacrifice to Athena may be as fine as possible at the Little Panathenaia and the income as 
great as possible’; RO 26 ll. 5-6 ‘so that the People may have grain available in common’ SEG 52.104 
ll. 1-8 ‘in order that everything in the sanctuary [of the] Brauronian [goddess] may be secure and 
sound’; Dem. 20.128 ‘to the end that the wealthiest citizens may perform the public services’. 
24 Dem. 20.128 presents the law which is being indicted. 
25 This is not to claim that the use of the intent of the lawgiver trope left no mark on Athenian 
interpretation of law. By choosing to frame arguments through the intent of the lawgiver, litigants 
left themselves unable to present laws in any ‘best possible light’ which was self-consciously 
innovative. See Chapter 5.1.6. 
26 (1999) p. 43-45. 
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and abilities. One of these was the ability to interpret laws in an authoritative 
manner. The laws themselves did not indicate how to do this; rather, proper 
interpretative skills were learned and handed down in the culture of the courts 
among an interpretive community.’27 Johnstone does not explore the mechanisms 
by which this interpretative community worked, but there are indications within 
our sources that can give some idea of how jurors learned to interpret laws. 
Aristophanes’ Wasps offers a caricature of jurymen who walk together to the court, 
discussing on the way how they intend to judge the cases before them.28 The jurors 
know one another’s habitual ways of judging,29 and there is even an indication that 
they might police their own membership.30 Rubinstein identifies the common 
trope of warning jurors that their decision might deter or encourage future 
offenders as a reminder to juries of the dikastic tradition of which they form a 
part.31 
 
Wasps predates changes made to the allocation of jurymen to courts which may 
have reduced the cohesion of individual groups of jurors,32 but even in the fourth 
century jurors do seem to have had some opportunity to learn about the 
interpretations adopted by other courts and other jurors. First, there is the 
phenomenon of thorubos,33 which is treated by litigants not as a one-way 
communication from the jurors to the speakers, but as something by which jurors 
may educate and inform one another. Second, there is the knowledge of previous 
cases which is commonly assumed by speakers, and which may have arisen from 
 
27 ibid. p. 132. Mirhady (2015) p. 242-43 also argues for the jurors as a community with knowledge 
of how laws should be interpreted. He does not explore how this community educated itself, but 
does note that the requirement that jurors be over 30 may have meant the jurors were more 
experienced citizens. 
28 Wasps 230-245. Biles and Olson (2015) p. 161-2 note the pathos of the jurors lamenting their 
deceased fellows, which is itself the act of a group which is aware of itself as such. Similarly, at lines 
268-9 Biles and Olson p. 182 note the presentation of the jurors as a ‘formal performance group’, 
though as a chorus some degree of internal cohesion is forced upon the Wasps by the constraints 
of the genre.  
29 Wasps 270. As a comedy, we cannot expect to see detailed discussion of how jurors habitually 
interpret laws. 
30 Wasps 1110. 
31 Rubinstein (2007) p. 367. 
32 see Rhodes (1980) p. 318-9. 
33 see Bers (1985).  
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jurors talking about their judging at home following cases.34 Court cases might also 
attract non-juror spectators, and though those litigants who wish to convince the 
jury that they have led sheltered lives claim never to have visited the courts 
before,35 it is quite possible that men would have seen many cases judged before 
they became of an age to sit as jurors themselves. While to some extent jurors must 
be assumed to have been educated on the law and its interpretation by litigants’ 
speeches, those speeches were only one source of information for jurors on how 
laws should be interpreted. 
 
 
2.2.4 Principles 
 
In Dworkin’s model, laws are interpreted in line with principles. These principles 
guide interpretation of laws, and are often themselves drawn from or evidenced by 
other laws.  
 
2.2.4.1 Use of ‘precedents’ understood as instances of principle 
 
The use made of precedent in Athenian court speeches has been a matter for 
academic debate. Previous court decisions and other examples of past practice are 
sometimes cited by speakers, but how far these can be considered precedents is 
disputed. 
 
Lanni looks at the use of precedent within her analysis of legal insecurity in 
Athenian courts.36 She considers Athenian courts not to have had the capacity to 
issue predictable or consistent judgements, but regards this as a trade-off against 
the flexibility to make just decisions on the facts of individual cases. Lanni 
considers judicial decisions to have been made based on such a wide range of 
factors that it would not have been possible in practice to find cases which were 
‘similar enough on all relevant axes’ to serve as precedents. She divides the use of 
 
34 e.g. Dem. 59.110. 
35 Isae. 1.1, 19.55. 
36 Lanni (2006) p. 115- 28. 
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precedent in the orators into a) citations of past penalties, b) comparisons of social 
standing of past and current litigants and c) passages that resemble modern use of 
precedent. Lanni’s categorisation is of limited use in understanding how 
precedents are used to try to steer jurors’ decision making in Athenian court 
speeches.   
 
Harris, responding to Lanni’s arguments,37 claims that use of precedent is much 
more common in Athenian speeches than Lanni acknowledges, in part because he 
claims her list of precedents is incomplete,38 and in part because he considers 
precedents to be prominent in guiding reasoning in cases where there are 
questions of law to be determined. Harris bases this on an analysis of the Lysianic 
corpus, of which he says six speeches raise legal issues, and precedents are used in 
four of these six. Not only is this a small sample size, but several of Harris’ 
‘precedents’ are somewhat dubious. He claims Lys. 3.40-43 to be a use of precedent, 
though the speaker mentions no cases, but just asserts that the Areopagus has 
‘many a time in the past’ interpreted the law in the way he wishes them to interpret 
it in the case at hand. Similarly, he claims Lys. 31.34 as a use of precedent, when no 
case is mentioned, and the speaker is just asking the boulē to decide whether 
Philon is of the same moral character as the current members of the boulē.  
 
Harris’ argument that use of precedent in Athenian court cases should be seen as 
a real attempt by Athenians to achieve consistency in their court decisions is not 
supported by the evidence he offers. This leaves open the question – what were 
these precedents supposed to achieve? They are common enough in court speeches 
that we must consider them to have had some weight in decision-making. An 
indication of their use may be given by the Rhetoric to Alexander,39  where litigants 
are advised to use precedent in court in a section of the work dedicated to how to 
 
37 Harris (2013) p. 246-66. 
38 Harris’ list cites as precedents several things which are not exactly precedents (see below). As 
such, Lanni’s list of precedents, taken from Rubinstein (unpublished) is to be preferred:  Dem. 
21.72–76, 175–184; 24.138; 19.273; 20.146–148; 34.50; 59.116–117; Lys. 12.35ff; 13.56–57; 6.17; 22.16; Aesch. 
1.86–88, 173; 2.6; 3.252–253, 258; Din. 1.14, 23ff; 2.14, 25; 3.17; Lyc. 1.52ff, 111–116; Andoc. 1.29–30; Hyp. 
4col. 1–3, 33–34; 5col. 27; Antiph. 5.67.  
39 1422b20. 
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use ‘the just’ to guide interpretation of ‘the legal’. This is not using precedents to 
establish a point of law in a strict sense, it is using precedents to support an 
argument that jurors should interpret a law in line with a particular principle. 
 
Rubinstein addresses only the trope of deterrence, but looking at how the idea of 
deterrence is used in Athenian court speeches despite the fact that it must be 
considered to have been primarily fictional, given the lack of any systems by which 
to create or enforce precedents, she identifies this trope as a means by which the 
Athenian demos could send messages about what behaviour it did and did not 
condone.40 Rubinstein draws on the evidence that calls to deterrence are far more 
common in public than in private speeches to support her argument that this trope 
relates to the demos’ ability to send messages about how it viewed particular 
offences.41 Put in Dworkin’s terms, the trope was used to call on the jury to 
establish or reinforce principles. 
 
Demosthenes’ Against Meidias makes particularly heavy use of precedents and so 
I will use it as a case study to show how precedents could be used by a litigant. The 
speech is probably a probole for committing an offence during the festival, with the 
offence in question being hubris.42  Certainly Demosthenes, whether for legal or 
personal reasons, wishes to persuade the jurors that Meidias’ actions should be 
considered to amount to hubris and he makes use of previous court decisions as 
part of his argument to this effect. 
 
 At 21.72–76 Demosthenes tells the story of Euaeon, who was so offended at having 
been struck by an acquaintance when both were drunk that he killed the man who 
struck him. When Euaeon came to trial, the jury is said to have convicted him by 
a one-vote majority. This precedent is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to 
Demosthenes’ case, since it tells us nothing about the law’s treatment of hubris. 
 
40 Rubinstein (2007). 
41 ibid. p. 371. 
42 Rowe (1994) 
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What it evidences is a principle – that jurors consider even a single blow to be an 
extremely serious insult.  
 
At 21.176-8 Demosthenes records the trial of Euandrus for profaning the Mysteries. 
Here he does try to increase the relevance of this case to his own by claiming that 
the law on the Mysteries is the same as that for the Dionysia, but, as Harris points 
out,43 Demosthenes’ account of the case suggests that Euandrus must have been 
tried by a dikē and not a public process, since he had to pay damages to the man 
he had seized. Demosthenes’ use of the precedent works not as a legal precedent, 
but to demonstrate a further principle, that those who break the law about festivals 
should pay high penalties.  
 
At 21.178 Demosthenes discusses the case of a festival official who, when instructing 
a citizen to leave a seat to which he was not entitled, laid hands on the man. The 
man brought a probole against the official and gained an initial condemnation, but 
died before the case could progress any further. It is unclear that the official was 
treated as having committed hubris, and he may well just have been condemned 
for breaching the law on the festival. It therefore cannot support Demosthenes’ 
point on Meidias’ actions having amounted to hubris, but it does serve as evidence 
of the principle that touching another citizen during the festival was considered 
wrongful.  
 
The final precedent Demosthenes cites is that of Ctesicles,44 who was sentenced to 
death for using a whip to beat an enemy of his with during the festival. The 
problem for Demosthenes is that the offence committed by Ctesicles was probably 
sufficiently serious to be treated as hubris at any time of the year.  
 
Demosthenes wants to argue that the additional protection offered to citizens 
during the festival means that the assault committed by Meidias should be treated 
more seriously than it otherwise would, and so should be considered to have 
 
43 (2013) p. 256. 
44 Dem. 21.180 
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amounted to hubris. He has apparently been unable to find any law which clearly 
states this, or any previous case which decided this, but he has been able to 
assemble an array of cases which evidence the following principles: 1) striking a 
citizen is seriously offensive to that citizen, 2) breaking the festival laws can lead 
to elevated penalties,45 3) you should not touch citizens during the festival and 4) 
acts committed during the festival may amount to hubris. None of Demosthenes’ 
precedents constitute precedents in a modern sense, but they all contribute 
meaningfully to Demosthenes’ arguments about how the jurors should interpret 
the laws in front of them. Demosthenes’ arguments are not poorly-achieved 
attempts to achieve consistency in legal decision making, they are meaningful 
attempts to guide the jury to make decisions which are in integrity with the 
principles which Demosthenes construes as underlying the decisions made by 
previous jurors.   
 
 
2.3 Principles in the interpretation of Athenian law 
 
The final part of Dworkin’s argument is his identification of what he considers to 
be a principle which underlies the common law on damages to be awarded 
following a tort. He does so as part of a thought experiment to show how a judge 
who wished to judge in integrity with the principles underlying that area of law 
might proceed. His analysis, however, offers a tool for questioning the principles 
that litigants invoke when guiding jurors towards an interpretation of the law ‘in 
its best possible light’ (albeit not objectively so, but in the best possible light for 
the litigant in question). The remainder of this chapter will consist of a study of 
the principles used to guide interpretation of laws in forensic oratory. 
 
One of the major controversies in studies of Athenian law and litigation is the 
degree to which jurors were free to decide cases on the basis of public interest, or 
the good of the polis, rather than on the basis of the law. This has set up a false 
 
45 Though in fact the wrongdoer only had to refund the money he had wrongfully extracted from 
the claimant and compensate him for the inconvenience – a fairly modest penalty. 
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confrontation between law and the good of the polis.46 In many of the surviving 
forensic orations, the good of the polis is explicitly used by speakers to guide 
interpretation of laws. For my analysis, I have classified arguments on legal 
interpretation as based on either the good of the polis or individual justice.47  
 
Individual justice may itself be divided into arguments of justice as fairness and 
justice as consistency with previous decisions. Arguments on the good of the polis, 
where they appear in forensic oratory, are generally arguments on expediency 
which either explicitly or implicitly set the interests of the polis against the 
interests of the individual.48 Soft arguments of the good of the polis, where the 
polis’s interests are presumed to equate to the good of individuals, (i.e. it is in the 
interests of the polis to respect the freedoms of individuals), are rare in forensic 
oratory.49  
 
It is noticeable how much more attention has been paid in modern scholarship to 
the use of arguments based on the good of the polis than to arguments based on 
personal justice. It seems likely this has arisen from the fact that the latter type of 
argument is an accepted aspect of court decision making in modern law, whereas 
making decisions on individuals’ cases to serve expediency is viewed as a breach of 
human rights and a failure to make just decisions. There is no reason, however, to 
 
46 As argued by Cohen (1995) p. 192. c.f. Harris (2013) pp. 101-137. 
47 I use justice in a modern sense, as a sense of treating the individual’s case fairly, and not in the 
more complicated ways dikaiosunē was treated by Greek philosophers. Mirhady (1990) p. 400 notes 
Aristotle in the Rhetoric using a similar distinction, with to epieikēs linked to to dikaion, and 
universal law linked to to sumpheron, with either of these two useable by a would-be litigant when 
arguing his case. 
48 Wallace (1996) examines how far Athenians can be considered to have had ‘rights’ and offers a 
useful summary of prior work on the subject. He concludes that although Athens recognised a few 
limited positive rights (freedom to), they made very little use of negative rights (freedom from), 
and within the vague confines of Athenian law, these rights could often be rejected in favour of the 
good of the polis. 
49 Funeral orations, as the genre in which Athenians talked about what it meant to be an Athenian 
(see Loraux (1986)), could be viewed as an alternative source for ideas on the interaction between 
law and justice/expedience. A survey of the surviving examples of the genre suggests that its 
confines meant these difficult ideas tended to be suppressed. Loraux p. 104 notes the tendency for 
the individual to be subsumed by the community in these speeches. The Athenian war dead are 
lionised for having willingly placed themselves in danger in service to their city. Far from allowing 
the interests of the individual to stand against the interests of the polis, these speeches imagine the 
primary interest of individuals to have been the good of the polis. 
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suppose that this reluctance to use expediency to guide judicial decision making 
would have affected an ancient Athenian jury. 
 
For my analysis in this chapter I have selected speeches where a point of law which 
could be subject to the jury’s interpretation appears to have been relevant to the 
dispute. I used a sample of 20 orations, giving representation to public and private 
cases and within these categories to prosecution and defence speeches. I selected 
to try to prevent any one area of law from dominating the sample. Of a sample of 
20 speeches, 7 of which are private and 13 public,50 in 15 of the speeches arguments 
based on public interest are used to guide legal interpretation.51 Of these, seven 
use only public interest arguments, while eight use both arguments of public 
interest and personal justice.  
 
The arguments on the basis of public interest are more prominent in public 
speeches, where they are seen either alone or in conjunction with arguments on 
personal justice in 76% of the speeches studied. Arguments based on the good of 
the polis seem to be equally useable in defence and prosecution speeches; however, 
arguments which rely on polis good alone are only found in public speeches (and 
predominantly in prosecution speeches).52 
 
The speeches are divided into private and public, and within these categories are 
presented in rough date order. 
 
 
 
 
50 Private: Lys. 3, Lys. 10, Isae. 1, Isae. 2, Dem. 54, Dem. 39, Hyp. Athenogenes. 
Public: Ant. 5, Isoc. 20, Lys. 13, Andoc. 1, Lys. 9, Lys. 22, Dem. 22, Dem. 23, Aeschin. 1, Aeschin. 3, 
Dem. 18, Lycurg. Leocrates, Hyp. Euxenippus. 
51 This analysis is limited to arguments which seek to guide the interpretation of laws. It therefore 
excludes arguments where a litigant might, for example, argue that it is unlikely he would have 
committed the offence in question because of his previous good character, as demonstrated by his 
services to the city. As such, it is not a comprehensive exploration of the use of ‘good of the polis’ 
arguments in Athenian court speeches. 
52 Good of the polis only: Isoc. 20, Lys. 22, Dem. 22, Dem. 23, Aeschin. 1, Lycurg. Leocr. Hyp. Euxen. 
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2.3.1 Private suits 
 
2.3.1.1 Lysias’ Against Simon 
 
In Lysias’ Against Simon,53 the speaker addresses the Areopagus and asks that they 
interpret the law on the dikē traumatos ek pronoias to understand the ek pronoias 
element of the offence as requiring active premeditation, and that that 
premeditation should be to kill, not merely to wound. He argues explicitly for his 
interpretation of the offence  
I also believed that there could be no premeditation in wounding if 
somebody wounded without intent to kill: for who is so naïve that he 
premeditates long in advance the way in which one of his enemies should 
receive a wound?  It is clear that our legislators also did not believe that they 
should prescribe exile from the fatherland in circumstances where people 
happen to break each other’s heads while fighting—or else they would have 
exiled a considerable number. But as for those who wounded others after 
plotting to kill them, but who did not succeed in killing, it was in the case 
of people like this that they established such severe penalties, taking the 
view that in cases where people have plotted and premeditated, they ought 
to pay the penalty: even if they did not succeed, nevertheless they had done 
their best. And indeed, on many previous occasions you also have given the 
same verdict about premeditation. So it would be a terrible thing if, when 
people are wounded while fighting because of drunkenness or quarrelling 
or horseplay or insults or over a hetaira (these are the sorts of things about 
which everybody is sorry when they recover their senses), you were to 
impose such severe and terrible penalties that you expelled some of the 
citizens from the fatherland.54  
 
His first argument is that any other interpretation would make a nonsense of the 
law, since it would turn it into a law against an offence which, he says, no one 
 
53 This speech is discussed in more detail at 3.1.1, with particular focus on the moral arguments in 
the speech. 
54 Lys. 3.41-4, trans. Todd (2007). See Phillips (2007) for intentionality in the dikē traumatos ek 
pronoias. 
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would commit. Next, he argues on the grounds of justice that the lawgivers would 
not have set such a serious penalty for such an insignificant offence. Finally, he 
gives a very vague reference to precedents, which Harris takes to be a recognition 
of the superior knowledge of the Areopagites,55 but which could equally be a result 
of the speaker not having been able to turn up any useable examples. His attempts 
at using these principles to guide interpretation of the law are striking since, as 
discussed in Chapter 3.1.1, he works from the assumption that any reasonable plot 
will be a murderous one. By emphasising the element of planning as the wrongful 
element of trauma ek pronoias he minimises the element which a modern reader 
might assume to have had the greater capacity to harm the polis, the element of 
actual harm.56 Here, then, we see a speech where the speaker wishes to guide 
interpretation of a law almost entirely on the basis of arguments about individual 
justice. 
 
2.3.1.2 Lysias’ Against Theomnestus 
 
Lysias’ Against Theomnestus57 is a prosecution for kakēgoria. Theomnestus is 
accused of having made an allegation that the speaker killed his own father. 
Theomnestus appears to have defended himself before the arbitrator by claiming 
that the law should be read only as forbidding use of the word androphonos,58 and 
since his allegation against the speaker had not used that word he should not be 
convicted. In response, the speaker has assembled an argument on how juries 
should interpret laws.  
 
He bases most of his analysis in archaic laws, where the need for interpretation can 
be assumed to have been apparent to the jurors. This may serve in part to reduce 
 
55 (2013) p. 253. 
56 Though it is not made explicit in this speech, allegations of groups of men plotting violence had 
a more threatening aspect to them than just the infliction of violence on fellow citizens. Lysias’ 
career took place in the shadow of two violent oligarchic revolutions against the democracy. 
57 This speech is discussed in more detail at 3.7, with particular attention given to the patterns of 
interpretation in the speech and the role of moral arguments. 
58 Lys. 10.6-7 Todd (2007) p. 635 suggests that Theomnestus may have been relying on an older 
interpretation of the law on kakēgoria which ‘conveyed the quasi-magical or quasi-religious sense 
that these were words which it was somehow inappropriate to utter’. 
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the potential for claims that his argument is sophistry, but it also allows him to 
blur the types of interpretation he is inviting jurors to do.59 The interpretation of 
archaic words to their contemporary equivalents is very different from the 
interpretative task the speaker is asking jurors to do when he invites them to 
include within the aporrhēta words which are not listed in the law.60 Interpreting 
a law which forbids use of the word androphonos also to ban use of the phrase 
apokteinei tina is not the same as understanding podokakkē to indicate to xulon. 
The law bans the use of certain words, and expanding the scope of the law to cover 
other words is a significant act of legal interpretation. The speaker justifies his own 
interpretation of the laws on what in Common Law is called the ‘mischief’ principle 
– that laws should be interpreted to best deal with the wrongful behaviour they 
were intended to govern. As such, the argument depends primarily on personal 
justice as consistency – that laws should be interpreted to provide the individual 
the protection against wrongdoing that they are deemed to have been intended to 
provide. 
 
2.3.1.3 Isaeus’ On the Estate of Cleonymus 
 
In Isaeus’ On the Estate of Cleonymus, Cleonymus had left a will, but his nephews 
complain that the will had been made at a time when Cleonymus was angry with 
his family, but that by the time he died he was reconciled to his nephews and 
treated them as his closest kin.61 The jury is asked by the litigants to determine, 
among other issues, whether a will has validity in and of itself or only as evidence 
of the deceased’s wishes, and whether family relationships should be allowed to 
 
59 Todd (1996) notes that by selecting only archaic laws, the task of interpretation is altered, but he 
notes this to observe that Athenian law was ahistorical, and that though this speech recognises that 
words could lose their meaning, it does not recognise that meanings might change and what was 
meant in a statute when it was written might not be how that statute would be read later. 
60 These two types of interpretation can be best understood as conversational interpretation, in the 
case of the interpretation of archaic words to match their contemporary equivalents, vs. 
constructive interpretation in the case of interpreting the aporrhēta law to include synonyms of the 
forbidden words. Todd (2007) p. 635 observes that Athenian juries had no guidance or means by 
which to establish authoritative interpretations of laws, but does not note the difference between 
the two types of interpretation the jurors are being invited to engage in. 
61 This speech is discussed in some detail by Harris (2013) pp. 192-6, who identifies it as an example 
of Open Texture in Athenian law. The questionable value of designating such interpretation Open 
Texture is discussed in the Introduction to this thesis. 
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outweigh a will that would otherwise have been valid. The litigants invoke the good 
of the polis, framed as the good of the jurors themselves, to support their 
interpretation of the law, by asking whether it is in the jurors’ interests to ‘force 
those who are next of kin to share in the misfortunes of their relatives, but, when 
money has been left, give anyone rather than them the right to its possession’.62 In 
addition, the litigants argue based on personal justice that it is fair that if you stand 
to inherit from a relative, that relative should also stand to inherit from you.63  
 
2.3.1.4 Isaeus’ On the Estate of Menecles 
 
Isaeus’ On the Estate of Menecles again asks jurors to consider whether inheritance 
should follow kinship or will, though in this case the speaker is urging the jury to 
accept the will that has been made. Despite the fact that the speaker appears to 
have been adopted by a process which followed all the proper rules and is able to 
produce witnesses to attest to this,64 his claim to Menecles’ estate has been 
challenged by Menecles’ brother. The speaker suggests that his opponent’s case 
relies on arguing that the adoption was invalid since it was made under the 
influence of a woman.65 Despite the fact that the case should apparently be 
resolvable by asking, first whether the speaker was adopted and second whether 
that adoption was valid, much of the speech is dedicated to narrative of the 
speaker’s family’s long and close relationship with Menecles66 and of his 
opponent’s quarrels with Menecles.67 The suggestion, as in Isaeus 1, is that the jury 
is unlikely to restrain itself to making a decision based on the legal positions of the 
respective parties, but will decide in accordance with a perceived sense of fairness. 
This case only makes use of arguments of personal justice to guide reasoning, 
though this personal justice is owed to both the speaker68 and Menecles.69  
 
 
62 Isaeus 1.40. 
63 Isaeus 1.44. 
64 2.14-18. 
65 2.19.  
66 2.2-21. 
67 2.27-34. 
68 2.27, 35-6, 43, 47. 
69 2. 23-4, 27, 37, 42-3, 47. 
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2.3.1.5 Demosthenes’ Against Conon 
 
This prosecution in a dikē aikeias relies on a strategy of persuading the jurors that 
the acts committed should be considered to amount to the more serious offence 
of hubris. The case is analysed in detail in Chapter 3.  
 
Because of the strategy adopted by Ariston of alleging hubris, the legal 
interpretation in the case is around whether Conon’s actions did or did not amount 
to hubris. It appears that Ariston expects Conon to argue on this point that the 
young men all belong to drinking clubs and this sort of behaviour between such 
young men is commonplace and so should not be considered to amount to hubris. 
Ariston’s response to this is to deny that he is a member of any such club, and so 
to try to place himself on the side of ‘ordinary’ people.70 Given the political 
implications of these drinking clubs71 it is possible this may be a veiled argument 
on polis good, but if this is the case the point is not laboured in the speech. At 54.20 
he returns to the question of membership of these clubs, but this time his 
argument is clearly one of fairness: he argues that whether or not they are members 
of drinking clubs, everyone should be held accountable for their actions in the 
same way.  
 
In the speech, Ariston offers a justification of sorts for Athens’ legal system, 
explaining that the reason actions exist is to prevent escalation of disputes.72 The 
passage is notable for the way in which justice is not treated as a desirable end in 
itself, but only as a means to achieve the goal of reducing serious violence within 
the polis. 
 
 
 
 
70 Dem. 54.14-17 
71 Such clubs were probably linked to the affairs of the profanation of the mysteries and the attacks 
on the herms in 415, both of which events were imagined at the time to have some connection to a 
planned oligarchic coup.  
72 54.20-21 
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2.3.1.6 Demosthenes’ Against Boeotus I 
 
Demosthenes’ Against Boeotus I appears to have had a weak basis in law, and the 
speaker Mantitheus is likely to have lost his case.73 He brought what was probably 
a dikē blabēs against his half-brother on the basis that his brother’s claim also to 
be called Mantitheus is causing him harm.74 This seems to be a case where the 
story of an ongoing dispute has been warped by the decision to bring the dispute 
into court.75 Both brothers want to be called Mantitheus, and at least one of the 
two wants the other to stop calling himself Mantitheus, but Athenian law lacked 
any injunction-process and so the speaker in the case has had to use some other 
action to bring his dispute before the court. Once before the court, he seems to 
need to demonstrate some actual damage which he has suffered as a result of his 
brother’s insistence on being called Mantitheus.76 The speaker uses a mixture of 
personal justice77 and polis good arguments78 to support his claim that the law 
should be considered to cover his situation.79 It is worth noting that many of the 
hypothetical harms he claims he will suffer if his brother is allowed to go on calling 
 
73 This is generally assumed on the basis that his brother seems to have continued to call himself 
Mantitheus – IG II2 1622. Since Athenian law lacked an injunction process, it is not impossible that 
our speaker might have won his case, but his brother might nonetheless have gone on calling 
himself Mantitheus. The inscription showing both men using the name Mantitheus cannot securely 
evidence that both men had by this time agreed about the use of the name  - it may be that they 
ran out of remedies for their dispute. 
This speech is subject to an in-depth study by Harris (2013 p. 223-226), who cites it as an example 
of a litigant taking a novel approach to interpretation of law and this being rejected. Aside from my 
hesitation on how certain we can be that Mantitheus lost his case, we cannot know for certain why 
any Athenian jury made its decisions, so Harris’ claim that the case was lost because of the novel 
approach taken by Mantitheus to the law must be treated with caution.  
74 Carey and Reid (1985) p. 166. MacDowell (1978) p. 60-1 suggests instead that the case may have 
been brought under a supposed law on the naming of children alluded to at 39.39. Carey and Reid 
(1985) p. 193 accept this as a law, though it is possible this is an instance where nomos might be 
better translated ‘custom’. 
75 See Johnstone (1999). Wohl (2010) pp. 158 ff. adopts a reading of the speech whereby the argument 
between the brothers centres on the symbol of the name, with the right of the father to name his 
sons a product of the law, and Boeotus’ challenge to that also a challenge to the laws of Athens. 
Wohl’s analysis probably goes too far, not least because, as in the anecdote related by Plutarch (De 
Garrulitate 5) the jurors hear the speech only once. 
76 39.13 – he is unable to give instances of actual damage suffered and depends mostly on 
hypotheticals. 
77 39.13-18, where Mantitheus argues that he is at risk of being blamed for Boeotus’s misdeeds.  
78 39.7-12. 
79 including at 39.20 a simple assertion that it is ou dikaion for him to be robbed of his own name; 
at 39.29 a claim that it is just that he should bear the name Mantitheus since his father gave it to 
him before he ever acknowledged paternity of Boeotus; and at 39.41 a final plea that the jurors 
should decide for Mantitheus as they would decide for their own children. 
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himself Mantitheus have an impact on polis institutions.80 He appears to judge that 
his attempt to escalate the hypothetical harm he is likely to suffer if his brother 
continues to call himself Mantitheus into a harm which merits intervention by 
jurors requires him to allege that the harm is of a public nature. 
 
2.3.1.7 Hyperides’ Against Athenogenes 
 
Hyperides’ Against Athenogenes is a case in which the prosecution appears to have 
had a very weak case under Athens’ laws.81 The speaker has entered into a 
financially disadvantageous contract and has brought what is likely to have been a 
dikē blabēs82  to ask the other party to the contract to make good his costs.83 The 
speaker claims that Athenogenes tricked him into entering into the contract and 
that, for a range of reasons, the contract should not be valid.  
 
The speaker never cites the law under which he has brought the case, but instead 
constructs an argument to the effect that only agreements which are just should 
be upheld by the courts. This argument is based on three laws, one forbidding lying 
in the agora, another requiring sellers to disclose disabilities when selling slaves, 
 
80 Boeotus’s expected misdeeds: Public: 39.14 – sykophancy; 39.15 – enrolment on list of state 
debtors; 39.15 failure to pay eisphora; 39.16 astrateia; 39.19 usurping citizen rights. Private: 39.15 dikē 
exoulēs; 39.18 pseudomarturion. Both of these ‘private’ misdeeds have a somewhat public nature, 
since they relate to failure to respect the courts. 
81 Phillips (2009) looks at the potential variants of the Athenian law on contracts and determines 
that ‘unlawful and unjust contracts were not voided by the letter of the law’ (p. 97). 
82 Whitehead (2000) p. 268. 
83 It is worth noting that, if this is a dikē blabēs, the jury does not have the power to decide that the 
contract should not be upheld, but only to award or fail to award damages. In principle, if the jurors 
were free to decide their conclusion based solely on their perceptions of justice, they could have 
decided to award damages to the speaker to cover his losses from the contract, even if the contract 
had been fully valid under the laws. This is not, however, an argument the speaker attempts to 
make. Thür (2013) argues that if the speaker were to be awarded the 40 mina price of the perfume 
shop, the ownership of the shop – and so of the debts – would revert to Athenogenes. He bases this 
argument on Pringsheim's (1950) model of ownership which is entirely conditional on payment for 
goods: the ‘owner is who spent the money for the goods’. Thür does not explain why he considers 
this to have been the case, or address the argument (which the speaker in Hyperides Against 
Athenogenes does broach) that the liability for the debt is not a part of the transferred property but 
was taken on as a result of the agreement entered into by the speaker. The attempts to show that 
the contract should not be considered to be valid in Athenian law would make more sense if they 
formed part of a defence speech by our speaker against one of his creditors, but this is not the 
situation here. In effect, the claims that the agreement should not be valid are a defence against 
Athenogenes’ own presumed defence of caveat emptor. 
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and the third specifying that only betrothals made according to the laws can result 
in legitimate offspring.84 No penalty is specified for telling lies in the agora, but the 
law on disclosing slaves’ disabilities apparently allows the buyer to return the slave 
to the buyer and presumably get his money back. Though the speaker attempts to 
paint the slaves’ debts as analogous to a disability, he undermines this analogy by 
claiming that the debts could not have been carried by the slaves to their new 
owner as, according to a law of Solon, slaves’ masters were liable for slaves’ debts 
at the time they arose.85 In this way the speaker tries to argue both that the slaves 
carried debts as disabilities, and that those same slaves could never have carried 
the debts at all, since debts belong to a slave’s master. The speaker’s larger point, 
however, is not that the slaves carried the debts as a disability, but that there exists 
a general principle in Athenian law that unjust agreements should not be valid. 
Similarly, no penalty is specified for failing to comply with the law on betrothals. 
Though such penalties existed, they are not useful to the speaker’s case, since what 
he wishes to argue is that these marriages are not legally valid.86 The next law he 
cites is the law on wills that specifies that wills made by those affected by ‘old age, 
illness or insanity’ and wills made under the influence of a woman or as a result of 
coercion shall not be valid.87 Again, the speaker attempts to create an analogy with 
his own situation, since he claims he only entered into the contract on the advice 
of a woman whom he later learned was conspiring with Athenogenes.  
 
In his treatment of the laws on lying in the agora, selling disabled slaves, betrothals 
and the validity of wills the speaker seems to assume that jurors will accept it as 
legitimate that there should be underlying legal principles which can be applied 
across different laws.88 These legal principles the speaker tries to ground in an 
argument that any and all agreements made must be fair if they are to be valid, 
which argument must be presumed to be a rebuttal of Athenogenes’ claim of caveat 
 
84 3.14-16. 
85 3.22. 
86 [Dem.] 59.52 gives the penalty for betrothing girls who are not Athenians as if they were 
Athenians as atimia and confiscation of property. 
87 3.18. 
88 Mirhady (2015) p. 238-41 notes the use made of principles to guide legal interpretation in this 
speech, but does not explore the wider significance of this use. 
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emptor. Athenogenes relies in this speech on arguments from personal justice and 
makes no use of arguments on the good of the polis.  
 
 
2.3.2 Public suits 
 
2.3.2.1 Antiphon’s On the Murder of Herodes 
 
Antiphon’s On the Murder of Herodes is an apagogē against kakourgoi brought 
against a non-Athenian for killing an Athenian citizen while outside of Athens. The 
defendant argues against his opponent’s use of the law, claiming that the 
prosecution should have been brought as a dikē phonou and not as an apagōgē.89 
The prosecutor appears to be arguing for a broad interpretation of the law that 
treats any act which can be considered the act of a kakourgos as within the scope 
of the apagogē law. The defendant argues for a narrow interpretation of the law 
and asks the jurors to interpret it as covering only kleptai and lōpodutai.90 He 
complains that he is the only person ever indicted by apagōgē for homicide, and 
argues that using this law to prosecute someone for homicide is illegitimate for 
multiple reasons.  
 
First, he claims it is irrational, since as a person under suspicion of homicide he 
should be barred from the very place where his trial is taking place.91 Second, he 
claims that the failure to use the dikē phonou has robbed the dead man of his 
justice, since the prosecutors are apparently seeking financial damages.92 Third, he 
complains that the failure to swear the antōmosia risks wrongs to both the 
defendant and the dead man, since the narrower rules of relevance applied in 
homicide cases mean both that the defendant will be tried only on charges of the 
death, and that the defendant will not have recourse to the kind of mitigation 
arguments commonly seen in the popular courts.93 Finally, the defendant asserts 
 
89 Antiph. 5.9. 
90 Antiph. 5.9. 
91 Antiph. 5.10-11. 
92 Antiph. 5.10. 
93 Antiph. 5.11. 
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that the prosecutor is setting himself up as a law-giver by arguing for a more 
expansive interpretation of the apagōgē law.94  
 
This case is highly dependent on arguments of personal justice, though that justice 
is shared between the speaker and the deceased. The only hint of ‘good of the polis’ 
arguments is the suggestion of an allegation that the prosecutor has acted in a 
dangerously hubristic fashion, both by pushing for an unusually wide 
interpretation of the law on apagōgē, and by unilaterally executing the slave who 
incriminated the defendant.95  It is possible that, as a non-citizen with no share in 
the polis, jurors might not have accepted the speaker arguing on the basis of the 
good of the polis. 
 
2.3.2.2 Isocrates’ Against Lochites 
 
Isocrates’ Against Lochites makes the strongest argument of all the cases in this 
sample for interpreting the law in line with the good of the polis. The problem for 
the speaker seems to have been to convince the jurors that Lochites’ assault on him 
merited a severe penalty, which is in itself an argument of legal interpretation, 
since he is apparently arguing for it to be punished as an act of hubris and not as 
aikeia, the charge actually brought. He does this by arguing that people who assault 
their fellow citizens pose a serious danger to the democracy. At 20.4 the speaker 
seems to argue for preventative punishment, and this is made more explicit at 
20.12-13: ‘you should punish potential criminals with greater severity than those 
who have already committed wrongs, in so far as it is better to find how to avert 
future evils than to exact the penalty for past misdeeds.’ At 20.10, the speaker 
claims that men who commit hubris are the same men who will seek to overthrow 
the democracy, and at 20.17 he identifies the good of the jurors with the good of 
the polis by claiming that by punishing Lochites they will deter other assaults, and 
thus protect themselves since all citizens are equally affected by the threat of 
physical assault. These arguments, in particular the claim for preventative 
 
94 Antiph. 5.12. 
95 Antiph. 5.35, 47. 
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punishment, contrast sharply with justice since they argue for punishment without 
any wrong or harm having been committed. Success in the speech depends on 
jurors being willing to set aside any claim to justice for Lochites and instead 
treating him as a symptom of a societal malaise.  
 
2.3.2.3 Lysias’ Against Agoratus 
 
In Lysias’ Against Agoratus the speaker has several challenging legal problems to 
overcome. The case concerns a man who, under the Thirty, is alleged to have been 
an informant and so to have caused the deaths of several citizens. In around 399 
an apagōgē96 was brought against him for one of these deaths. Agoratus apparently 
argued that he should not be held liable for the deaths since he acted unwillingly. 
This personal justice argument is countered by the speaker on the grounds of the 
good of the polis: ‘But in my view, gentlemen of the jury, when a man has done you 
such unsurpassable evil— even if it is totally against his will— you still have a duty 
to defend yourselves on this account.’97  
 
At 13.86 we are told that the Eleven insisted on the addition of the words ep’ 
autophoroi into the original apagōgē. It appears that Agoratus is relying on these 
words for some of his legal argument, and is presumably claiming that since the 
prosecution are alleging he was an informant they cannot consider him to have 
killed ep’ autophoroi. In response, the speaker argues for an extremely wide 
interpretation of the phrase ep’ autophoroi.98 He claims that since Agoratus was 
witnessed by 500 people denouncing the victims, he must have been caught ep’ 
autophoroi. The argument here is somewhat unclear, but he seems to support his 
proposed interpretation on the claim that someone needs to be held liable for the 
 
96 see Hansen (1976) p. 130-1. 
97 Lys. 13.52 trans. Todd (2000a). 
98 Harris (2006b) pp. 373-90 analyses the phrase ep’ autophoroi and concludes that it should be 
understood not as ‘in the act’ but as ‘clearly, manifestly’. He bases his analysis on the idea of thieves 
being caught in possession of stolen goods, and does not identify the significance of this translation 
for questions of homicide. In cases of theft the distinction between being caught stealing the goods 
and being caught in possession of stolen goods can be so fine as to be almost non-existent, but this 
is not the case for homicide. As such, the translation of ep’ autophoroi as ‘in the act’ should probably 
be retained. 
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deaths of the men on whom Agoratus informed, and if Agoratus cannot be held 
liable then no one can. This seems to be based on a principle of personal justice in 
relation to the justice owed to the dead men.99  
 
A further obstacle to the speaker’s case lies in the Amnesty, which simply 
understood ought to protect Agoratus from his acts under the regime of the Thirty. 
The speaker tries for a subtle interpretation of the Amnesty as a contract between 
the men of the City and the men of the Piraeus.100 Since both the speaker and 
Agoratus were, by the time of the Amnesty, men of the Piraeus, the speaker claims 
the Amnesty does not cover disputes arising between them. The speaker does not 
argue in detail for this interpretation of the Amnesty, but simply states it as a fact. 
This, then, is an interpretation grounded in the coherence of Athens’ legal 
system.101  
 
2.3.2.4 Andocides’ On the Mysteries 
 
Andocides’ On the Mysteries is Andocides’ successful defence against a charge of 
impiety. The speech makes unusually substantial use of legal argument. Andocides 
was accused of entering sacred spaces in breach of Isotimides’ decree of 415BC 
banning anyone who had confessed to committing impiety from entering such 
spaces. Andocides had been closely bound up with the scandals of the profanation 
of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the Herms and had denounced others and 
possibly himself for participation in these offences,102 and so was vulnerable to 
prosecution under this decree. In the intervening years between the decree of 
Isotimides and On the Mysteries, which was tried in 399BC, Athens had seen two 
major upheavals in its government and had made significant changes to its laws. 
On this basis Andocides was able to make a highly complex and legalistic argument 
 
99 Though it seems unlikely there was any firm legal duty on family members to prosecute a 
homicide, there does appear to have been a social expectation that family members should 
prosecute those responsible for the deaths. See MacDowell (1963) p. 8 c.f. Phillips (2008) p. 104. In 
Lys 13.21 and Antiph. 1.29 the dying men ask those present to punish their killers.  
100 Lys. 13.88-90. 
101 Though this version of the Amnesty has generally been rejected by academics, except Carawan 
(2013), it also appears in another speech in the Lysianic corpus – 6.37. 
102 1.61-64 
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which claimed that because of the intervening events the decree of Isotimides was 
no longer valid (akuron) as well as presenting a case that it was not in Athenians’ 
interests to seek to uphold the decree. 
 
His argument begins with a long explanation (1.10-71) of the events of 415 by which 
he tries to persuade jurors that he was never liable under the decree of Isotimides 
to begin with, since he did not admit to having committed any act of impiety. He 
then, very explicitly, explains that he wishes to address the legal question of the 
validity of the decree of Isotimides (1.70). The first line of argument Andocides 
adopts is to claim that the decree of Patrocleides,103 which gave back the privileges 
which had been stripped from atimoi (1.73), had removed any disability he might 
have been under as a result of the decree of Isotimides. Andocides offers examples 
of different forms of atimia which were cancelled by the decree of Patrocleides, but 
atimia for asebeia is not included in his list.104 Andocides does not present any 
argument to the effect that atimia for asebeia should be considered to have been 
cancelled by the decree of Patrocleides, but instead moves on to the upheavals 
caused by the rule of the Thirty and the subsequent Amnesty. It seems this 
argument may be being used in the same way as precedents were used in Against 
Meidias, to construct an argument that cases somewhat like Andocides’ have been 
treated in this way, so this is how Athenians think cases of this kind should be 
decided. Though this is not strictly a precedent, it does appear to be an argument 
on the grounds of justice as consistency. More importantly, it is the first step 
towards Andocides arguing that Athenians of the recent past wished all previous 
offences to be forgiven and forgotten. 
 
Andocides next line of argument is to claim that in the immediate aftermath of the 
Thirty it was decided that there should be a total revision of the laws of Athens and 
 
103 passed in 405. 
104 The speech at 1.77-79 purports to present the text of the decree of Patrocleides, which shows 
different categories of people affected by atimia, but Canevaro and Harris (2012) conclude that the 
Decree of Patrocleides as presented cannot have been a fifth-century decree and must be 
considered to be a later forgery. MacDowell (1962) p. 201 notes that if atimia for asebeia or atimia 
affecting access to temples had been mentioned one would expect Andocides to have highlighted 
the fact. 
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the results should be inscribed in the stoa basileios.105 Moreover, a law was made 
that no archon should use any unwritten law. At 1.86 Andocides claims ‘then if it 
is illegal to enforce a law which has not been inscribed, there can surely be no 
question of enforcing a decree which has not been inscribed’. It is not at all clear 
that this should in fact be the case.106 While certain decrees were reaffirmed by the 
post-405 democracy,107 these appear to have been ones which the Thirty had tried 
to destroy. These reaffirmed decrees were not passed by the complex process 
described by Andocides for the establishment of any law other than the laws of 
Solon and Draco, but were instead approved by the boulē acting on its own. 
Andocides, however, hopes that this measure will be interpreted on this occasion 
as instructing that all uninscribed decrees should be disregarded, thus nullifying 
the decree of Isotimides. This appears to be an argument based on a slightly 
sophistic version of justice as consistency. 
 
To complete his argument, Andocides refers to the law which, as he gives it, 
provides that only laws made after the archonship of Eucleides, that is, after the 
restoration of the democracy, shall be used. This provision, as given by Andocides, 
mentions decisions in dikai and achieved through arbitration and affirms them as 
valid, but does not mention psēphismata.108 Andocides argues:  
 
105 The nature of this revision is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.3. 
106 It is unclear whether the law requiring that magistrates should only use inscribed laws (presented 
in Andocides as meaning laws inscribed as part of the process of legal reform) would have been 
considered to be universally applicable to decrees. The evidence from the reinscription of honorific 
decrees suggests that they, at least, continued to be valid. The decree of Isotimides is a much more 
complex question, since it invokes asebeia, which we know was an offence under Athens’ laws 
through the fourth century, and seems to have been intended to close a loophole which allowed 
entry to temples for those who had admitted asebeia but had been granted adeia, such that under 
the decree of Isotimides they would be vulnerable to conviction for asebeia if they did enter the 
temple, despite being under no formal legal disability. As such, the decree could be considered to 
be one which in the fourth century should have been a nomos  and so should have been inscribed. 
Equally, it is not clear exactly which nomoi the inscription requirement applied to, whether it meant 
that only laws which had been inscribed as part of the process of revision of laws could be used, or 
whether it was simply a prohibition on the use of unwritten laws more generally, but which allowed 
continued use of laws which were inscribed prior to the process of revising the laws.   
107 1.82. See discussion in chapters 1.2 and 5.3. 
108 The veracity of the documents in On the Mysteries have been doubted – Canevaro and Harris 
(2012), but Andocides at 1.88 offers his own gloss on the contents of the laws he has had read out, 
in which says that decisions in private suits and decisions of arbitrators have been upheld, but that 
for public suits only laws passed since the archonship of Eucleides could be used. If the law had 
referred to psēphismata we would expect Andocides to have referred explicitly to that. 
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Now you decided that the laws were to be revised and afterwards 
inscribed: that in no circumstances were magistrates to enforce a law 
which had not been inscribed: that no decree, whether of the Council 
or the Assembly, was to override a law: that no law might be directed 
against an individual without applying to all citizens alike: and that only 
such laws as had been passed since the archonship of Eucleides were to 
be enforced. In view of this, can any decree passed before the 
archonship of Eucleides, whatever its importance or unimportance, still 
remain in force?109  
Essentially, Andocides is claiming that since nomoi outrank psēphismata, if nomoi 
from before the archonship of Eucleides are no longer to be used, then it stands to 
reason that psēphismata should also no longer be used. As we have seen in the case 
of honorific inscriptions, the case is not as clear as Andocides would like to make 
out.110 As such, the interpretation of the laws which Andocides wishes the jurors to 
adopt is not straightforward. He offers no reason for his preferred reading beside 
a claim that the purpose of the changes to the laws was to ensure that no one could 
prosecute out of malice any longer (1.86), but the argument seems to lean towards 
interpreting laws in line with justice as consistency.  
 
Next Andocides turns to the oath which the Athenians swore as part of the 
reconciliation after the fall of the Thirty by which they promised mē mnēsikakein, 
not to remember evil.111 Andocides tries to extend this promise, which is likely to 
have been intended only to cover events during the rule of the Thirty, to any and 
all events falling before the reconciliation. Not only is this legalistically tricky, since 
 
109 Andoc. 1.89.  
110 Hansen (1990) identifies this as the Law of Diocles cited in Dem. 24.42 'laws enacted under 
democratic government before the archonship of Eucleides and all laws that were enacted during 
the archonship of Eucleides and are on record shall be in force'. Carawan (2002), on the other hand, 
treats it as a sort of statute of limitations which affected both the validity of laws and the capacity 
of Athenians to prosecute for wrongful acts committed prior to Eucleides' archonship. MacDowell 
(1962) regards it solely as a statute of limitations. The law seems to relate better to the validity of 
the laws themselves than to their applicability. Not only is it not cited in Isoc. 18 (which concerns 
an alleged offence committed prior to the restoration of the democracy), the use Andocides tries 
to make of it would make no sense at all if it was not understood by the jurors to govern the validity 
of the laws. 
111 The Amnesty is discussed in detail in chapter 1.2. 
71 
his alleged offence (entering sacred territory when forbidden by decree) occurred 
after the reconciliation, the decree against which he is fighting is unlikely to have 
been covered by the Amnesty. As above, this is probably best read as an attempt 
to reinforce the principle that Athenians have decided to forget all past offences. 
 
Andocides makes an attempt to show that laws which predate the archonship are 
no longer valid by using the law against tyranny. Andocides uses the inconsistency 
between this law, which permits any Athenian to kill with impunity any person 
who holds public office after the Athenian democracy has been suppressed, and 
the terms of the Amnesty, which allowed those who had served public office to 
undergo euthynai to be granted forgiveness, to claim that the law was no longer 
valid, and that its invalidity was because it pre-dated the archonship of Eucleides 
(1.99). It seems unlikely that this argument would have stood up to close scrutiny. 
The decree of Teisamenus determined that Athens should use the laws of Solon. 
The law against tyranny appears to have been considered to be a law of Solon, and 
according to the preamble to the law against tyranny quoted by Andocides it may 
have come out of the process of drawing up of the laws by sungrapheis,112 further 
suggesting that it was considered to be one of the laws of Solon.113  As such, it seems 
likely that this law would have retained its validity.  
 
At 1.103 Andocides does, finally, admit that the law under which the prosecution 
brought their endeixis against him is a valid law, but he claims that they based their 
prosecution on an ‘old decree which was about other things.’ Rather than 
defending this claim on legal grounds, Andocides instead dwells on the chaos that 
would be unleashed on Athens if it were to renege on the promises it had made to 
create the Amnesty, restore exiles, and give back citizens their rights. It is not, 
however, clear that Andocides’ case should fall into any of those categories. He was 
 
112 See Chapter 5.3 on the processes of reform and republication of Athens’ laws which began after 
the fall of the Four Hundred, were interrupted by the Thirty, and continued following the 
restoration of the democracy. 
113 The validity of the decree of Demophantus has been doubted by Canevaro and Harris (2014) but 
defended by Sommerstein (2014), who nonetheless doubts its original inclusion in Andocides’ 
speech. 
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not barred from sacred spaces as a result of acts done under the Thirty, nor as a 
part of a formal exile, nor did he formally lose his citizen rights.114 This argument 
is entirely based on interpreting laws in the interests of the good of the polis.    
 
Andocides made an argument that his novel interpretations of the laws should be 
adopted by the jurors. He bases these interpretations on a combination of justice 
as consistency with other laws and previous decisions and polis good. He 
successfully establishes a claim that for the good of the polis the Athenians decided 
to forget past wrongs, produces what he claims are multiple examples of this, and 
argues that his case should be decided in consistency with these previous 
examples. We know him to have won his case, though as always cannot know 
whether the jurors favoured his interpretation of the laws, or rejected them but 
nonetheless accepted his argument that reopening old wrongs risked harm to 
Athens, or simply pitied Andocides.  
 
2.3.2.5 Lysias’ For the Soldier 
 
The point of law at issue in Lysias’ For the Soldier is under what circumstances it is 
an offence to insult a magistrate. The speaker claims that the law only treats 
insulting a magistrate as an offence if that insult took place in certain public spaces. 
He argues that since he was not in one of the designated spaces at the time he 
insulted the magistrate he should not be convicted.115 He does not argue in detail 
for this interpretation, instead presenting it as a common sense reading of the law. 
He does, however, state that when the magistrates he had insulted attempted to 
register the fine they had imposed upon him with the tamiai, the tamiai refused.116  
The reason given for this refusal was not, apparently, that the fine was unlawful, 
but because the tamiai did not think it right that any citizen should be registered 
as a public debtor out of personal enmity. This enmity could be a reference to the 
decision to fine the speaker, but it could equally be a reference to the initial 
 
114 MacDowell (1962) p. 203 concludes that ‘in strict law, the decree of Isotimides was still valid in 
400’ and accordingly we must assume that when Andocides entered the sacred space he committed 
an offence. 
115 Lys. 9.6. 
116 Lys. 9.6-9. 
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enrolment as a soldier, which the speaker felt was unjust (9.4-5, 15) and which 
prompted him to insult the magistrate responsible. Todd suggests that the law on 
insulting magistrates may not be as simple as the speaker would have us believe, 
and that in fact two separate laws might be being conflated; one forbidding 
insulting any person in certain spaces, and another forbidding insulting 
magistrates anywhere.117 Nonetheless, since the speaker does not argue for his 
interpretation of the law it is not possible to get any understanding of the 
principles on which he might base such an argument.  
 
2.3.2.6 Lysias’ Against the Graindealers 
 
Lysias’ Against the Graindealers is a prosecution against a group of metics for 
buying up more grain than the amount permitted under the laws of Athens. The 
speaker presents himself as meticulously concerned for the sanctity of Athens’ 
laws, claiming at 22.2 that he has only brought the case at all to prevent the 
graindealers from being executed without trial, as the boulē wished to see, in order 
to prevent the boulē getting into the habit of such practice, then at 22.4 explaining 
that he did this not to protect the graindealers but ‘in support of the established 
laws’. At 22.5 the speaker gives an indication of why it is so important to his case 
that he present himself as the defender of the laws: the graindealers had been 
ordered to buy up excess grain by the magistrates.  
 
The question of exactly what is meant by sumpriasthai, translated here as ‘buy up’, 
is subject to debate. Seager identified an ambiguity in the meaning of this key word 
in the law, which could mean either ‘buy to accumulate’ or which could carry a 
meaning associated with group buying. He claimed that the law must have been 
intended to prevent hoarding behaviour - that is, buying to accumulate - the 
speaker in the case takes advantage of the ambiguity in the meaning of 
 
117 (2007) p. 539. Harris (2013) p. 222-3 does not appear to take note of Todd’s suggestion, and claims 
this as an instance in which a conventional interpretation of law was favoured over an innovative 
interpretation. It should be noted that when the speaker explains why the Treasurers agreed with 
his claim that he should not be fined, he justifies this in a claim that the Treasurers did not think 
citizens should be mistreated by the generals (i.e. a claim based in justice), not that this was the 
only interpretation open to the Treasurers. 
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sumpriasthai to have the graindealers’ confession to having bought grain together 
blur into a confession to having bought grain in order to hoard it.118  
 
Seager’s interpretation of the case was challenged by Tuplin, who argued first that 
if there had been a dangerous ambiguity in the word sumpriasthai, the graindealer 
interrogated at 22.5 would have been more careful to explain himself clearly, and 
secondly that the speaker’s arguments centre around convicting the graindealers 
of hoarding, and not of combining together.119 Seager agreed to Tuplin’s objections, 
but neither stands up well to scrutiny. The first objection assumes that what we 
see at 22.5 is a literal transcription of the words of the graindealers. This cannot be 
securely established with the information we have about the process of publication 
of forensic speeches, so cannot be relied upon as a basis for argument. The second 
is more subjective, but Figueira has argued that the speech actually places very 
little emphasis on hoarding.120 Figueira’s reading of the case argues that the law in 
question is not in fact a law against hoarding, but rather a law against cartelisation. 
He claims that a limit on grain buying of 50 phormai would mean that Athens 
would have had to have had absurd numbers of graindealers, and that the 
mechanics of Athens’ grain trade suggest that the business of storing grain must 
have been left to the graindealers and not to the emporoi.  
 
Both Figueira and Seager proceed on the assumption that there must have been a 
single correct interpretation of the law, and they base their attempts to construct 
the correct interpretation on the presumed intent behind the law. This neglects 
the fact that there were no rules in Athens on legal interpretation, and while 
constructing the intent of the lawgiver was a popular method, it was not the only 
method available to jurors and litigants. Rather than trying to construct for 
ourselves a single ‘correct’ interpretation of the law, it may be better to address the 
law simply as presented to us here. There is definitely a level of ambiguity in the 
 
118 Seager (1966). 
119 Tuplin (1986). 
120 Figueira (1986). 
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meaning of the word sumpriasthai121 and we must assume that this ambiguity 
would have been an issue for jurors hearing the speech.  
 
As is apparent from the disagreement between modern scholars on how to read 
this case, the speech itself retains the ambiguity of the word. At times the 
graindealers do seem to be being accused of hoarding,122 but other sections of the 
speech only really make sense if the accusation is of cartelisation.123 The question 
then becomes what advantage there is for the speaker in retaining this ambiguity. 
It seems likely that the graindealers had formed some kind of cartel on the orders 
of Anytus as an attempt to artificially reduce grain prices, so it is possible that 
though the law might be understood by the jurors as against cartelisation, the 
orders of Anytus had made it questionable whether or not the graindealers had 
broken the law, so the speaker added in an accusation of hoarding, not because it 
was against the law, but because it was viewed with hostility so might persuade the 
jurors that what the graindealers had done was wrong. Equally, it might be that 
the law was likely to be understood to be against hoarding, but this is not what the 
dealers had done, so the speaker needed to utilise the ambiguity in sumpriasthai 
to take advantage of the fact that the word also connoted cartelising, which the 
graindealers had done.124  
 
As well as the ambiguities in the law, we see in this case a conflict between common 
sense ideas of fairness, where graindealers might expect that if they were ordered 
to do a thing by the magistrates they would not later be prosecuted for doing so, 
and a pedantic insistence on the importance of the letter of the law. At 22.6 the 
speaker makes it clear that he favours the letter of the law: ‘If he can demonstrate, 
gentlemen of the jury, that there is a law that orders grain retailers to buy grain 
together if the officials order this, then you should acquit him. If not, it is right that 
 
121 see Figueira (1986) p. 153-55 for a useful summary of instances and contexts of the word in 
contemporary texts. 
122 22.9, 15. 
123 22.8, 17, 21. 
124 This, minus the assumption that there is a single correct interpretation of the law, is Seager’s 
(1966) argument, but as discussed above, neither of the objections made by Tuplin stand up well, 
so Seager’s reading of the case is still of value. 
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you should convict. We have presented you the law forbidding any of the 
inhabitants of the city to buy together more than fifty phormoi of grain.’125 
Nonetheless, the speaker does attempt to refute the claim that the graindealers 
were validly ordered by the magistrates to buy up excess grain, bringing one of the 
former magistrates forward to testify that he ordered them to cease competing 
with one another, but not to buy up grain and hold it in store.126 This brings most 
sharply into play the question of exactly what behaviour the law should be 
interpreted as forbidding, but the speech preserves the ambiguity in the law and 
the speaker moves on to demand that if the jury do believe the graindealers that 
they were ordered to buy up grain by the magistrates then the jury should convict 
both the graindealers and the magistrates: ‘In situations where the laws are 
explicitly written, it is surely necessary to punish both those who disobey and those 
who tell them to do the opposite of what the law says’.127  
 
Unusually for a case where a highly legalistic interpretation of the law is used, the 
speaker does not offer any justification for this interpretation. His strategy seems 
to be to depend on the mistrust and dislike of the jurors for graindealers, and to 
hope that because of this mistrust, when the graindealers admit that they 
committed the acts in question but claim that they were neither illegal (based on 
the orders of the magistrates, and possibly the law itself, if it were to be interpreted 
as forbidding hoarding) nor wrongful (22.11 ‘it was in kindness to the city that they 
bought up the grain’) the jurors will reject one or both of those justifications and 
convict them.  
 
The clash of authority between the laws and the orders of the magistrate makes 
arguments on fairness difficult for the speaker to sustain. Instead, he relies on 
arguments on the interests of the polis, which he construes as upholding the 
 
125 Trans. Todd (2000a) 
126 22.9 
127 22.1o trans. Todd (2000a). A wholly rhetorical argument, since the jurors have no means by which 
to convict the magistrates of anything at this point and would need either to raise it at their 
euthunai (if they have not yet been scrutinised) or wait for some volunteer prosecutor to bring a 
case against the magistrates. 
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laws.128  It appears he expects that the graindealers themselves will also rely on 
arguments on the good of the polis, probably in order to show that their actions 
were in accordance with the instructions of the magistrate.129 This he counters with 
a long argument to the effect that the graindealers did not act in the interests of 
the polis.130 He follows this up with an explicit call to protect the interests of the 
polis by using the case to set an example to other graindealers: “So they will find 
out your attitude toward these cases, in the belief that if you condemn the 
defendants to death, the other grain retailers will be better behaved”.131 
 
2.3.2.7 Demosthenes’ Against Androtion 
 
Against Androtion is a prosecution speech for a graphē paranomōn brought against 
the proposer of a decree honouring the members of the boulē for their service. 
There are several points of law raised in Demosthenes’ speech. First, there seems 
to have been a clash of laws, with one law requiring a preliminary decree from the 
Council before the Assembly could pass any decree, but another law stating simply 
that ‘if the Council by its performance of its duties seems to deserve a reward, that 
reward shall be presented by the people’.132 Androtion is said by Demosthenes to 
have argued on the grounds of justice as consistency that many previous Councils 
had been honoured by the Assembly without any need for a preliminary decree.133 
Demosthenes, on the other hand, relies on a strict interpretation of the law, and 
argues that the fact of other people having acted contrary to the law only shows 
that a prosecution like this one should have been brought long before. He alludes 
to the possibility of deterrence, and this seems to be an argument based mainly on 
the good of the polis.134  
 
 
128 Lys. 22.6. 
129 Lys. 22.11-12. 
130 Lys. 22.12-16. 
131 Lys. 22.20 trans. Todd (2000a) 
132 Dem. 22.5. 
133 Dem. 22.6. 
134 Dem. 22.6-7. 
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Demosthenes next cites another law, which forbids any Council which has not 
built warships from asking for honours. Demosthenes claims that Androtion will 
argue that the Council have not asked for honours and so cannot be said to have 
breached this law (22.8). Demosthenes counters that the Council must in practice 
have asked for the honours since they had to propose the vote to the Assembly 
(22.9) and additionally that when the grant of honours was queried and members 
of the Council asked for the honours not to be revoked they must be considered to 
have been asking for the honours at that point (22.10). This issue of whether the 
Council did or did not ask for honours is treated here by Demosthenes as a 
question of fact, but it seems likely that in his opponent’s speech it would have 
been treated as a question of legal interpretation: his opponent will presumably 
argue on the basis of justice as consistency with other decisions that other Councils 
have proposed such votes to the Assembly, and that the fulfilment of this political 
role should not be treated as ‘asking for honours’ for the purposes of this law. 
 
Demosthenes does not rely solely on arguments that the Council asked for the 
honours, but tries to persuade the jurors to interpret the law based on its purpose. 
According to Demosthenes, the purpose of the law is to prevent the demos from 
being misled into granting honours to any Council which has not built warships, 
and as such the law should be read as banning both the requesting and the 
awarding of honours to such a Council (22.11). Demosthenes bases this 
interpretation of the law on arguments on the good of the polis, specifically the 
great benefit of possessing a large fleet.135 Demosthenes then tells the jurors that 
Androtion will try to argue on the basis of personal justice (though justice to the 
Council and not to himself) that it would be unfair to deprive the Council of 
honours because the failure to build warships was not their fault. Demosthenes 
counters this with a further good of the polis argument: it is not in the interests of 
the polis, he says, to reward failure.136 
 
 
135 Dem. 22.12-16. 
136 Dem. 22.17-21. 
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There is a separate line of argument in this speech which concerns Androtion’s 
legal capacity to make proposals in the Assembly.137 He is accused by the 
prosecution team of having been a prostitute and so of having lost his right to 
speak in the Assembly. While Androtion apparently objected to the prosecution 
charging him with wrongs other than having proposed an unlawful decree, 
Demosthenes claims that these accusations are relevant. Androtion’s supposed 
objections to this and his complaint that prosecution should be done through the 
proper actions (22.21-4) are countered by Demosthenes’ arguments on Athens’ 
range of processes (22.25-30).  
 
Demosthenes seeks to illustrate what he claims is a guiding principle of Athenian 
law; that a range of actions should be available to enable people with different 
levels of capacity to prosecute different actions. Not only is this argument 
dependent on an assumption that wrongs should be prosecuted,138 it does not work 
well for Demosthenes’ case, since even at the date of this case Demosthenes can 
hardly be said to have lacked the capacity to bring high-risk prosecutions against 
other public figures. Demosthenes backs this up in more arguments based on the 
good of the polis, arguing that Solon put the laws on prostitution in place not to 
punish those who engage in it, but in order to protect the polis from being harmed 
by men with bad characters.139 Here, Demosthenes explicitly promotes the 
interests of the polis over any claim for personal justice. Again at 22.35 
Demosthenes places the good of the polis over justice for the boulē. He argues that 
it is better that the 500 men of the boulē should be deprived of their honour 
because of the bad actions of a few of them, in order that this should educate and 
improve the 10,000 citizens. 
 
2.3.2.8 Demosthenes’ Against Aristocrates 
 
Against Aristocrates is another graphē paranomōn speech, but the central point of 
law in the speech seems to have been suppressed. The prosecution is brought 
 
137 Dem. 22.21-30. 
138 By no means an unproblematic assumption in Athenian law – see Chapter 4. 
139 Dem. 22.30-32. For a detailed study of this argument as used in Aeschin. 1 see chapter 3.2.2. 
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against Aristocrates for having proposed an honorific decree for Charidemus, who 
had already been granted Athenian citizenship. Aristocrates’ decree declared that 
if any man killed Charidemus, he would be liable to arrest everywhere. 
Demosthenes argues that this decree is unlawful since it is in breach of Athens’ 
ancient laws on homicide.140 It seems likely that there is a clash of laws. While 
Demosthenes argues only on the basis of the laws on the dikē phonou, Carawan has 
argued convincingly that by the mid-fourth century the dikē phonou had effectively 
been replaced by the more flexible apagōgē process.141 If this is the case, 
Aristocrates’ decree might not have appeared controversial to a contemporary 
casual observer.  
 
Rather than explicitly argue for his version of the law as an interpretation, 
Demosthenes presents it as the only version of the law available, and supports this 
primarily in Athens’ respect for ancient laws, as well as in the lawgiver’s supposed 
desire to prevent cycles of retribution. The circumstances and attitudes which 
prevailed at the time that Athens’ laws on the dikē phonou were made seem to have 
emphasised the maintenance of social order, rather than the punishment of the 
killer. By the fourth century, attitudes may have shifted to become more 
punitive,142 but Demosthenes is continuing to argue that these archaic laws are the 
only ones applicable to any potential violent death that might be suffered by 
Charidemus.  
 
At 23.61 Demosthenes argues that because Aristocrates’ decree did not make 
allowances for Athens’ recognised defences to homicide law, it is ‘manifestly 
 
140 Dem. 23.29-36. 
141 (1998) pp. 313-373. 
142 The dikē phonou seems to focus on removing the killer from the community as cleanly as 
possible, with most of Draco’s surviving homicide law focussing on processes of forgiveness and 
exile; the tighter rules of relevance applied in the dikē phonou (see Lanni (2006 pp.75-114), Rhodes 
(2004)) meant the Areopagites judging the case could not take into account the broad range of 
other exacerbating, or mitigating, information that might be taken into account by a dikastic court 
when judging the wrongfulness of a case, but that might also serve to fuel resentments between 
families. The dikē phonou builds in non-punishing through the rule that the accused could choose 
to go into exile before the final speeches were given. Antiph. 5 seems to show a family who are 
unwilling to make use of the dikē phonou for precisely these reasons – they have imprisoned the 
accused so he cannot exile himself and have brought their case before a dikastic jury. 
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contrary to law –  I do not only mean written law but to the shared law of all 
mankind – that I should not be permitted to defend myself against one who 
violently seizes my goods as though I were an enemy’.143 This claim is supported 
both by a supposed ‘universal law’, which should probably be interpreted as an 
argument based on justice, and by the threat that without this permission to 
defend one’s property one becomes vulnerable to hubris and to the damage hubris 
can do to the safety of the polis.    
 
A further point of law raised in the case seems to have concerned the wrongful act 
which constituted the offence in the graphē paranomōn. Aristocrates apparently 
argued that the wrongful act should be interpreted to be the harm caused by a 
unlawful decree, and that since the decree he proposed was never enacted he 
should not be liable to any penalty. Demosthenes counters that the wrongful act 
is the speech-act of proposing the decree, and so Aristocrates became liable for an 
offence as soon as he made the proposal.144 Demosthenes supports his 
interpretation of the law with arguments on the good of the polis, claiming that 
punishing Aristocrates will serve to deter other people from making similarly 
unlawful proposals.  
 
At 23.95 we are told that Aristocrates will try to argue that his decree follows a 
standard form and so, presumably, justice as consistency would require that jurors 
acquit him. Demosthenes counters with the same argument he uses in Dem. 22.5, 
that other people also having broken the law is no defence, and that this line of 
argument just shows more clearly the need for deterrence.  
 
2.3.2.9 Aeschines’ Against Timarchus 
 
The strategies of Aeschines in Against Timarchus will be discussed further in 
Chapter 3.2.2. The central legal point in dispute concerns the definition of 
 
143 Trans. Loeb, adapted. It should be noted that in the Rhetoric 1375a-b Aristotle treats to 
sumpheron as an attribute of universal law. No trace of this interpretation of universal law is visible 
in its use in Dem. 23. 
144 Dem. 23.92-94. The significance of these two interpretations is discussed in detail at 5.4.2. 
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prostitution for the purposes of the dokimasia rhētōrōn. Aeschines admits that 
some of Timarchus’ behaviour could be seen as hētairēkenai, but claims that since 
the behaviour was repeated across various relationships it should instead be 
treated as peporneumenos.145 Demosthenes is portrayed by Aeschines as intending 
to argue for a narrow and highly legalistic definition of prostitution centred on a 
definition of prostitutes as those who paid the prostitute tax.146 Aeschines, on the 
other hand, argues for a wide definition which focuses on the behaviour of the 
alleged prostitute and is based in ordinary linguistic usage of the term.147 He 
supports his preferred interpretation on the basis that it is the acts themselves that 
the lawgiver objected to, since they were evidence of a character which was not fit 
to influence decision-making in the polis.148 As such, Aeschines’ interpretation 
focuses not on personal justice, as is especially evident from the fact that about 
half the laws he cites have the prostituted body as victim149 not perpetrator of an 
offence, but on the good of the polis. While it might be unjust to exclude a man 
from full citizen rights because of what had been done to him in boyhood, in 
Aeschines’ reading of the laws it is expedient.150  
 
 
 
 
 
 
145 1.51-53. The legal relevance of this distinction is uncertain. Aeschines claims (1.32) to be 
prosecuting under the dokimasia rhētōrōn. Lane Fox (1994) has doubted this, but Fisher’s (2001 p. 
158-9) arguments that this is the procedure used by Aeschines seem compelling. In Aeschines’ 
summary of the law on the dokimasia rhetoron 1.28-32 he states that it applies to ‘those who have 
lived shamefully’, and gives examples of this as those who have mistreated their parents, those who 
have failed to do military service, and anyone who has prostituted himself or served as an escort 
(‘having been an escort’ is Fisher’s preferred translation of hētairēkenai). Fisher p. 158 notes that 
Aeschines’ additions and comments make it hard here to work out which parts were and were not 
part of the law.  
146 1.119. 
147 This is implicit throughout the speech, but particularly at 1.124. 
148 Again, this appears at multiple points in the speech, but most explicitly at 1.30. 
149 Aeschin. 1.9-18. 
150 While Aeschines won his case, we cannot assume that this is an instance where expediency was 
definitely allowed to outweigh justice, since Aeschines also makes it clear that Timarchus’ 
prostitution continued into adulthood. 
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2.3.2.10 Aeschines’ Against Ctesiphon and Demosthenes’ On the Crown 
 
Aeschines’ Against Ctesiphon and Demosthenes’ On the Crown allow us to compare 
strategies151 of legal interpretation in a single case.152 While Aeschines’ speech 
contains a significant amount of detailed argument about legal interpretation, 
Demosthenes’ is almost exclusively focused on defending his own record. It is 
important to remember, however, that Demosthenes was only one of the sunēgoroi 
supporting Ctesiphon, and other speakers may have given more time to arguing 
Ctesiphon’s legal position.153  
 
Aeschines argues that Demosthenes’ crowning was unlawful since it was done 
before his euthynai. In response, Demosthenes claims that the act for which he was 
crowned was not one which was subject to euthynai. Aeschines bases his 
interpretation on the good of the polis, claiming that the ban on awarding crowns 
prior to euthynai enables the polis to uphold its laws more effectively by preventing 
the dēmos from being put in the difficult position of needing to condemn a person 
they had already crowned.154  
 
There is a further disputed point of law on the definition of an archē for the 
purpose of the law. Aeschines urges a broad interpretation of the term in line with 
other laws.155 He anticipates Demosthenes arguing for a narrow interpretation of 
this term which limits archē to the offices filled by election and by appointment by 
lot by the thesmothetai.156 Demosthenes does not argue this point in detail, but 
instead seeks to separate the act for which he was honoured (the donations) from 
the office he held, thus rendering his actions exempt from euthynai at any time. 
 
151 How far the speeches were revised prior to publication is addressed by Yunis (2001) p. 26-7, who 
considers that though both speeches would have received some revision, this was likely to be small 
details and that both speeches can be considered to be similar to the speeches delivered at the trial. 
152 Harris (2013) p. 225ff, arguing that Aeschines had the weaker position in law, offers a summary 
of previous opinions that Aeschines had the stronger position. Stating that Demosthenes or 
Aeschines had a stronger position in law requires us to understand that there did exist a ‘correct’ 
interpretation of the laws at stake in this case. Given that Athens did not have any authoritative 
means by which to interpret laws, no such correct interpretation can be said to have existed. 
153 Rubinstein (2000) p. 169. 
154 Aeschin. 3.10-12. 
155 Aeschin. 3.12-16. 
156 Aeschin. 3.13. 
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Demosthenes justifies his interpretation on the basis of both personal justice (‘It 
would be quite intolerable that it should either not be permissible for a man 
holding any office to make gifts to the polis, or if, having given gifts, he should 
receive an audit instead of thanks’ 18.114-115) and justice as consistency with 
previous decisions.157 Aeschines rejects this argument on the basis that all Athenian 
officials, even those who handle no polis funds, are subject to euthynai at the end 
of their term.158 Aeschines bases this interpretation of the law as requiring 
Demosthenes’ donations to have been subject to euthynai in part on consistency 
with other laws, but also on the good of the polis,159 since he claims that the 
purpose of euthynai is to protect the functioning of the democracy. 
 
Aeschines argues another point of law on the permissibility of proclaiming crowns 
in the theatre. He claims that Athenian law allows crowns to be proclaimed only 
in the boulē or the Assembly.160 It appears that the two opposing litigation teams 
have found contradictory laws. Whereas Aeschines presents a law which states that 
crowns awarded by the boulē should be presented in the boulē, and crowns 
awarded by the Assembly should be presented in the Assembly ‘and nowhere 
else’,161 Demosthenes presents a law which allows proclamation in the theatre of 
decrees made by the boulē or the Assembly.162  
 
Aeschines pre-emptively rejects the law presented by Demosthenes on the basis 
that Athenian law cannot have had two contradictory laws on the same subject. 
He evidences this by discussing the steps taken by the thesmothetai to maintain 
Athens’ laws.163 Aeschines argues that the second law should be interpreted in line 
 
157 Dem. 18.112-118. 
158 Aeschin. 3.17-22. 
159 Aeschin. 3.9-11. 
160 Aeschin. 3.32. 
161 Aeschin. 3.32 – though it is tempting to believe that the phrase ‘and nowhere else’ is Aeschines’ 
own gloss on the law, his repeated use of the same phrase (3.34, 48) suggests it may be a quote from 
the law, especially since the first time he cites it is immediately before he has the law in question 
read to the jurors. 
162 Dem. 18.121. 
163 Although in principle Athenian law should not have had contradictory laws, since any newer law 
which contradicted an old one should not have been allowed (see chapter 5.4), it is worth noting 
that although Aeschines subtly implies that his law is the older of the two laws (his is attributed to 
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with the mischief principle, and that the mischief that law was intended to solve 
was the disturbance that was previously being caused to the theatre by too many 
people being crowned. He appears to claim that since the law in question was not 
explicitly intended to introduce proclamation of crowns granted by the boulē or 
Assembly in the theatre, the clause in the law that would appear to allow this 
should not be read as a valid part of the law, and instead the only part of the law 
which remained should be read as standing on its own.164 In this round-about way, 
Aeschines construes the law as permitting proclamation in the theatre only to 
crowns awarded by foreign states. This complex interpretation of the laws is based 
in part on consistency with other Athenian laws, and in part on arguments based 
on the good of the polis, both since it is that good which Aeschines claims was 
intended to be protected by the law on proclaiming crowns in the theatre, and 
since Aeschines claims this law means that people receiving crowns in the theatre 
will be grateful to Athens for the proclamation, rather than being grateful to the 
foreign city for the crown. Demosthenes takes a more robust approach to legal 
interpretation. Rather than arguing in a lot of detail against Aeschines’ 
interpretation of the clash of laws, Demosthenes accuses Aeschines of being a 
sykophant165 about the issue, and claims that the proclamation of crowns in the 
theatre is both commonplace (justice as consistency with previous decisions) and 
beneficial for the polis as a whole, since it will encourage other citizens to emulate 
excellent behaviour.166  
 
 
ho nomothetēs, 3.33 while the law cited by Demosthenes is attributed to tis nomothetēs 3.44) he 
does not rely on this for his argument, but instead makes a complicated and ultimately unsatisfying 
argument based on the mischief principle of interpretation. In effect, rather than arguing that the 
newer law is unlawful in its entirety, he treats it as a valid law, but in order for it to be valid he is 
forced to adopt an extremely strained reading of the law. 
164 Aeschin. 3.45 ‘So when [the lawgiver] stipulates announcement  in the bouleuterion for those 
who are crowned by the boulē, and in the Assembly for those crowned by the demos, and when he 
forbids announcement at the tragedies for those crowned by the demes and tribes, in order that no 
one, by gaining crowns and proclamations, should acquire philotimia falsely, and additionally in 
the law he bans proclamations from any other source, then without boulē or demos or tribe or deme, 
when these things are taken away, what is left but foreign crowns?’. 
165 On sykophancy, see Chapter 4.3.1.3. 
166 Dem. 18.120-21. 
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In these paired speeches, we see both sides using arguments based on both the 
good of the polis and justice as consistency or as personal justice to support their 
preferred interpretation of the law, demonstrating both the flexibility of these 
arguments and the fact that they are equally useable in defence and prosecution 
speeches. These are clearly powerful arguments for guiding jurors’ interpretation 
of the law, and arguments which both sides want to be able to use to support their 
own proposed interpretation.  
 
2.3.2.11 Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates 
 
In this speech, Lycurgus prosecutes Leocrates for having fled Athens during a time 
of crisis. The speech is explored in more detail in Chapter 3. The interpretative task 
the jurors are called upon to complete is extremely broad: as Lycurgus himself 
admits, there is no one law which clearly covers Leocrates’ act, and instead the 
jurors are called upon to act as nomothetai.167  
 
Lycurgus’ rhetorical strategy is dependent on arguments about the good of the 
polis. Though he makes some use of previous cases, he does this not to encourage 
the jurors to make fair decisions which are consistent with previous cases, but 
instead to evidence the idea that Athens treats and has always treated acts of 
disloyalty to the polis very seriously.168 Though he makes some pretence to fairness 
by claiming that whereas other speakers stray from the point of their prosecution, 
he will not do this169 he quickly moves away from this, and far from wishing 
Leocrates to have a fair hearing, he reminds the jurors that Leocrates’ hearing 
should be treated as unlike any other defendants’ because of Leocrates supposed 
notoriety in the rest of the Greek world.170 Lycurgus uses arguments about polis 
good to attempt to increase the wrongfulness of Leocrates’ actions, as at 1.63-64, 
where he argues that Leocrates’ actions must be regarded as more wrongful than 
any other harm done to a polis, since if every citizen were to leave the polis would 
 
167 Lycurg. 1.8-9 
168 1.37-55 
169 1.11 
170 1.14 
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cease to exist. This argument on wrongfulness is a part of Lycurgus’ rhetorical 
strategy to influence the jurors’ interpretations of laws, since he has already urged 
them that they must act as nomothetai if they consider Leocrates’ actions to be 
more wrongful than other acts which are more clearly covered by Athens’ laws. 
 
2.3.2.12 Hyperides’ In defence of Euxenippus 
 
Hyperides in his speech In defence of Euxenippus seeks to present an interpretation 
of the eisangelia law which excludes anyone who is not a rhetor from the scope of 
the provisions on speaking against the best interests of the city and receiving 
bribes.171 He bases this interpretation in part on the need for Athenian laws to be 
consistent, not as a matter of justice, but as one of structure, as we also saw in 
Andocides On the Mysteries. He also supports the interpretation on the basis of 
fairness, since, he says, private citizens do not enjoy the same rewards as rhetors 
they should not be expected to share the same risks.172  
 
At 4.27 he comes back to his argument on how the eisangelia law should be 
interpreted and argues on the basis of the good of the polis that since private 
citizens do not have the same power to hurt the polis as rhētōrs do, the law on 
eisangelia should not be interpreted in such a way as to include them in its scope.173  
 
The speech makes peculiar use of precedents. At 4.3 Hyperides complains about 
recent trivial uses of the eisangelia law, effectively citing precedents for precisely 
the interpretation of the law he is rejecting. At 4.33-38 however precedents are used 
to support his argument that Athenian juries are not in the habit of convicting rich 
men just to gain their estates for the polis. It shows one of the rare examples of 
forensic speeches arguing that private justice serves the good of the polis through 
 
171 As noted in Chapter 3.2.4, this speech takes a remarkably narrow approach to interpretation of 
laws, insisting that each law should be interpreted and applied in isolation. On the meaning of 
rhetor in fourth-century Athens, see Hansen (1983). 
172 Hyp. 4. 7-9. 
173 Whitehead (2000) p. 158 notes the argument in Curtis (1970 – unpublished dissertation) p. 31-2 
that the prosecution is likely to have argued that Euxenippus’ actions had been a threat to the 
democracy. 
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the story of a jury rejecting a phasis of a mine which was alleged to have exceeded 
its boundaries, and by respecting the law in their judgements, increasing 
investment in Athens’ mines as the wealthy felt safe to invest again. Neither of 
these can be seen as real uses of precedent, since the first explicitly rejects the 
precedent cited, and the second does not seek to guide interpretation of a law and 
is probably best understood as a rejection of an argument for aggravated penalties.  
 
In this speech we can see the speaker using an interplay of polis good and 
individual justice arguments to persuade the jurors to adopt his interpretation of 
the law, but placing most reliance on arguments from polis good. 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
By taking seriously the interpretative role of juries in classical Athens, we can get 
a better understanding of the interplay between considerations of law, justice and 
expediency. Athenian orators seem to have been equally comfortable using 
arguments based on justice, whether personal justice or justice as consistency, and 
arguments based on expediency to guide jurors in how they should interpret law.174 
Apart from the fact that we only see arguments on personal justice used in isolation 
in private cases, no marked pattern emerges on the use of these arguments across 
different types of case. Neither does there seem to be any change across time of 
these arguments. From this evidence, it seems likely that juries were equally willing 
to accept the principles underlying the laws of Athens as supporting justice or as 
supporting the good of the polis. Far from needing to view these arguments as 
antithetical to a functioning legal system, they show the accepted purposes of the 
system, even if they also show that, as in most legal systems, those who lived within 
and used it were not entirely coherent about what they wanted their legal system 
to achieve. As such, where we see litigants arguing that the jury’s decision in their 
 
174 This of course contrasts with Aristotle’s advice in the Rhetoric 1358b that to sumpheron is a matter 
only for deliberative oratory. As Mirhady (1990) p. 395 observes, Aristotle does not allow these 
boundaries to limit his orator, and instead invites orators to push the boundaries of rhetorical 
genres, making use of tools from deliberative oratory where to do so will strengthen their speech.  
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favour will serve the interests of the polis, we do not necessarily need to see this as 
a perversion or a misuse of the legal system: serving the interests of the polis was 
one of the accepted purposes of Athenian law. 
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CHAPTER 3: MORALITY – ROLE IN INTERPRETATION 
OF LAW 
 
 
In this section, I continue to apply Dworkin’s model of interpretation according to 
principles, but I use it to ask a different question. Rather than looking at how far 
jurors were asked to view individual justice or community advantage as principles 
underlying the laws of Athens, here I explore the use of morality to guide 
interpretation of law.1 Whereas in the previous chapter I adopted a very narrow 
definition of justice focussed on consistency with previous decisions and 
arguments of fairness, here I have adopted a wide, values-based definition of 
morality.2 As I explored in the previous chapter, Athenians did not object to 
arguments about expediency being used in their courts and were probably willing 
to use expediency as a principle for interpretation of laws. As such, the contrast we 
might naturally make between justice/right vs expediency/wrong would be less 
apparent to Athenians. It is likely that Athenians would seek to treat both ta dikaia 
and to sumpheron as ‘right’.  
 
Litigants’ speeches generally have three elements to them: 1) I didn't do it / He did 
it; 2) It wasn't wrongful / It was particularly wrongful and 3) It wasn't against the 
law / It was against the law. Different speeches, of course, use these elements in 
different ways and balances, and few if any rely solely on a single line of argument. 
Here, I seek to look at the interplay between arguments on morality and 
wrongfulness and arguments on legality to try to understand what Athenian 
litigants hoped would persuade jurors to adopt their interpretations of the law in 
 
1 Dover (1974) pp. 288-316 treats individuals’ relationship with the state as part of his study of 
popular morality, but his model of Athenian morality proved to be unusable for this study, see p. 
94 below. 
2 Greek use of dikaios is difficult here given its very wide range of meanings and contexts. Dikaios 
can mean just, but also fair, right, and can be a more general positive term.  
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question. Accordingly, I have disregarded the parts of the speeches which concern 
the likelihood of the person accused having committed the act in question, and 
have focussed on the parts of the speech which concern the morality of the alleged 
act and the laws relevant to the case. This means that some sections of speeches 
which do have relevance for those who study Athenian morality have not been 
included here, since they are not directly related to the act of which the defendant 
is accused but are instead character evidence intended to increase jurors' 
perception of the likelihood of the defendant having committed the act in 
question. This is not to deny the relevance of such arguments in helping Athenian 
juries to make their decisions, but only to allow me here to focus on the interplay 
between the wrongfulness of an act and its illegality in the forensic speeches. Given 
jurors’ freedom to interpret laws (see Chapter 2), if laws were generally considered 
to have an underlying moral purpose, we would expect to see litigants trying to use 
this moral purpose to guide legal interpretation. 
 
I have based my selection of speeches here on those used in the previous chapter, 
and from there have selected speeches which show particularly interesting 
approaches to the role of morality in judging cases. 
 
A major problem for this section has been to find some adequate definition of 
morality. I had hoped to adopt the definition of morality used by other scholars 
who have worked on Athenian morality, but their various definitions have proved 
difficult to apply outside of their own studies.3  
 
Dover defined morality as ‘the principles, criteria and values which underlie [a 
person’s responses]’ to the experience of one’s own desires clashing with the 
desires of another.4 This means that Dover’s definition of morality can only be 
 
3 In modern scholarship on the relationship between law and morality the focus tends to be on 
justifying that there must necessarily be some close relationship between law and societies’ moral 
values (e.g. Dworkin), or between law and a set of moral values based on fundamental freedoms 
which would have been alien to ancient Greece (e.g. Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights); and 
not on defining what those moral values are. 
4 Dover (1974) p. 1. 
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applied where there is a pre-existing conflict of desires, and, more limiting for this 
study, that it includes a wide range of behaviour where the term ‘morality’ is 
probably too strong.  
 
Herman appears reluctant to offer any clear definition of how he understands 
morality, beyond the fact that it concerns the behaviour of those living together 
cooperatively in societies.5 This fails to account for any moral expectations that 
might undermine social cohesion, and as such leads to his conclusion that 
Athenian morality tended to promote highly cooperative behaviour. For the 
purposes of this study, Herman’s definition of morality is both too widely inclusive, 
applicable as it is to good manners, and too restrictive, excluding as it does any 
moral condemnation that might not promote social cohesion.  
 
Cohen appears to take immoral behaviour as behaviour which diverges from 
normal behaviour.6 Though this works tolerably well for his study of Athenian 
sexual behaviour, attempting to apply it more widely means that it is necessary to 
ask the question: can a person be exceptionally moral? Cohen does also write on 
the interconnection between morality and law, but his interest lies in the reality of 
the role law played in controlling Athenian sexual behaviour. He is looking, as 
result, at the degree to which law genuinely did govern morality, and is not looking 
at the role of morality in understandings of law. He does, however, note that if law 
diverges too far from popular morality, that law will then lose some of its 
influence.7 So, for Cohen, some basis in popular morality is required for law to have 
any effect. This brings into play questions about personal initiative in prosecuting 
as well as problems in convincing juries to convict. These are, however, questions 
about an individual law, not the whole system of laws. For Cohen, we can say that 
some connection with morality is a necessary condition of laws, but not a defining 
one.  
 
 
5 Herman (2006) chapters 1 and 2. 
6 Cohen (1991) p. 24-34. 
7 Ibid. p. 4. 
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Adkins examined values, rather than morality, and defined values as ‘what is 
expressed and revealed by the explicit value judgments of members of the society, 
which they use to evaluate an individual or a group ... and the actions of either, or 
when taking decisions, when those judgments are considered in the light of the 
characteristics which are held to justify passing them.’8 
 
Adkins’ approach is the most applicable to this study, but I have also been keen to 
include elements of moral judgment which express disgust for the act in question. 
The role of the emotion of disgust in moral judgments is an important one,9 
especially in its ability to ‘other’ the person who is made the object of disgust. 
Fisher and Spatharas have produced recent studies of the role of disgust in three 
Athenian forensic speeches (Demosthenes’ Against Androtion and Against 
Meidias, and Aeschines’ Against Timarchus). Fisher notes that there is no mention 
in the rhetorical handbooks of the emotion of disgust, and that the Athenians did 
not use ‘disgust’ as an abstract noun. He observes that the two main words 
associated with disgust, bdeluria and miaria, have slightly different roles to our 
term disgust. While bdeluria has an important role for expressing physical disgust, 
it is rarely used with a moral sense. Miaria, though it carried important moral 
significance, was rarely used for physical disgust.10  
 
In his analysis of Against Androtion and Against Meidias, Fisher argues that the use 
of disgust in these speeches is strongly correlated with hubristic and anti-
democratic behaviours. The association of these behaviours with disgust may 
highlight the seriousness with which Athenian viewed these types of offences. 
Spatharas focuses on the use of disgust to ‘perpetuate “comforting fictions of 
normality”’ and on how disgust is used in Aeschines Against Timarchus to 
highlight Timarchus’ repeated breaches of normal social boundaries.11 As such, 
 
8 Adkins (1972) p. 2. 
9 Fisher (2016) p. 103-5 offers a useful summary of some of the modern work on the role of disgust 
in making moral judgments.  
10 Fisher (2016). 
11 Spatharas (2016). 
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both studies show appeals to disgust being used to protect Athens’ social order, 
and in particular Athens’ democracy.  
 
Though Harris bases much of his analysis of Athenian law on the work of Hart, 
who as a positivist tends to minimise the role of morality in grounding 
understandings of law, he nonetheless at times appears to expect law to serve some 
moral purpose within the polis.12 Harris brings much of his moral analysis to bear 
not on Athenian law but on Athenian judging in his work on the use of arguments 
based on epieikeia.13 
 
In this study, I am primarily looking for moral arguments where the speaker does 
not feel any need to explain to the jurors why the behaviour is morally wrong.14 In 
this way, I hope to be able to access shared Athenian assumptions about moral and 
immoral behaviour. I am also interested to highlight presentations of the laws 
where speakers argue that a law should be interpreted in the light of others of 
Athens’ laws, on the assumption that there exists an underlying purpose to all of 
Athens’ laws (broad interpretation). Equally, I am interested in the arguments used 
to claim the converse - that each of Athens’ laws exists in a vacuum and should be 
interpreted independently of anything else (narrow interpretation). Though this is 
not universal, in general the broad interpretation model also carries with it more 
explicit appeals to the jurors to interpret the laws as serving a moral end, while the 
narrow interpretation tends to favour interpretations which exclude moral 
considerations. As in chapter two, speeches are divided into public and private and 
presented in chronological order within these categories. 
 
 
12 Harris (2013) p. 3 Harris quotes Lord Bingham on the protections afforded by the rule of law, but 
neglects to observe that Lord Bingham’s favoured definition of rule of law is a ‘thick’ definition, 
inclusive of a range of human rights, where by necessity the definition of rule of law Harris adopts 
is a ‘thin’ one limited to procedural matters. 
13 ibid. chapter 8. 
14 If asked whether parking on the curb is immoral, most people might be likely to say it is not, but 
if you then explain the inconvenience and potential danger caused to others by this they might 
then be willing to concede that it is immoral. On the other hand, we are quick to condemn any 
form of sexual behaviour with a child as wrong, even where (for example, Japanese manga featuring 
sexualised images of children) no child is harmed. 
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3.1 Private suits 
 
3.1.1 Lysias’ Against Simon 
 
Lysias’ Against Simon is a trial before the Areopagus in defence on a charge of 
trauma ek pronoias. There appears to have been some degree of ambiguity in 
whether the pronoia in the charge should relate to wounding (intentional 
wounding) or to murder (wounding with intent to kill). The speaker in Against 
Simon assumes the latter, claiming ‘I also believed there could be no premeditation 
in wounding if someone wounded with intent to kill; for who is so naïve that he 
premeditates long in advance the way in which one of his enemies should receive 
a wound’.15 It is to be assumed that the prosecutors were arguing for the opposite 
interpretation: that the case belonged before the Areopagus as a graphē traumatos 
ek pronoias, and not before a dikasterion as a dikē aikeias.  
 
The eikos argument that the speaker uses to support this interpretation looks odd 
to modern eyes, as assuming that any reasonable Athenian’s plots against his 
enemies will be murderous ones, but may fit within one set of Athenian standards 
of morality as proposed by Cohen, but opposed by Herman.16 It is interesting that 
the speaker does not attempt the sort of defence of narrow approaches to legal 
interpretation used in In defence of Euxenippus,17 but instead supports his proposed 
method of interpretation in assumed norms of behaviour, such that it would be a 
nonsense to have a law against something which no reasonable Athenian is going 
to do.18  
 
Here, laws are presumed to fulfil a function, but not one which is necessarily aimed 
at enforcing social norms of behaviour. Rather than the law existing to control a 
 
15 3.41 Trans. Todd (2007) 
16 Cohen (1995), Herman (2006). 
17 see below 3.2.4. 
18 Phillips (2007) argues by analogy with the law on homicide that in trauma ek pronoias the pronoia 
element applies to mere intent and not to premeditation, and that intent related to wounding, so 
the best translation would be intentional wounding. The argument from analogy with homicide 
law may assume more rigid standards of interpretation than can be securely relied upon. Certainly 
in both Lysias 3 and Lysias 4 the speakers make claims which suggest that the intent should be 
considered as intent to kill.  
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behaviour generally accepted as wrongful, the law is presented as controlling 
behaviour which is socially normal and to be expected. It must be presumed that 
the purpose of the law as presented is not to punish behaviour which is universally 
condemned, but to control behaviour which while deemed to be normal, is 
nonetheless socially disruptive and harmful.19 
 
 
3.1.2 Lysias’ Against Theomnestus 
 
Lysias’ Against Theomnestus is a dikē kakēgorias concerning the aporrhēta – the 
unsayable words. From the speech we learn that Theomnestus is accused of having 
claimed that the speaker killed his own father, and that before the arbitrator 
Theomnestus claimed that the law forbade the use of the term androphonos, but 
did not forbid using other words carrying the same meaning. As such, the case is 
closely argued on grounds of legal interpretation. Theomnestus is presumably 
arguing for a narrow approach to legal interpretation, similar to that seen in In 
defence of Euxenippus,20 where a law should be read in isolation and applied 
strictly.21 The speaker, meanwhile, argues for a much wider approach to legal 
interpretation.  
 
 
19 That homicide was considered to be socially harmful in Athens is perhaps best exemplified by the 
complex attitudes towards the miasma attaching to murderers. See Parker (1983) p. 104 ff. 
20 see below 3.2.4. 
21 Todd (2007) suggests that this may be a misinterpretation of Theomnestus' argument to allow 
the speaker a reductio ad absurdum argument. If this is the case, it seems risky for the speaker to 
have given 15 paragraphs of his speech over to countering an argument which is not core to 
Theomnestus’ case. There seems to be no doubt about Theomnestus having made the accusation 
that the speaker killed his father, so Theomnestus’ remaining line of argument is to claim that it 
was not illegal to say what he said. It appears he can justify this either on the basis that he did not 
speak one of the aporrhēta (the argument the speaker claims he favours) or that his accusation was 
true and therefore not unlawful (Lys. 10.30). If Theomnestus had argued his case on the basis that 
it was true that the speaker murdered his own father, that would be a deeply damaging allegation 
(Dem. 22.2 claims his enemy prosecuted his uncle for asebeia for being on friendly grounds with 
him despite his having allegedly murdered his own father - illustrating the degree to which a 
patricide should be shunned. The speaker in this case does not claim to have brought a dikē 
kakēgorias against his enemy, but instead to have cleared his name in court when his enemy won 
less than a fifth of the votes.) and an allegation which one would expect the speaker to spend 
significant effort rebuffing. As such, it seems likely that Theomnestus’ argument did centre around 
a claim that his insult did not constitute any of the aporrhēta. 
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To support his argument, he argues first that laws cannot be expected to cover 
every possible eventuality: ‘For it was too much of a task for the lawgiver to write 
all the words that have the same effect; but by mentioning one he showed his 
meaning in regard to all of them’ (10.7-8). He goes on to give examples of laws 
where the wording is archaic and this does not affect how the laws are used.22  
 
The leading moral argument in the case is one of reciprocity – that Theomnestus 
had apparently won a case he brought under the same law against someone who 
had accused him of throwing away his shield (ῥῖψαι τὴν ἀσ+ίδα), though the law 
apparently used different wording (ἐάν τις φάσκῃ ἀ+οβεβληκέναι) (10.12). 
According to the speaker, if Theomnestus had been allowed to win a case based on 
a wider interpretation of the aporrhēta, then that wider interpretation should be 
available to him in his prosecution of Theomnestus. At 10.24, this successful 
prosecution by Theomnestus is even presented as a ‘great and good gift’ given by 
the jurors to Theomnestus, and a gift which he did not deserve.  
 
In his arguments on how the law should be interpreted, the speaker does not 
attempt to address the purpose of the law in question. Rather than attempting to 
argue that the law had certain purposes and interpretation should be in line with 
those purposes, the speaker argues instead in favour of legal interpretation more 
generally – claiming that it is always necessary for jurors to interpret laws in their 
decision making, and that it is normal for terms in laws to be subject to 
interpretation. The moral arguments he uses are only to support a consistent 
approach to legal interpretation. As such, the speaker does not engage at all with 
any moral purpose that might underlie the law. 
 
 
 
 
22 Todd (2007) observes that although the arguments in the case have generally been considered to 
be weak, in the absence of fixed rules on interpretation of laws, the argument may 'have been a new 
one for the jury' p. 635. See Chapter 2.3.1.2 on the two types of interpretation the speaker blurs 
together here. 
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3.1.3 Demosthenes’ Against Conon 
 
Demosthenes’ Against Conon is, legally, a slightly odd case. The prosecution is a 
dikē aikeias against Conon for allegedly assaulting the complainant. Despite 
prosecuting using the dikē aikeias, the speaker works to prove that Conon should 
be considered to be guilty of having committed hubris, presumably on the basis 
that if he is guilty of the greater offence he must definitely be guilty of the smaller.23 
The reasoning used to support the speaker’s decision to prosecute for the lesser 
offence is social, not legal; as the speaker explains (54.1), he was persuaded by those 
around him not to take on ‘matters which I should not be able to carry, or to appear 
to be bringing suit for the maltreatment I had received in a manner too ambitious 
for one so young.’  
 
The other peculiarity of the case is that Conon’s personal role in the assault appears 
to have been questionable. It is not clear whether the only witness to the assault, 
Phanostratus, appeared in court (54.8-9). He is described at 54.8 as having been 
fallen upon and held down while the speaker was assaulted. Witnesses are not 
called upon until 54.9, by which time the speaker has also described how passers-
by found him lying naked and injured in the street and carried him home to his 
mother and to be attended by a surgeon. The witnesses called at 54.9 therefore 
may or may not include Phanostratus.  At 54.25 the speaker seems to acknowledge 
this by attempting to argue that the attribution of guilt to the instigator seen in 
Athens’ homicide laws24 should also apply to the dikē aikeias. As in other cases, the 
speaker is trying to imply the existence of a cohesive structure of laws, where 
provisions from one area of law can simply be carried over as general principles 
into other areas. There is no evidence that the law on aikeia did consider the 
instigator to be as guilty as the doer.25 
 
23 Prosecuting through a dikē aikeias but alleging hubris is also used in Isocrates 20 (see 2.3.2.2). 
Todd (2000a) p. 347 suggests that Lysias’ fragmentary speech Against Teisis may have done the 
same. 
24 IG I3 104 l. 12-13. 
25 The choice of Conon as the defendant seems strange. The speaker seems to have a good case 
against Conon’s sons and a poor one against Conon. It is possible he was motivated by some 
ongoing dispute we cannot see. Or perhaps, since this is an agōn timētos where the claimant gets 
to keep for himself any damages awarded, Conon was just a better target for getting financial 
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In the speech, the speaker gives an explanation of what he presents as the purpose 
of Athens’ overlapping laws:  
there are actions for evil-speaking; and I am told that these are 
instituted for this purpose—that men may not be led on, by using 
abusive language back and forth, to deal blows to one another. Again, 
there are actions for battery; and these, I hear, exist for this reason—
that a man, finding himself the weaker party, may not defend himself 
with a stone or anything of that sort, but may await legal redress. 
Again, there are public prosecutions for wounding, to the end that 
wounds may not lead to murder. The least of these evils, namely 
abusive language, has, I think, been provided for to prevent the last 
and most grievous, that murder may not ensue, and that men be not 
led on step by step from vilification to blows, from blows to wounds, 
and from wounds to killing, but that in the laws its own penalty 
should be provided for each of these acts, and that the decision 
should not be left to the passion or the will of the person concerned. 
(Dem. 54.18-19) 
As we have seen in other cases, Athens’ laws are presented as forming part of a 
larger, coherent structure with ascertainable purposes. The purpose here is to 
prevent escalation of violence from verbal abuse, through physical violence and on 
to homicide. Here, homicide does seem to be presented as a wrong in itself, with 
the structure of laws existing to prevent people from feeling the need to resort to 
that extreme response. On the other hand, the laws are not presented as existing 
to prevent wrongdoers from committing wrong, but only to offer a non-violent 
recourse for their victims to seek redress. The law on kakēgoria, for example, is not 
presented as seeking to reduce the levels of verbal abuse, but only to prevent those 
 
redress. Since we are told Conon will argue (54.13-14) that the whole affair was just normal, young 
male behaviour, it is possible the choice of Conon as defendant was to lessen the impact of this 
defence (which defence would presumably be an argument to the effect that the behaviour should 
not be considered wrongful). However, societies’ willingness to turn a blind eye to young male 
violence can usually be expected to come to an end when the violence becomes too severe, and by 
the speaker’s evidence we might expect this line to have been crossed in this case. 
101 
who are subject to it from using violence against their abusers. The laws do rely on 
certain social assumptions (i.e. that these acts constitute insulting behaviour, and 
that those subject to insulting behaviour will want access to redress) but it is not 
clear how far these are moral positions. 
 
Where Cohen reads this as an acknowledgement of a feuding culture, where feuds 
may be carried on just as well through legal violence as through physical, Herman 
instead considers it to embody a system which tries to limit violence and encourage 
moderate, controlled responses to provocation.26 As Wohl notes, the speech itself 
equivocates between these two positions, recognising the existence of some 
normalised violence, while trying to draw a boundary and place Conon and his 
sons’ behaviour on the far side of it.27  
 
Cirillo notes the emphasis placed in this speech on the disgustingness of Ariston’s 
beaten body, and seeks to demonstrate that the speech transfers this disgust from 
the person of Ariston onto the act of Conon.28 His analysis is not entirely 
convincing, and the evocation of disgust in Ariston's description of the harm he 
suffered does not seem to be passed on to Conon or his actions. As such, disgust 
cannot be used as a useful guide to the moral positioning of the law in this case.  
 
The law is presented not as furthering the moral state of Athenian society, but only 
as allowing those who have been wronged to seek redress without risking major 
societal disorder. The law, in effect, is presented as a societal safety valve. The 
purpose of the laws seems not to be about enforcing a version of morality which 
condemns the use of violence, but instead acknowledges a social norm that would 
encourage violent responses to aggression, while controlling those responses to 
maintain order within the polis. The structure of laws envisioned by the speaker in 
Dem. 54 does not enforce a social norm that rejects violence, but instead seeks to 
 
26 Cohen (1995) p. 127, Herman (2006) p. 157-60. 
27 Wohl (2010) p. 71 ff. 
28 Cirillo (2009). 
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channel expected violence through the system of the courts.29 Much of the moral 
argument in Against Conon focuses on characterising Conon and the group around 
him as habitually hubristic and dishonest, but the accusation of habitually 
hubristic behaviour, while relevant to the charge in question, is not used to guide 
the legal reasoning.   
 
 
3.1.4 Hyperides’ Against Athenogenes 
 
In this case, a weak legal argument is supported by a complex moral argument 
which is tied closely to the arguments on personal justice we have seen used in 
Chapter 2.3.1.7. The moral arguments in the case attempt to paint Athenogenes as 
of bad character, focusing chiefly on accusations that Athenogenes is guilty of 
desertion (3.29) and of mistreating the citizens of Troezen after they had made him 
a citizen (3.30), yet these accusations are not simply general character 
assassination, but are integrated into the main argument of the speaker’s case, 
which emphasises the importance of reciprocity: ‘after disregarding the agreement 
which we all make with the polis, he insists on his private contract with me’ (3.31). 
The speaker attempts to paint Athenogenes’ presumed argument that the jury 
should uphold the agreement and leave the speaker to suffer his financial losses on 
his own, as Athenogenes asking the jurors for a favour which Athenogenes does 
not deserve.  
 
As mentioned above (Chapter 2.3.1.7), the speaker makes use of a law of Solon that 
slaves’ debts were the responsibility of their masters, and claims that on this basis 
the debt cannot have been passed to him on the purchase of the slaves since the 
debt did not belong to the slaves but to Athenogenes. On this basis, the speaker 
protests that if Athenogenes insists on the terms of the agreement, this will mean 
that Athenogenes is asking that an agreement should be allowed to override the 
law, something even ‘fairly drafted’ psēphismata could not do.30 Here, the speaker 
 
29 Cohen (1995) argues that this is true of all of Athens’ laws. 
30 3.22 δικαίως ἔγραφεν ψήφ[ισ?ά. ‘Fairly drafted’ is Whitehead's (2000) translation. Loeb has 
‘constitutionally proposed’ -  neither quite catches the breadth of dikaios. 
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makes use of his characterisation of Athenogenes as someone who does not 
deserve any favours from the Athenian demos by framing Athenogenes’ request 
that the agreement be upheld according to the law as instead a request that the 
agreement be upheld over the law.  
 
The interaction between legal and moral arguments in the case is complicated, 
with a weak legal case being supported with both subtle arguments on legal 
interpretation and a characterisation of Athenogenes as someone who breaches 
the norms of reciprocity that are essential in any sale agreement.31 The laws of 
Athens are presumed by the litigant to have a consistent moral purpose to deny 
validity to unjust agreements, and his argument depends on the jurors accepting 
the existence of such a morally consistent basis for the laws. As such, the speaker’s 
argument presupposes an Athenian legal system in which laws serve moral ends 
and those moral ends are essential in legal interpretation. The litigant asks the 
jurors, based on the moral principle evidenced by other laws, to effectively create 
a new law and so makes an argument for a legal system in which the authority of 
law is based on the moral purpose it serves. Though this principle is an explicitly 
moral one, centring as it does on the idea of an unjust agreement, it does not derive 
from off-the-cuff values judgements. It remains unclear whether Athenians would 
generally have seen Athenogenes’ behaviour as wrongful, let alone unlawful, but 
Hyperides successfully constructs an argument that it should be considered both 
wrongful and unlawful.32 Despite this clear assumption of a consistent moral 
underpinning to the laws, the speaker does not attempt to invoke it in his moral-
type arguments, which instead explicitly espouse a social contract model of law 
(3.31 ‘after disregarding the agreement which we all make with the polis, he insists 
on his private contract with me’) and attempts to argue that because of 
Athenogenes’ failure to abide by agreed standards of reciprocity he should be 
denied the support of the jury and so the protection of the law on contracts.  
 
 
31 I give you A if you give me B being the simplest form of any sale. 
32 It is also notable that the speaker does not treat the jurors as free to make a solely moral decision 
on the case. He does not argue that since the agreement was unjust it should not bind; rather he 
argues that since the agreement was unjust the laws do not allow it to bind. 
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3.2 Public suits 
 
3.2.1 Andocides’ On the Mysteries 
 
As we saw in chapter 2.3.2.4, in this speech Andocides successfully puts forward 
novel interpretations of the laws and bases his proposed interpretations in polis 
good and justice as consistency. The moral arguments in this case are less 
significant than the complex legalistic arguments. Andocides makes a fairly weak 
argument on grounds of reciprocity that if citizens are to be tried for their past 
actions his accusers should be much more in danger than he is, but this argument 
plays much more strongly into the polis-good argument highlighting the dangers 
that faced Athens more generally if people were to be allowed to rake up past 
wrongs. He makes allegations of wrongdoing against his accusers, that Callias is 
bringing the case against Andocides because of a dispute between the two men 
over an epikleros; that Callias was a dissolute youth; that Agyrrhius is bringing the 
case because Andocides outbid him and won a tax farming position, which when 
Agyrrhius held it he used to take money from the polis. None of these arguments 
are connected to Andocides’ arguments on how Athens’ laws should be interpreted 
and applied, but are instead very generic arguments intended to cast doubt on his 
opponents’ motives and so on the likelihood of their version of the justice of the 
case being the right one.  
 
The major moral argument that Andocides does make, at 1.140, is that Athenians 
are being admired by all of Greece as ἄνδρες ἄριστοι καὶ εὐβουλότατοι and for their 
ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ σωφρόνων ἔργον, and Andocides urges the Athenians to show 
that they authorised their decree (or vote) by intention, not by chance. Here, 
Andocides grounds his argument that the jury should uphold the Amnesty in an 
explicitly value-based argument, and asks the jury to prove in court that they really 
meant the fine sentiments they expressed in their decree (or vote). This moral 
claim, that Athenians as andres agathoi and sophronoi must uphold the Amnesty, 
is of course blurring the terms of the Amnesty itself, but this forgiving approach is 
exactly what most suits Andocides’ extremely expansive reading of the Amnesty. 
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At 1.143 Andocides attempts a solely moral argument based on reciprocity. 
Explaining that the Spartans declined to destroy Athens because of Athens’ role in 
the Persian Wars, Andocides claims that his family’s benefactions to Athens should 
be considered in the same light as Athens’ benefactions to Greece, and so 
Andocides should be shown the same mercy that Athens was shown by the Greeks. 
In making this argument, Andocides does not attempt to use his family’s history 
as evidence that he is less likely to have committed the offences for which he is 
being tried, neither does he use it to mitigate the wrongfulness of the offences. The 
elegant argument undermines Andocides’ previous arguments that he should be 
acquitted because he is not guilty of anything, but the tendency to treat conviction 
or acquittal by Athenian juries as a personal favour is by no means limited to 
Andocides. It does not attempt to guide the jury’s interpretation of the laws, but 
simply places Andocides at the mercy of their whim and asks them to look kindly 
on him.  
 
In the speech we see Andocides using highly complicated legalistic reasoning, 
including imputing some degree of moral purpose to the laws he seeks to have the 
jury use in their decision making. Though most of his argument about the purpose 
of the laws is focused on expediency,33 he does also praise the Amnesty on solely 
moral grounds, and those moral grounds are important for his preferred 
interpretation of the Amnesty and the other laws and decrees which surrounded 
the transition from the Thirty to the restored democracy. He does not, however, 
impute any such moral purpose to the wider system of laws. His analysis of Athens’ 
laws is highly temporally specific, focussing on a short period after the fall of the 
Thirty which was already being characterised by Athenians as particularly notable 
for the mercy and moderation shown by the victorious returning democrats. The 
claim that Athenian laws had a moral underpinning is linked very closely to the 
spirit of forgiveness which Andocides claims underlay those particular laws. As 
such, though Andocides’ On the Mysteries shows some evidence that Athenians 
could consider the moral purpose for which laws were made to be important in 
 
33 As explored at 2.3.2.4 
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guiding how those laws should be applied, this evidence is very specific to the 
historical moment in which the laws in question were made. 
 
 
3.2.2 Aeschines’ Against Timarchus 
 
Aeschines in Against Timarchus presents a set of laws as part of a coherent system 
with a set purpose: to protect Athens’ democracy from perversion by those whose 
characters have been corrupted by inappropriate sexual behaviour. From 1.7 
onwards, Aeschines presents a large number of different laws which govern the 
education of boys, and imputes to all of them the underlying purpose of protecting 
boys from sexual predation, and so protecting those boys’ characters from 
perversion. None of these laws is directly relevant to Aeschines’ prosecution of 
Timarchus. Aeschines is not alleging that Timarchus committed any of the 
offences related to the protection of young boys; far from it, he claims that 
Timarchus was the victim of such offences. Rather than forming part of his 
prosecution of Timarchus for sexual offences, the citation of these laws is intended 
to support an argument which is likely to have been controversial:34 the argument 
that it is harmful for adult men to have sex with young boys. To support this 
argument, Aeschines takes this fairly disjointed selection of laws and claims that 
they all have as their purpose the prevention of sex between men and boys, and 
argues that the reason they have this as their purpose is because Athenians had 
always considered that young boys who had sex with older men would see their 
characters perverted as a result.35 Here, we see Aeschines attempting to use the 
existence of laws which he claims are intended to prevent young boys having sex 
as evidence to substantiate an argument that Athens considered and had always 
considered sex between young boys and grown men to be harmful to the characters 
of young boys. Timarchus was not, according to Aeschines, the perpetrator of this 
 
34 See Cohen (1987) pp. 171-202 on the contradictions inherent in Athenian approaches to sex 
between males. Fisher (2001) pp. 25-36 concludes that there was probably a ‘relatively high level of 
actual homosexual sex’. 
35 Fisher (2001) p. 37 suggests that these laws, if genuinely Solonian, were more likely to have as 
their purpose the maintenance of correct status boundaries. 
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kind of wrongful sex, but its victim, which suggests that Aeschines was trying to 
present not a moral argument (having sex with boys is wrong), but a pragmatic one 
(having sex with boys damages the characters of Athens’ future citizens). This is 
borne out by the rest of the speech, as we shall see. 
 
From 1.18 onwards, Aeschines moves from the laws that concern young boys, and 
onto the laws which determine what a man can do with his own body. The shift 
from offences with a victim to victimless offences is marked by Aeschines, but in a 
sense which continues to place emphasis on the body which is subject to 
penetration: ‘But as soon as the young man has been registered in the list of 
citizens, and knows the laws of the state, and is now able to distinguish between 
right and wrong, the lawgiver no longer addresses another, Timarchus, but now 
the man himself.’ (1.18-19) Again, we see Aeschines present a selection of different 
laws with the purpose of demonstrating to the jurors an underlying intention. The 
first law presented is one which appears to have governed the graphē hetairēseōs 
and which forbade anyone who had been a prostitute36 from serving as one of the 
nine archons, as a state advocate, as herald or ambassador, or in any office whether 
appointed by lot or elected, or from addressing the Council or the Assembly.37  
 
From there, Aeschines moves on to the law governing the arrangements for 
meetings of the Assembly. Aeschines successfully spins a law instructing the herald 
to invite men over fifty38 to speak first into a paean to the orderliness and politeness 
of Athenians’ forbears, and then into a complaint about Timarchus᾽ rude behaviour 
in giving a speech in which he threw off his cloak (1.26). The laws which Aeschines 
actually presents about the organisation of the Assembly, however, specify only 
 
36 It is unclear exactly what forms the core of the act of hetairesis. Fisher (2001) pp. 40-2 is unsure 
that penetration is the core element, and suggests that living financially off someone else was at 
least as important. E. Cohen (2016) p. 366-69 argues that a fairly large number of Athenian citizens 
might have worked in prostitution, and claims that the purpose of the laws restricting the political 
rights of male prostitutes was to guard against those who would pervert traditional homosexual 
relationships and gift-giving into business relationships, in line with other Athenian prejudice 
against money-making activity. 
37 1.19-20. 
38 A law the validity of which is doubted by Lane Fox (1994) p. 147-8, who observes the conflict 
between citing an obsolete law while claiming to exist in a state in which laws are sovereign. On 
obsolete laws, see 5.4.3. 
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that the sacrifice is to be carried around, that the Assembly is to discuss ‘matters 
to do with ancestral religious matters, dealing with heralds and embassies, and 
with secular matters’,39 and that older men should be invited to speak first. Though 
many jurors might have agreed that behaving appropriately in the Assembly was 
important, Aeschines has not been able to present a law to that effect. Nonetheless, 
Aeschines gathered a set of laws which he can convincingly argue have as their 
principle the maintenance of order in the Assembly, and successfully argues that 
the reason this was considered important was to prevent unsuitable people from 
addressing the Assembly.  
 
Finally, Aeschines comes to the law concerning the dokimasia rhētorōn, which 
excluded men who have abused their parents, failed to perform military service, 
prostituted themselves, or squandered their patrimony from speaking before the 
demos.40 Underlying all these laws, Aeschines claims to find a consistent belief that 
men who are disorderly and poorly disciplined should not be allowed to address 
the people because they will give unsuitable advice. This claim, that only men with 
morally upstanding lives should be allowed to address the demos, is, at heart, an 
argument about expediency. It is not that Timarchus must be punished for his 
immoral behaviour, but rather that Timarchus’ behaviour shows him to be the kind 
of man whom lawgivers considered likely to be damaging to good order in the city. 
Despite the moralising arguments used by Aeschines in his speech, his 
presentation of the laws relevant to his case depends not on moral arguments but 
on practical ones.41  
 
39 1.23 Trans. Fisher (2001). 
40  1.28-32. Lane Fox (1994) pp. 147-9 identifies this law too as having probably been semi-obsolete 
at the time Aeschines used it in this case. 
41 Lanni (2016) pp. 98-117 claims to find the laws on the graphē hetairēseōs and dokimasia rhētorōn 
having wider effects among Athens’ elite. She seems to identify the laws as initially embodying a 
popular dissatisfaction with the elite practice of pederasty, and argues that this elite practice fell 
out of fashion precisely because of these laws. Her argument depends on two unprovable 
assumptions: first that the laws were genuinely popular attempts to control elite behaviour, and 
second that the laws predate the change in elite attitudes towards homosexual pederasty. Even if 
Lanni’s arguments can be substantiated, they do not clearly indicate a moral role for laws in Athens. 
Participation in pederastic relationships does not, in her analysis, become morally wrong, but it 
may become dangerous for one’s later career. Lanni seeks to identify these laws as signalling that 
‘a majority of the Athenian population viewed hetairesis as incompatible with honorable 
citizenship’ (p. 109), however this assumes a great deal about how Athenians viewed their laws and 
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3.2.3 Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates 
 
Lycurgus’ Against Leocrates takes an approach to both legal and moral arguments 
remarkably similar to that of Hyperides’ Against Athenogenes. Like Hyperides, 
Lycurgus’ main difficulty in constructing the speech is that it is unlikely that the 
defendant in the case actually broke any of Athens’ laws, yet he can be considered 
to have breached Athenian norms of behaviour. As in Against Athenogenes, 
Lycurgus quotes various Athenian laws as he attempts to construct an argument 
that, by analogy with these laws, the defendant should be considered to have 
broken the law. Unlike in Against Athenogenes, however, Lycurgus openly 
acknowledges that no law covers this precise situation (1.9).  
 
Lycurgus claims ‘where different offences are not specifically included in the law, 
being covered by a single designation, and where a man has committed crimes 
worse than this… your judgement must be left as an example for your successors’ 
(1.9-10).42 Here he sets out the model he would like the jurors to apply to their 
interpretation of the law – that they should look at the already broad scope of the 
existing law, and then ask if what the defendant did is more wrongful than the acts 
included within that law. If they find that the acts done by the defendant are more 
wrongful than those included within the scope of the law, as Lycurgus presents it 
those acts simply cannot be considered to have been legal, and as such must be 
covered by the law.  
 
Lycurgus’ speech concerns a man, Leocrates, who fled Athens after Athens' defeat 
at Chaeroneia. Lycurgus attempts to use a combination of decrees and precedents 
from previous cases to show that Leocrates’ flight from Athens should be treated 
as unlawful. The first decree cited is one which was passed after the battle of 
Chaeroneia determining that women and children should be brought in from the 
countryside to the safety of Athens’ walls and that generals should be empowered 
 
the role of their laws in society. If laws are not assumed to have moral content or purpose, they 
cannot give moral signals. 
42 Trans. Loeb (adapted) 
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to appoint citizens and residents of Athens to defence duties.43 Though Lycurgus 
tries to frame this as though it places duties on individuals, it is not clear that this 
is the case, and it is perfectly likely that this decree simply set out the decision of 
the Assembly as to Athens’ strategy to handle the crisis.  
 
At 1.52 Lycurgus presents as a precedent the execution of men who tried to flee 
Athens by the Areopagus during the crisis. It seems that Lycurgus anticipated that 
this would be a controversial precedent; he first hushes an expected thorubos, then 
presents his opinion that men who sit on the body that tries homicide would not 
take life unlawfully. The expected thorubos and Lycurgus’ defence of the 
Areopagites suggest that this is not as reliable a precedent as one might hope for, 
and that there were perhaps allegations that the Areopagus had unlawfully ordered 
the deaths of these men, which further suggests that fleeing Athens might not have 
been recognised as treasonous.  
 
The precedent given at 1.53 seems a little more secure. It rests on a jury's conviction 
of Autolycus for sending his family out of Athens during the crisis, though he 
remained in Athens himself. According to Harpocration,44 Autolycus was an 
Areopagite, which may affect the legal situation, or it may be that, as in Against 
Leocrates, Lycurgus had prosecuted him without a strong legal basis, but had, in 
that case, been successful. This is the full extent of Lycurgus’ arguments to the 
effect that Leocrates’ actions should be considered to constitute treason.45  
 
From 1.111 Lycurgus moves away from showing that what Leocrates did constituted 
treason (that is, making legal arguments), and instead focuses on showing that the 
offence of treason has always been treated severely by Athens’ laws and courts (that 
is, persuading the jurors of the wrongfulness of Leocrates’ actions). It is notable 
 
43 1.17. 
44 Harpocration s.v. Autolukos. Harpocration records that it was Lycurgus who prosecuted 
Autolycus.  
45 Though he does at 1.76-77 invoke the ephebic oath and claim that Leocrates is guilty either of 
oath-breaking (epiorkia and thus asebeia) or of failing to take the oath, presumably for nefarious 
reasons. Leocrates does not attempt to give the oath legal status in itself. 
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that it is in this context that Lycurgus refers to the decree condemning to death 
those who settled at Decelea (1.121). The decree seems, on its face, a perfect example 
for Lycurgus to use to show that moving away during a time of crisis constituted 
treason. Lycurgus does not mention in his speech that at the time of the decree 
Decelea was occupied by Sparta, and from Lycurgus’ presentation of the decree it 
seems likely that the decree itself did not reference it.46 He describes it to the jurors 
as a penalty inflicted for moving within the same xōra and asks that since Lycurgus 
travelled much further he should be more harshly treated. The fact that he used it 
in this way suggests that the settlers at Decelea may have been condemned for 
some offence other than treason, or that their condemnation may have been solely 
on the basis of the decree against them. 
 
As the speech progresses, Lycurgus, though painting himself as the defender of the 
laws,47 moves increasingly towards a position where the laws set out only 
minimum standards of behaviour, but citizens can and should be held to higher 
standards. Lycurgus offers the evidence of poetry and plays to demonstrate to 
jurors the high ideals Athenians should hold themselves to, and seeks to present 
abandoning one’s own country as, if not against polis law, then against a natural 
law which is respected even by animals.48  
 
Though in 1.9-10 the law seems to be placed on a moral footing, where it must be 
assumed that where offences are defined by statute, and a man is proved to have 
committed worse than those, he must therefore be guilty of something, later in the 
speech a much more complex model of law and wrongfulness is presented. At 1.66-
7 Lycurgus imputes to the earliest lawgivers the intention that laws should, above 
all, deter people from committing wrongs, such that penalties should be set 
according, not to the wrongfulness of the acts, but to their likely harm if they were 
 
46 By the time the speech was given in 330, it is possible many of those listening would not in the 
moment have realised that around 80 years previously Decelea had been occupied by Sparta and 
this was the context of the decree. 
47 1.4. 
48 1.132. For the complex interplay between phusis and nomos, see chapter 4.3.3. 
112 
to be adopted by all citizens.49 This highly utilitarian model may suit Lycurgus’ 
case well, since Leocrates seems likely to have presented himself as having broken 
no law nor done anything wrongful by leaving Athens to become a trader in 
Megara. In Lycurgus’ version of Athenian emigration, any person leaving Athens 
to live abroad, at whatever time and for whatever reason, could be considered 
guilty of a serious harm to the polis, given that if all Athenians imitated them the 
city would soon be empty.  
 
Whereas Hyperides tried to substantiate his claim for moral basis in other 
Athenian laws,50 Lycurgus is much more dependent on the precedents offered by 
previous cases. Lycurgus cites no laws, and his attempts to guide the jurors’ legal 
reasoning as to whether the actions of Leocrates constituted treason are based 
instead on one decree and two precedents.  As in Against Athenogenes, Lycurgus 
also raises the question of reciprocity, and claims at 1.143 that Leocrates cannot be 
permitted to claim the protection of the laws now, since he abandoned them when 
he ran away. Here again, the protection of the laws is treated as a privilege, and 
one to which Leocrates, by his desertion of Athens and alleged habitual disloyalty, 
is no longer entitled. Unlike in Hyperides Against Athenogenes, however, the 
defendant is not relying on the protection of a discrete law, or even the protection 
of a legal principle underlying one particular area of law,51 but rather is relying on 
the much wider principle that citizens should not receive punishment if they have 
not broken any law. Lycurgus seems to be trying to push the reciprocity argument 
even further than Hyperides when he asks that Leocrates should be denied the 
protection of Athens’ laws since he did not himself protect Athens. 
 
 
 
 
49 Putting deterrence above all other ends can lead to morally problematic results. Deterrence 
works just as well if you convict the wrong person for the crime, as long as the public never find 
this fact out. Crimes which are most common, on this model, should be the ones most seriously 
punished, regardless of their relative wrongfulness. 
50 See above chapter 3.1.4. 
51 i.e. contracts should be upheld. 
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3.2.4 Hyperides’ In Defence of Euxenippus 
 
Hyperides’ In defence of Euxenippus, a defence in an eisangelia alleging bribery, 
takes the narrowest approach to interpretation of all the cases we have examined 
here. The case is a defence against an allegation that Euxenippus, apparently an 
elderly and not especially prominent Athenian, took bribes to falsely report a 
dream he had had when sleeping in a temple in order to get an indication from the 
gods about to whom land in Oropos should be granted.  The land had, we are told, 
been shared between the Athenian tribes, but a question had arisen about whether 
one section, which had been assigned to Acamantis and Hippothontis, should in 
fact have been part of the land set aside for the hero Amphiaraos. In response to 
Euxenippus’ dream, Polyeuctus, the prosecutor of Euxenippus, had proposed a 
decree that would have assigned the land to Amphiaraos and had the other eight 
tribes compensate Acamantis and Hippothontis for the value of the land, but the 
decree had subsequently been found to be unlawful. Unfortunately, we do not 
know how the decree related to Euxenippus’ dream.52  
 
Hyperides adopts a very limited argument in this case, arguing primarily on the 
basis that the law under which the eisangelia has been brought does not apply to 
the alleged wrongdoing and is limited to prosecutions against orators, and asks the 
demos for a narrow interpretation of the law on the basis that the polis has laid 
down specific laws for good reasons (4.4) (though sadly those reasons are not 
stated), and the jurors should respect that. The purpose the speaker claims for this 
specific law is given at 4.9 and more explicitly at 4.27-8, where the speaker objects 
to the prosecution of Euxenippus on the basis that the prosecutor should focus 
only on those with the power to cause real harm to the city, and Euxenippus is not 
among them.53 There is a suggestion at 4.4 and at 4.35-6 that the prosecutors may 
 
52 Whitehead (2000) 201-203 summarises the main strands of opinion, either that Polyeuctus’ decree 
attempted to act on the conclusion of Euxenippus’ dream, or that it was intended to oppose the 
dream, or that the dream was in some way ambiguous or deficient. 
53 On the basis of the evidence of this case, Hansen (1983) argues that Athens recognised two 
separate definitions of rhetor in Athens, the first a legal definition which applied to any person who 
‘took it upon himself to address the ecclesia, the boulē, the nomothetai and the dicasteria’, and the 
second a more colloquial definition which ‘designates a small group of regular speakers’. Since he 
draws his evidence for the existence of the first definition from his modelling of the presumed 
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be demanding, as Lycurgus does in Against Leocrates, that Euxenippus does not 
simply rebut the legal charge, but that he show his behaviour was within norms of 
behaviour. Though at 4.31 the speaker makes reference to various attacks which he 
claims the prosecutor made on the character of Euxenippus, he does not address 
these accusations in detail and instead accuses the prosecutor of using this as a 
cheap trick to confuse the jurors and distract the defence speakers.54 The speech 
relies for its moral force on the idea that it is wrong for a professional and 
experienced speaker like Polyeuctus to victimise a private citizen like Euxenippus. 
This is backed up by language invoking disgust (4.1 prosistantai- identified by 
Whitehead (2000) as coming from medical literature and meaning ‘sicken’) and 
has significance for the interpretation of the law favoured by Hyperides. 
 
It is necessary for Hyperides’ argument that the jurors accept, first, that 
Euxenippus is a private citizen and not a politician, and, second, that the eisangelia 
law should only be applied to politicians. It is this second argument where the 
identification of the prosecution of idiotai by rhētorai as morally wrong becomes 
significant. Hyperides seems to be hoping that the jurors, by interpreting the law 
in isolation from all other laws and with it in their heads that it is wrong for idiotai 
to be victimised, will come to the conclusion that the narrow interpretation of the 
law is the correct one.  
 
In this speech, it appears that the speaker is adopting the opposite approach to 
legal interpretation to that used in Against Athenogenes. Far from treating 
Athenian laws as each being indicative of broader underlying moral and legal 
principles, Hyperides argues that each law should be, and indeed must be, 
considered independently. This, he claims, is necessary to ‘ensure that the laws in 
a democracy are kurioi and that impeachments and other actions are brought into 
 
intent behind the law, this argument for two different definitions of rhetor cannot be sustained, for 
the reasons discussed in relation to the interpretation of the law on the buying of grain, 2.3.2.6. 
54 Though Hyperides in this case is a sunēgoros acting as part of a team of speakers, so these 
allegations, as well as other points such as whether Euxenippus can be said to have been speaking 
against the interests of the Athenians, and whether he did or did not take bribes to speak as he did, 
may have been addressed by other speakers. 
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court kata tous nomous’ (4.5). This claim that laws must be considered individually 
in order that they should remain kurios gives on the one hand greater prominence 
and power to individual laws, since there is less risk of their provisions being 
eroded by other laws, yet at the same time limits the application of the laws as a 
whole, since under this analysis laws cannot be extended by analogy. Here, laws 
are assumed to be entirely positivist, and, unlike in many cases,55 are attributed 
solely to the demos of the Athenians (ὑ?εῖς ὑ+ὲρ ἁ+άντων τῶν ἀδικη?άτων … 
νό?ους ἔθεσθε)56 and it is solely the demos’ (imputed) intentions when making the 
law in question that must, according to the speaker, be used to guide the jury’s 
interpretation of the law. As contemporaries of the jurors, however, the demos’ 
priorities in making the law can be understood as equivalent to the jurors’. As such, 
Hyperides can attempt moral arguments on the correct interpretation of the law 
based on the idea that it is wrong to persecute idiotai for participating in polis 
business. 
 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
Athenian litigants do not adopt any consistent approach to the role of morality in 
law. Where it suits their argument to do so, they will ground the law in explicitly 
moral claims, and attempt to use those moral claims to extend the application of 
the law to suit the circumstances of their case. Equally, where a narrowly legalistic 
interpretation of law suits their argument better, that is the version they present. 
In speeches which appear highly reliant on moral argument, arguments on 
expediency can become prominent in guiding interpretation of laws. This suggests 
that there was no strong assumption among Athenian juries that their law was 
necessarily based on morality. Though moral claims could be used to guide 
interpretations of the law, implying that the law was understood to serve moral 
ends and to have some of its legitimacy based on the moral ends it served, at other 
times litigants seem to have been confident to dispense with moral argument and 
 
55 See Chapter 5.4 
56 4.5. 
116 
rely solely on legalistic argument. This suggests that in the minds of Athenians law 
did also have some authority outside of the system of morality, but that it was also 
potentially imagined as serving a moral purpose. 
 
Throughout the past two chapters, I have found it convenient to use ideas from 
modern societies to help to understand where Athenian attitudes towards law 
differed from our own. For us, communal good is not clearly a moral end, and is 
much more likely to be contrasted with the human rights of individuals, which are 
more rooted in moral ideals. For the Athenians, as Dover observes, polis interests 
could be an aspect of morality.57 As such, the interests of the polis and rendering 
individually just decisions could both be considered moral ends.  
 
In this sense, what we have seen over the past two chapters is that Athenian law 
could be, but was not consistently, imagined to depend on certain aspects of 
morality. The strongest evidence we have for any of the principles we have 
explored is for law being interpreted to serve the interests of the polis, but both 
individual justice and other moral values could potentially be used to guide 
interpretation of laws.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 Dover (1974) p. 288 ff. 
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CHAPTER 4: OBEYING AND ENFORCING THE LAW AT 
ATHENS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Modern theories on law, given their diverse stances on what underpins laws, 
unsurprisingly take different approaches to the obligation to obey law. Whereas 
‘hard’ positivists adopt Austin’s definition of law as commands backed by force, 
both Hartian positivists and theorists who take a more natural law approach 
contend that this does not reflect the role law plays in modern day society.1 Hart 
explains this in his thought experiment whereby we are invited to imagine a person 
caught up in an armed robbery and ordered by the robber at gun point to hand 
over his money. Hart argues that while we are comfortable to say that this person 
had no choice but to obey, we do not recognise him as having had an obligation to 
obey.2 In contrast, Hart argues, we do recognise a social obligation to obey law. 
Hart’s model of law, based on primary and secondary rules,3 is dependent on the 
rule of recognition, which in turn relies on a socially recognised obligation to obey 
those rules. Hart’s model of law could be characterised as observational, rather 
than prescriptive, in that in his 1994 postscript to Concept of Law in which he 
addressed some of the criticisms of his work, Hart claimed that whether or not 
something is formally law has no bearing on whether, from a moral standpoint, 
people should obey it. Although Hart recognises that in fact there exists a 
perceived obligation to obey law, he does not allow that to carry over into a genuine 
moral obligation to obey a law that might be morally objectionable. 
 
 
1 Hart (1961), Fuller (1958) Dworkin (1998). 
2 Hart (1961) p. 82. 
3 Primary rules are those easily recognised as laws (e.g. the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 is 
a primary rule. Secondary rules are the set of rules, in English law mainly informal, which govern 
whether a particular rule is or is not treated as a law by those in a position to make use of laws. 
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Whereas Hart bases law on the obligation to obey, natural lawyers assume the 
obligation to obey the law rests largely on the moral goals of the law: obeying law 
is right because the law itself is right; where the law is wrong, no obligation exists 
to obey it.4 As such, natural lawyers are much more comfortable with the idea that 
there does exist a genuine moral obligation to obey law.  
 
As well as these two models there exists the ‘bad man’ theory, which is generally 
associated with the realist school of law.5 Under this model, people do not have 
any obligation to obey the law; they act instead as rational actors,6 and obey the 
law only so long as the burden of obedience does not outweigh the unpleasant 
consequences of being caught in disobedience. 
 
The degree to which there existed at Athens a perceived sense of obligation to obey 
the law may tell us a great deal about Athenian perceptions of law itself. Where 
law is understood to rely for its authority on the moral principles which underlie 
it, we can expect to see higher levels of social pressure to obey law as law. 
Enforcement of law is more complex, as it relates to both the social expectation 
that people should obey law, and a recognition that by failing to do so they have 
behaved wrongfully and merit punishment, and to the interest a society holds in 
compelling obedience to law in order to maintain social order.7 
 
 
 
 
 
4 see, e.g. Fuller’s (1958) objection to the conclusions of Hart on Germany’s attempts to grapple with 
the legacy of Nazi law, where Fuller’s objections are posited on an understanding that law creates 
moral obligations, see particularly p. 656. 
5 The bad man theory originates from Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 1897 essay ‘The Path of the Law’. 
6 The term ‘rational actor’ is drawn from social sciences, and denotes an imagined actor who always 
acts solely to his own economic benefit. The construct has been carried across from economics into 
other social sciences. It has been criticised, in economics, by behavioural economists such as 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
7 Some of the strongest calls for rigid enforcement of law come from societies where that law has 
become far detached from ordinary notions of moral behaviour. Consider, for example, Nazi 
Germany, or the recent claims by the Trump administration that rigid enforcement of law, even to 
the point of separating young children from their parents, is necessary to protect the state. 
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4.2. Social obligation to obey 
 
In depictions of Athenian society, the social obligation to obey the law appears to 
be weak. In Plato’s Crito, for example, Crito shows a startling disregard for the law. 
He wishes to persuade Socrates to disregard the death sentence passed by the 
Athenian court and flee into a self-imposed exile with Crito’s help. Rather than 
arguing on legal terms, that perhaps the laws used to convict Socrates were invalid, 
or the vote fallacious, Crito uses arguments based on Socrates’ social obligations 
to his friends and to his sons.8 These, as we know, fail to convince Socrates, who 
argues for total obedience to the laws. Crito’s only apparent concern for the law, 
by contrast, is that he is likely to be harassed by sykophants9 if it is known that he 
has broken the law by helping Socrates to escape punishment, but this he brushes 
off contemptuously, describing the sykophants simply as ‘cheap’.10 Crito is much 
more concerned that he will be badly thought of if it is learned that he failed to 
help a friend in need, regardless of the legal situation. He considers himself much 
more likely to face social censure for failing to help a friend than for breaking the 
law.11 In the dialogue, Crito does not seem to recognise himself as holding any 
obligation to obey the laws, and even Socrates, as noted by Sauvé-Meyer,12 does 
not treat law-breaking as automatically unjust, but as something which merits 
investigation as to whether it is or is not unjust.  
 
Crito is not Plato’s only law-disregarding character. In the Republic, Glaucon gives 
an unremittingly ‘bad man’ narrative of the origin and function of law in society: 
‘It lies between what is most desirable, to do wrong and avoid punishment, and 
what is most undesirable, to suffer wrong without being able to get redress’.13 
Glaucon goes on to imagine what would happen if both an unjust and a just man 
were to be given rings which made them invisible, and concludes that both men 
 
8 Pl. Cri. 45c-46b. 
9 Pl. Cri. 44e-45b. The Crito of Xen. Mem. 2.9 is not quite so sanguine about sykophants, finding 
them enough of an inconvenience to merit hiring his own sykophant to protect himself against 
their attacks. 
10 Pl. Cri. 45b. 
11 Pl. Cri. 44c. 
12 (2006) p. 374. 
13 Pl.  Resp. 359a. 
120 
would commit wrong in their own self interest.14 Glaucon’s primarily hypothetical 
argument is followed up by Adeimantus, who emphasises what are presented as 
common views of justice and injustice, where although justice is praised in theory, 
in fact people admire those who are unjust and successful. Both stress the role of 
outward appearances of justice, and claim that this is why people value justice, and 
that no one values justice for justice’s sake.  Unlike Crito, however, Glaucon and 
Adeimantus are both distanced from these approaches and are presented as 
putting forward the (flawed) views of others, rather than their own views of the 
law.15 By the time Socrates gets round to discussing what, in his opinion, justice 
is,16 he has already laid out the basics of his ideal state, so whereas Glaucon and 
Adeimantus’ discussion of justice was predicated on the ‘bad man’, Socrates’ is 
based on the ‘good man’ who has been created by the Republic’s systems of 
education and government. Thus, Socrates can define justice as ‘minding your own 
business and not interfering with other people’.17 
 
Some evidence of the degree to which Athens expected its citizens to obey law may 
be drawn from court narratives. As Herman shows, these can at times indicate that 
Athenian social expectations of obedience to law were high, but allowance must 
be made for the fact that these are speeches to be given in court, where the jurors 
are being asked to apply the law and in these circumstances law might naturally 
be expected to have a higher value.18 Wohl notes that court narratives, particularly 
those relying on eikos arguments, require Athenians to present themselves as 
rational characters highly aware of and anxious to conform to the legal 
requirements placed on them.19 In this light, it is understandable that the laws are 
often described by litigants as ‘ordering’ (keleuein) or forbidding (apagoreuein). 
Even within this, many of the actions described as being according to the orders of 
the laws are not actions guiding the relationships or behaviour of citizens towards 
 
14 Pl. Resp. 359c ff. 
15 Pl. Resp. 361e. 
16 443a ff. 
17 Pl. Resp. 443d. 
18 Herman (2006). 
19 Wohl (2010) p. 138. 
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each other, but are instructions to magistrates, or instructions on penalties to be 
applied. 
 
Even within the lawcourts, despite the narrative requirements for litigants to 
present themselves as highly law abiding, some indications of other standards of 
behaviour can be identified. The speaker of Isocrates’ Trapeziticus comes to court 
expressly to ask jurors to uphold a deliberately fraudulent contract. The speaker is 
a citizen of Pontus whose father had a dispute with Satyrus, the ruler. At the time 
of this dispute, the speaker was in Athens. Satyrus, according to the speaker, 
ordered the citizens of Pontus living in Athens to seize the speaker’s money and to 
tell him to return to Pontus. If the speaker did not return to Pontus, the citizens of 
Pontus in Athens were instructed to ask the demos to return him home (17.5). The 
speaker, not wanting his wealth to be seized, but afraid of defying Satyrus, 
conspired with the banker Pasion to hide his wealth by pretending he owed large 
debts to Pasion (17.6-7). This pretence included the speaker issuing a formal denial 
of his wealth before witnesses (17.8).  
 
Once the dispute between his father and Satyrus was over, the speaker tried to 
reclaim his money from Pasion but was refused (17.12). The speaker now asks the 
jurors to return his money to him, though the deposit of the money with Pasion 
was fraudulent and conducted in order to evade the orders of the ruler of his home 
territory. It seems likely that Athenians would have been comfortable to deny the 
status of law to the orders of Satyrus,20 but it is less clear from the speech how far 
those orders were also the instructions of the Athenian demos. Satyrus appears to 
have been confident to order the citizens of Pontus resident in Athens to request 
that the speaker be sent back to Pontus.21 It is possible that a request for 
confiscation of the speaker’s wealth could have been passed to the demos in the 
same way. This, then, does suggest that the speaker was attempting to subvert not 
only the will of Satyrus, but also the will of the Athenian demos. As such, his 
request that the jurors ignore the witnessed but fraudulent assertion that he owed 
 
20 In the same way, Athenians denied that Persian law was law – see below p.206 n. 23. 
21 Isocrates 17.5. 
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Pasion money and instead abide by the terms of the secret contract does show a 
disregard for the legislative actions of the Athenian demos.  
 
Demosthenes’ Against Boeotus I shows some traces of a similar attitude to the law, 
though not on the part of the speaker. The speaker of Against Boeotus I is disputing 
with his half-brother which of them should get use of the name Mantitheus. 
Mantitheus, the speaker, complains that his half-brother should never have been 
acknowledged as his father’s son anyway, since his father was tricked into the 
acknowledgement. Mantitheus explains that Boeotus brought a lawsuit against 
Mantitheus’ father on a complaint that he was being deprived of his patris. 
According to Mantitheus, his father did not wish to defend this case because he 
was too afraid of being confronted with complaints about how he had treated 
people in his public life.22 Mantitheus does not attempt to cast these claims as 
untrue, but treats the possibility that public service will earn you enemies likely to 
make claims against you in court as entirely probable. Because he did not feel able 
to access the legal system, Mantitheus’ father entered into an oath challenge23 with 
Boeotus’ mother, with the intention that she should withdraw, but she did not and 
so was able to force Mantitheus’ father to enrol Boeotus as his son.24 Both Isocrates’ 
Trapeziticus and Demosthenes’ Against Boeotus show litigants treating the law not 
as a guide to correct and incorrect behaviour which carries with it an inherent 
obligation to obedience, but one solution for resolution of disputes. 
 
It is hard to say what, in Athens, proper obedience to law would look like. 
Xenophon wrote a dialogue in which Alcibiades asks what it means to be nomimos, 
or law-abiding, then ties Pericles in knots when he tries to answer.25 Lycurgus 
could complain in court that laws set out only a minimum standard of behaviour, 
 
22 Dem. 39.3. Though complaints about sykophancy are common, it is not clear that allegations of 
sykophancy are always allegations of false claims – 4.3.1.3. 
23 see Gagarin (1997a) for oath challenges in Athenian law. 
24 Dem. 39.3-5. 
25 Xen. Mem. 1.2.4-46. 
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and a good man should go far beyond that standard,26 implying that for him there 
was no specific obligation to obey law as law.   
 
 
4.2.1. Ephebic oath 
 
In a context of a society which appears to show a weak sense of any obligation to 
obey laws, the oath sworn by ephebes is striking. This oath, which formed a part 
of a young man’s transition into full citizenship status from at least the 330s 
onwards, contains both military and civil matters. It was sworn as part of young 
men’s compulsory military service and survives in an inscription found in Acharnae 
and dated to the mid-fourth century.27 There are also versions preserved in Pollux 
and Stobaeus.  
The different texts of the section of the oath which relates to the laws are as follows: 
 
Inscribed stele from Acharnae - Ephebic Oath SEG 21.519 ll. 11-16 
Rhodes and Osborne 88 
 
καὶ εὐηκοήσω τῶν ἀεὶ κρ- 
αινόντων ἐ?φρόνως καὶ τῶν θεσ?ῶν τῶν 
ἱδρυ?ένων καὶ οὓς ἂν τὸ λοι+ὸν ἱδρύσω- 
νται ἐ?φρόνως. ἐὰν δέ τις ἀναιρεῖ, οὐκ ἐ- 
+ιτρέψω κατά τε ἐ?αυτὸν καὶ ?ετὰ +άντ- 
ων 
 
And I shall be willingly obedient to whoever exercise 
power reasonably on any occasion and to the laws 
currently laid down and any reasonably laid down 
in future. If anyone destroys these I shall not  
 
26 Lycurg. 1.132 
27 Though there is no explicit evidence of the oath being used in the fifth century, Siewert (1977) 
argued that there are echoes of the oath to be found in fifth-century material, and as such the oath 
may have existed in some form during the fifth century. His arguments are not entirely convincing, 
and it is probably safest to treat the oath as an artefact of the fourth century. 
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give them allegiance both as far as it is in my own  
power and in union with all.28 
 
 
Pollux viii 105 
 
Καὶ συνήσω τῶν ἀεὶ κρινόντων, καὶ τοῖς θεσ?οῖς τοῖς ἱδρυ?ένοις +είσο?αι καὶ 
οὕστινας ἄλλους ἱδρύσεται τὸ +λῆθος ἐ?φρόνως  
Καὶ ἄν τις ἀναιρῇ τοὺς θεσ?οὺς ἤ ?ὴ +είθηται, οὐκ ἐ+ιτρέψω, ἀ?υνῶ δὲ καὶ ?όνος 
καὶ ?ετὰ +άντων 
 
And I shall take notice of whoever exercise power on any occasion, and shall obey 
the laws laid down, and whichever other laws the plethos reasonably lays down.  
And if anyone destroys the laws or does not obey them, I shall not give them 
allegiance, but shall defend against them both alone and in union with all.29 
 
 
Stobaeus iv 1.8 
 
Καὶ εὐηκοήσω τῶν ἀεὶ κρινόντων ἐ?φρόνως, καὶ τοῖς θεσ?οῖς τοῖς ἱδρυ?ένοις 
+είσο?αι καὶ οὕστινας ἄν ἄλλους ἱδρύσηται τὸ +λῆθος ὁ?οφρόνως  
Καὶ ἄν τις ἀναιρῇ τοὺς θεσ?οὺς ἤ ?ὴ +είθηται, οὐκ ἐ+ιτρέψω, ἀ?υνῶ δὲ καὶ ?όνος 
καὶ ?ετὰ +άντων 
 
And I shall be willingly obedient to whoever exercise power reasonably on any 
occasion, and shall obey the laws currently laid down, and whichever laws the 
plethos unanimously lays down. 
And if anyone destroys the laws or does not obey them, I shall not give them 
allegiance, but shall defend against them both alone and in union with all.30 
 
 
28 Translation: Rhodes and Osborne (2003), adapted to mark the different verbs for obeying used 
in the different versions. 
29 Translation my own, using the translation of RO 88 as a model. 
30 Translation my own, based on the translation of RO 88. 
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The version in Pollux lacks the first emphronos, though the verb implies a slightly 
weaker agreement to obey those holding power, while the version in Stobaeus 
retains the first emphronos, but changes the second to homophronos. Daux31 
favours Stobaeus, suggesting that the repetition of emphronos on the stele may 
have been a mistake, and that homophronos may have been an ‘expression de 
l’idéal démocratique d’unanimité populaire’.32 Siewert rejects this amendment of 
the stele’s text on the basis that it makes sense without emendation.33 A further 
possibility is that the oath recorded in Stobaeus is a later version of the oath 
recorded on the stele. 
 
Because the other oath on the same stele appears to form part of fourth-century 
Athenian reconstructions of their fifth century past, the historicity of the ephebic 
oath has also been doubted. Robertson suggests that the ephebic oath as inscribed 
may have been a combination of an archaic ‘citizens’ oath’ and a newly created 
soldiers’ oath.34 Siewert argues that it is possible to identify references to the 
ephebic oath in fifth-century material.35 Rhodes and Osborne highlight the archaic 
character of the inscribed oath, not only linguistically, but also in its approach to 
the law, which they consider the oath to envisage as being the responsibility of 
magistrates rather than the demos.36 For our purposes, the antiquity of the oath is 
not relevant. It seems likely that the oath inscribed on the stele would have been 
the oath used by the ephebes of Acharnae in the mid-fourth century.37 
  
How to translate this oath seems to cause people problems. Part of the problem 
may be highlighted by Siewert, who translated emphronōs as ‘reasonably’, but 
 
31 Daux (1971). 
32 ibid. p. 374, quoting Marrou. It might be added that the fourth-century nomothetai voted by show 
of hands – Hansen (1985), which could have increased the chances of unanimous decision making. 
33 Siewert (1977) p. 103. 
34 Robertson (1976) p. 7. 
35 Siewert (1977). 
36 Rhodes and Osborne (2003) p. 445, based on the word krainontōn. 
37 Rhodes and Osborne (2003) p. 449. Though the ‘Oath sworn at Plataea’ on the same stele is 
apparently an invention of the fourth century, we know the ephebic oath to have been sworn 
annually, and there would be no advantage to creating a different, more archaised, version of the 
traditional oath, as doing so would then place suspicion on what would then come to be understood 
as the ‘new’ ephebic oath. 
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could not believe it was left up to each individual to decide what is reasonable, and 
instead suggested an otherwise un-attested role for the Areopagus to decide what 
laws were and were not reasonable, on the basis that ‘government could hardly 
work if everyone could interpret according to his own discretion’.38 Lambert on 
Attic Inscriptions Online39 translates emphronōs as mindfully, and Daux40 favours 
en tout conscience, with both treating the adverb as governing the act of obedience, 
and not the rule. Siewert rejects this on the basis that ‘euēkoēsō  (equivalent to eu 
akouein) has an adverb of its own, and an additional emphronōs would sound 
somewhat pleonastic.’41 Lambert does not offer any reasoning for his translation, 
and Daux merely suggests it as one option, before moving on to other discussions.  
 
Siewert’s hesitation about the translation ‘reasonably’ is worth addressing in more 
detail. He expressed concern that a society could not function if everyone could 
interpret the laws according to his own discretion, but in fact wide discretion on 
interpretation of laws is well attested in other areas of Athenian law.42  
 
Moreover, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the oath has a three-
fold structure. The ‘reasonableness’ condition can be interpreted to apply only to 
‘those holding power’ and to new laws.43 This recognition that the institutions of 
the democracy could be vulnerable to abuse, as indeed happened during the 
oligarchic revolutions at the end of the fifth century, may also be seen in the 
inscription from 337 threatening penalties against the Areopagus Council in the 
event that the councillors continue the work of the Council under a non-
 
38 Siewert (1977) p. 103-4. 
39 https://www.atticinscriptions.com/inscription/SEG/21519. 
40 Daux (1971). 
41 Siewert (1977) p. 103. 
42 see 4.3.2.1 on the jurors’ oath. 
43 This is how it is translated by Rhodes and Osborne and Siewert. For the presumption of excellence 
for the established laws, see Aeschin. 1.6 ‘It is my view that it is our duty, when we are making laws, 
to have as our aim that we create laws that are well framed and suitable for our type of government; 
but it is equally our duty, when we have enacted the laws, to obey the established laws and to 
punish those who do not obey them, if the city’s affairs are to be in good order.’ Trans. Fisher, 
adapted. See further Lys. 1.48, 10.32, 22.3; Dem. 24.24, 24.29. The phrase οἱ κεί?ενοι νό?οι is common 
in the orators. 
For suspicion of new laws, see Allen (2000) pp. 29 and 92-93. 
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democratic regime.44 Meanwhile, the established laws are presumed to be 
reasonable and the promise to obey them is unconditional.45  
 
The requirement that new laws and those holding power must be reasonable may 
be connected to the next clause of the oath, a promise not to give allegiance to 
anyone who would destroy the laws. If Stobaeus does record a slightly later version 
of the oath, but an oath which was used in democratic Athens, the change is 
interesting. The oath as inscribed has ephebes promise only not to offer allegiance 
to anyone who would destroy the laws. The oaths recorded in Stobaeus and Pollux 
instead require the ephebes to swear that if anyone destroy the laws or does not 
obey them, they will refuse him allegiance and will defend (presumably the laws) 
against him. Depending on the date of this change, this could have important 
consequences for how Athenians viewed their relationship to the law. Whereas the 
older oath only requires the individual citizen to comply with the law, the newer 
oath places on him a new responsibility to protect the laws, not only against those 
who would overthrow them, but against anyone who might break them. Each 
Athenian male is asked to swear to fight against anyone who breaks Athens’ laws. 
It is not possible to date the development in the oath conclusively, but if we accept 
the conjecture of Rhodes and Osborne46 that the inscribed stele predates the 
reorganisation of the ephebeia in the 330s, it is possible the versions recorded in 
Stobaeus and Pollux come from this reorganised ephebeia. 
 
If this reconstruction is correct, it seems to show a development in Athenian 
understanding of their laws, with the earlier version of the oath asking uncritical 
obedience only to the established laws, while the later version of the oath asks 
obedience to all laws created by the plethos as well as placing on individual citizens 
the duty to protect the laws against lawbreakers. This seems to indicate a growing 
dedication to the role of law in the polis, but of course this is all speculative, 
 
44 RO 79. 
45 For more on the distinction in fourth-century Athens between established and new laws, see 
Chapter 5. 
46 (2003) p. 448.  
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predicated as it is on the assumption that Stobaeus did record a genuine version of 
the ephebic oath, and this oath post-dated that inscribed on the stele at Acharnae. 
 
 
4.3 Enforcing law 
 
4.3.1 Bringing a case to court 
 
4.3.1.1 Volunteer prosecutors 
 
Athens never had a professional police system, outside of the very limited role 
played by the Scythian slave archers. It did, however, possess court procedures 
which enabled citizens who were not the victims of the harm in question to 
prosecute wrongdoers for certain types of wrongdoing.47  
 
The rationale behind the distinction between graphai (public suits) and dikai 
(private suits) is hard to identify precisely. Osborne argues for a procedural 
distinction based on whether or not there existed an individual capable of 
prosecuting the wrongful act as its victim.48 Todd argues instead for a looser 
distinction broadly reflecting who could be considered to suffer from the wrongful 
act, whether an individual or the polis as a whole.49 Where the victim is considered 
as the polis as a whole, there is generally no single identifiable victim, so the two 
arguments both cover the available evidence well.50  
 
 
47 These processes were primarily graphai, but see Todd (1993) p. 112-122 for other public procedures. 
48 (1985) p. 40-41. 
49 (1993) p. 109-112. 
50 The graphē hubreōs could be considered an offence with an identifiable victim capable of 
prosecuting, though it is possible that since hubris was an offence governed by status distinctions, 
the lower status victim might usually be assumed not to have been capable of prosecuting.  
The graphē pseudoklēteias, for fraudulently attesting delivery of a summons, could be interpreted 
as an action where it is clearer that though an individual and not the demos is harmed, the 
individual concerned would usually be unable to prosecute the case since he would have been 
convicted in absentia on the original summons. Though lying to the demos in the Assembly was 
subject to public actions (Hesk (2000) p. 56), giving false evidence in court was subject only to the 
private dikē pseudomarturiōn. It seems likely that there was no strong consistency in how Athens 
used private and public actions.  
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The use of graphai, on the face of it, appears to show a genuine concern to hold 
people to the law, but in practice this seems not to have been how the procedures 
were treated, or even conceived of. The creation of graphai was ascribed to Solon 
and is often interpreted by modern scholars51 as a way to promote the enforcement 
of the law, but this is not necessarily how it was understood in antiquity. Plutarch 
attributes Solon’s creation of the graphē to his desire to promote a sense of 
solidarity among Athens’ citizens:  
‘The law-giver in this way rightly accustomed the citizens, as members 
of one body, to feel and sympathize with one another’s wrongs. And 
we are told of a saying of his which is consonant with this law. Being 
asked, namely, what city was best to live in, ‘That city’ he replied, ‘in 
which those who are not wronged, no less than those who are wronged, 
exert themselves to punish the wrongdoers.’52 
 
The Ath. Pol. assesses the creation of graphai as one of Solon’s most democratic 
reforms,53 but it is unclear from the context whether its democratic merits come 
from its capacity to hold all citizens to the law, or its offer of retribution against 
wrongdoers to the weak as well as to the strong. Demosthenes, when describing 
the multiplicity of Athens’ legal procedures, focuses on the need to provide to the 
weak the opportunity for retribution even when wronged by the strong.54  
 
The graphē procedure, because it was open to any citizen to prosecute, is generally 
understood to have been vulnerable to misuse, and therefore to have had 
restrictions placed on it. An unsuccessful prosecutor in a graphē who failed to win 
 
51 e.g. MacDowell (1978) p. 53 incorrectly paraphrases Plutarch on Solon: ‘He said it ought to be 
everyone’s concern to see that the laws were obeyed’. 
52 Plutarch Solon 18.5. 
53 Ath. Pol. 9.1. 
54 Dem. 22.25 ‘If, then, he was going to frame the laws to satisfy the moderate man's claim to redress, 
many wicked people, he reflected, would receive indemnity, but if he framed them in the interests 
of the bold and the clever speakers, the plain citizen would not be able to obtain redress in the 
same way as they would.’ It is unclear exactly what Demosthenes means by this. It is possible that 
it relates to how precisely laws define offences, as a precisely termed law could be considered easier 
for a prosecutor to use, while also being easier for a clever defendant to argue his way out of, 
whereas a loosely defined law might suit a more experienced prosecutor who had the confidence 
to argue widely. 
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at least a fifth of the jurors’ votes was subject to a 1000 drachmae fine, and possibly 
also some limited form of atimia, or loss of citizen rights. There were similar 
penalties for unsuccessful phasis and apographē prosecutions. The only types of 
public cases we know to have been risk-free are eisangeliai.55 Eisangelia actions 
could only be brought against those who subverted the democracy, committed 
treason, took bribes to speak against the interests of the demos, maltreated 
orphans, or misbehaved in public office.56 The fact that until the 330s Athens 
continued to allow these cases to be brought without any risk suggests that, in 
these limited areas,  it was felt to be disadvantageous to the polis to do anything 
that would potentially discourage would-be prosecutors who would uphold these 
laws in protection of the state or of those unable to prosecute for themselves. 
Nonetheless, from the 330s even these categories of case came to carry risks for the 
prosecutor. The potential for large penalties in the event of unsuccessful cases 
created a structural disincentive to prosecute, even where someone did know his 
opponent to have committed legal wrongs. Rather than prioritising enforcement 
of law, Athens here appears to prioritise the maintenance of social order – which 
could be disrupted by people bringing unwinnable lawsuits.57  
 
4.3.1.2 Menusis and denunciation 
 
Similarly, the use of the process of menusis, which allowed slaves to inform on their 
masters, was very tightly restricted. Menusis may only have been usable at all in 
 
55 Until the 330s – Hansen (1975) p. 29-31. 
56 Hansen (1975) pp. 21-9. Rhodes (1979) argues that eisangelia could also be brought for other, 
undefined harms to the public good. 
57 Athens did have some public lawsuits which allowed rewards to be given to the successful 
prosecutor. Though in principle they could be seen as intended to promote prosecution and 
enforcement in these areas, in practice the possibility for reward seems to have clashed with the 
disincentives against prosecution. Osborne (1985) p. 46 notes that there appear to be no recorded 
apographai which were clearly brought for financial reward. Christ (1998) pp. 139-143 argues there 
is no greater association with sykophancy in suits carrying rewards and those that did not. Lanni 
(2016) p. 52 argues that ‘the financial rewards offered to volunteer prosecutors seem to have 
reflected, not rectified, under-enforcement in those types of suit’. Rubinstein (2016) has studied use 
of rewards for denunciation across the Greek world and identifies Athens as anomalous in its 
restricted use of rewards.  
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Athens for religious offences.58 Slaves’ evidence could be admitted in court, but 
only if it had been extracted through use of judicial torture.59 We do not have any 
cases in which slave evidence extracted through torture is adduced by speakers, 
though references to use of the process are reasonably common. We do know that 
submitting one’s slave to torture was entirely voluntary. Mirhady argues that 
acceptance of a challenge to torture was an agreement to settle one’s case out of 
court, entirely on the word of the slave.60 If this is correct, Athens’ legal system 
placed slaves’ evidence of wrongdoing entirely outside of its own enforcement 
mechanisms. Even if slave evidence could be produced in court, the facts that the 
decision to torture or not torture slaves is left entirely up to the litigants and that 
Athens possessed no mechanism to compel a slave-owner to allow his slave to be 
tortured suggest a choice not to prioritise enforcement of Athens’ laws. Given the 
almost universal presence of slaves, use of slave denouncers and slave evidence 
could have given Athens enormously greater capacity to enforce its laws,61 but 
again social order is given priority over enforcement of laws. 
 
In On the Mysteries Andocides tries to defend his behaviour at the time of the 
profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the herms. It appears that one 
of the charges he was defending himself against was that he acted as an informer. 
Even in so grave a matter,62 Andocides presents himself as extraordinarily 
unwilling to come forward with what he knew. Andocides depicts himself as giving 
up the wrongdoers only after he and his family have been thrown in jail and placed 
in fear of their lives.63 Far from wishing to allow the law to be enforced, Andocides 
 
58 Osborne (2000). Osborne suggests that the use of slave denouncers in the Kean Ruddle Decree 
RO 40 suggests Athens recognised the potential for using slave denouncers to police the laws, but 
made a conscious choice not to allow it in Athens. 
59 See Thür (1977), Todd (1990a), Gagarin (1996) and Mirhady (1996) for more on the challenge to 
torture.  
60 Mirhady (1996) sf. Thür (1977) and (1996). 
61 Hunter (1994) pp. 75-94. 
62 The profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the herms were not only serious acts of 
asebeia, but were associated at the time with attempts to overthrow the democracy (Thuc. 6.27.3). 
Although by the time Andocides gave his speech in 399 the immediate panic around the original 
acts must have died away, Andocides was contending with ill feeling from the overthrow of the 
democracy in 411 and in 403. As such, the identification of the acts with anti-democratic plotters 
could be said to have made his position even more dangerous than it was in the first trials in 415. 
63 Andoc. 1.48-57. 
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finds it necessary instead to defend himself from accusations that he too willing 
gave up the wrongdoers.  
 
4.3.1.3 Sykophancy 
 
Perhaps the most striking mark of Athens’ lack of interest in society-wide 
enforcement of law is the degree to which sykophants appear to have been reviled. 
Sykophancy is difficult to define precisely, but has long been seen as an abuse of 
Athens’ legal system. Sykophants are variously presented as people who bring 
groundless lawsuits, people who bring too many lawsuits, blackmailers, or, 
generally, a useful insult to throw at one’s opponent in a lawsuit.64 As Osborne 
shows, in metaphorical uses of ‘sykophant’ words, dishonesty is not an essential 
element of sykophancy, and the word can best be translated as ‘quibbling’.65 
Sykophants then are people who are hated for bringing legal cases, even where 
those legal cases may not be groundless. If we follow through the idea of 
‘quibbling’, sykophants could be seen as people who attempt to enforce laws 
against people who are not, apart from having happened to break these particular 
laws, otherwise bad people. This seems to tally with Crito’s dismissal of those who 
would try to convict him of helping Socrates to escape as mere sykophants, and 
cheap to buy off. This despite the fact that Crito, had his plan come off, would have 
been guilty of the accusations made by the sykophants. The sykophant in 
Aristophanes’ Wealth 914–5 even defends himself by claiming that the polis is 
‘served by watching that the established law is observed —  by allowing no one to 
violate it.’ Although the other characters reject his claim for pity, they do not refute 
his claim that he enforces the laws of the city.   
 
Sykophants were not only hated – sykophancy was also an offence.66 It appears to 
have been possible to prosecute sykophants using either a graphē or a probole. In 
 
64 Osborne (1990) gives a short history of the scholarship on sykophancy, and argues that 
sykophancy, while used as an insult, could be understood in a more socially valuable light as a 
means of driving wealthy Athenians to comply with the democracy’s expectations. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Though vexatious litigation might seem a tempting comparator, there are some important 
differences. Vexatious litigation is handled within the narrow bounds of the Civil Procedure Rules. 
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addition, the penalties suffered by those who fail to win more than 1/5 of the votes 
in a graphē are linked by orators to sykophancy.67 Crawley (1970) denies the 
existence of a graphē sykophantias, but his arguments are unconvincing. Crawley 
rejects the clear evidence of Ath. Pol. 59.3 (‘Also they [the thesmothetai] hear 
graphai for which a fee is paid, on charges of xenias, doroxenias,… sykophantias, 
doron, pseudengraphes, pseudokleteias, bouleuseos, agraphiou and moikheia.’) on 
the weak grounds that sykophancy does not fit in the list because it is harder to 
prove to a jury than the rest of the list. There is no evidence that Athens grouped 
its procedures by proveability. Instead, the Ath. Pol. groups procedures by the 
archon in charge, and there was commonly some thematic unity in which 
procedures were overseen by which archon. Here, one could make an argument 
for a thematic list based around behaviours which are harmful to the functioning 
of the democracy. Moreover, the evidence in the Ath. Pol. is supported by Isoc. 
15.314 ‘but against sykophants they provided graphai before the thesmothetai….’  
 
Crawley, having dismissed the evidence of the Ath. Pol. argues from absence that 
there cannot have been a graphē sykophantias or we would see evidence of it 
having been used, but here again his argument remains unconvincing, since one 
could say much the same thing for the graphē hubreos.68 If we assume that a graphē 
sykophantias did exist, it is worth imagining what a prosecution for sykophancy 
would entail. Presumably, any prosecution would have to come out of an original 
case, much as with the dikē pseudomarturias. If in the original case the sykophantic 
prosecutor failed to win the necessary proportion of the votes, he would already 
 
Vexatious litigants are not sentenced to any penalty, but their capacity to bring further suits on the 
same matter, or exceptionally on any matters, might be limited by a judge. Modern means of 
dealing with vexatious litigants might be seen as more comparable to the penalties suffered in 
Athens by those who fail to win one-fifth of the votes. 
67 It is hard to be sure how to understand this. There is no evidence of there being a separate trial 
for failing to win enough votes – it is an automatic penalty. Is it, then, a breach of Athens’ law to 
fail to win enough votes? Athens lacked any particularly predictable way of phrasing laws (using 
casuistic phrasing or predictive/prohibitory phrasing as suited), so a casuistic law ‘if anyone fails to 
win the votes he shall be disenfranchised’ is no different from καὶ ἐὰ? ?ὲ ’κ [+]ρονοί[α]ς [κ]τ[ένει τίς 
τινα, φεύγ]ε[ν (IG I3 104), except that it lacked a court proceeding to determine guilt, but given the 
context of failing to win enough votes, what process could be necessary? The Silver Coinage law 
(SEG 26 72 [RO 25]) ll. 10-13, and possibly ll. 16-18 may show a law which similarly provides for a 
penalty but because of the nature of the offence has no provision for judgement. 
68 See Fisher (1990) on scarcity of graphē hubreōs prosecutions. 
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have been subjected to penalties as discussed above. If the sykophantic prosecutor 
had won the original case, the loser would be in a poor position to bring a graphē 
sykophantias, having lost at best money and prestige, or at worst his life or right to 
speak. A volunteer prosecutor in this instance would also face barriers: the risk of 
his own case being regarded as sykophantic, the fact that in the original case the 
alleged sykophant was able to convince the jury, showing both his own skill at 
speaking and his enjoyment of popular support, and the fact that by bringing an 
unsuccessful graphē against the alleged sykophant and losing, the volunteer 
prosecutor risks further reinforcing the outcome of the original case. Only in a 
scenario where the alleged sykophant lost the original case, but not by so large a 
margin as to attract penalties, does it seem practical to bring a graphē, and even 
there the risk of confronting a skilled speaker on a charge which, relating as it 
probably did to intention, would have been difficult to prove to a jury, may well 
have outweighed any potential advantage. Given the inherent barriers to bringing 
a graphē sykophantias, any argument based on the absence of their use must be 
treated with caution. 
 
There was also the option of bringing a probolē against sykophants. A probolē was 
a public denunciation of an offender, but while it certainly had symbolic 
importance, the degree to which probolai had legal consequences is unclear.69 The 
Ath. Pol. groups together sykophancy and deceiving the demos,70 and the latter 
appears to have had legal penalties attached to it, as in the case of those who were 
convicted of deceiving the demos over the execution of the generals at Arginusae 
and were held pending trial, until they escaped.71 MacDowell,72 on the evidence of 
Demosthenes Against Meidias, thinks that a probolē could be turned into a full 
trial, and gives the analogous example of how apagogē lent its name both to the 
mode of introducing the case and the procedure for trial. Rowe assesses the various 
 
69 Christ (1992) p. 339 describes probole as ‘an expression of public opinion without binding force’. 
MacDowell (1990) p. 16 argues that probole was the term used for both the initial, non-binding 
ecclesia vote and the subsequent action before the dikastic courts. 
70 Ath. Pol. 43.5. 
71 Xen Hel 1.7.35. Hesk (2000) p. 55-7 considers whether there may have been other procedures for 
prosecution for deceiving the demos, and concludes that there were not.  
72 (1990) p. 13-17. 
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arguments about what process was used in Against Meidias and agrees with 
MacDowell that the case was itself a probolē.73 Given the evidence that it may have 
been possible to continue a probolē into a trial, and the absence of evidence for any 
process other than a probolē by which to convict people of deceiving the demos, it 
seems likely that a probolē could carry a penalty. The probolē may have offered 
certain advantages over a court trial. Hearings in the Assembly appear to have been 
less formalised than in the courts,74 and did not carry the same risks for a 
prosecutor as a graphē.  
 
What is particularly interesting about the probolē against sykophants is that the 
number of persons who could be indicted by probolē each year was limited to three 
citizens and three metics. Osborne argues that this is a mistranslation and the 
limitation is  not on the number who can be indicted, but on the number who can 
bring indictments.75 Christ (1992) rejects this and argues that the limit on 
prosecutions was intended to prevent abuse in wake of the damage caused by what 
he argues is the Thirty’s use of sykophant as a catch-all term to enable them to 
persecute their enemies. This seems unconvincing, since there is no evidence that 
the restriction was introduced after the Thirty and in fourth-century discourse 
about the Thirty the progression is quite clear – first they came for the sykophants, 
then they came for the good people (Ath. Pol. 35.3). Sykophancy was not rendered 
invalid as a term of abuse after the Thirty, which would be expected had they used 
it as Christ argues. Osborne’s proposed translation seems most convincing, despite 
 
73 Rowe (1994). 
74 E.g. the execution of the Generals at Arginusae, and Euryptolemus’ request that they be tried in 
the courts Xen. Hel. 1.7.12-16, Lys. 22.2 the speaker claims to have forestalled the attempt by the 
boulē to put the graindealers to death without a trial only to bring them to trial on the same charges 
in the case at hand. 
75 (1990) p. 94-5 n. 37. Accepted by Harvey (1990) p. 106 n. 13. How this would work in practice is 
hard to imagine. It is easy to see how a large number of people accused of sykophancy could be 
reduced to three, in the same way that a field of candidates for ostracism is reduced to one, it is not 
clear how the number of indictments accepted could be kept to three. It is possible that, were e.g. 
seven citizens initially to make accusations of sykophancy (against seven different sykophants), 
there could be an initial vote held to reduce that to three (though the mechanics of this are hard to 
work out – perhaps if each voter were permitted to submit three ostraka with names of those to be 
tried through probolē? Voting in the ecclesia was usually by show of hands, but this would not be 
practicable for a decision like this), before a second, third and fourth round of voting to result in 
three probolē decisions. 
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the logistical problems, and though to us the mismatch between the size of the 
citizen and metic populations means that giving each group the same number of 
indictments looks strange, an equal split between Athenian and non-Athenian 
might have seemed more reasonable to Athenians.  
 
Limiting the number of indictments that could be brought for probolē must be 
assumed to have limited its efficacy as a tool to punish sykophants, since regardless 
of the number of sykophants active in Athens only six people could make 
indictments. This structural barrier to prosecution may highlight some of the 
difficulties Athenians had with managing accusations of sykophancy. Though 
Athens had decided that sykophancy should be punished, allowing an unlimited 
number of risk-free indictments for sykophancy to be aired in the Assembly could 
have been disruptive and harmful. It seems likely that by limiting the number of 
indictments that could be brought, the dēmos could choose to select only 
indictments brought by the type of citizen who would not be perceived as likely to 
try to abuse the system; meanwhile the people who might otherwise have found 
themselves subjected to accusations of sykophancy did not have to face the 
reputational damage of being discussed in this context in the Assembly, nor the 
risk of having to face a potential trial. 
  
The legal procedures against sykophancy, then, show Athens allowing prosecution 
against people bringing lawsuits which even if not legally baseless, are nonetheless 
considered an abuse of the democracy’s courts and legal processes, because they 
concern quibbling, small illegalities rather than behaviour that was recognised as 
being in some sense more harmful to the community. In this way, Athens 
prioritises other polis interests over the enforcement of its laws. 
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4.3.1.4 Arbitration 
 
Another barrier to enforcement of the law at Athens was the pressure in dikai76 to 
use arbitration rather than the courts to settle disputes.77 In the fourth century, 
litigants in dikai were required to make use of non-binding arbitration processes, 
and there also seems to have been social pressure for litigants to use binding, 
voluntary arbitration. In court speeches we see litigants complaining of their 
opponents’ intransigent and unreasonable behaviour during the arbitration 
proceedings, such as in Demosthenes 33.16-19, where the speaker complains that 
his opponent abused the arbitration proceedings. This is of interest when thinking 
about law enforcement precisely because, according to Aristotle, whereas courts 
are supposed to judge according to the law, arbitration should be based on fairness 
(epieikēs).78 Arbitration is thus marked out as an area where relying too much on 
the laws is inappropriate.  
 
The expectation that litigants should use arbitration seems to have applied only to 
dikai, which could be seen only to have a limited effect on enforcement of law, if 
dikai are understood as private suits, between individuals, and it is better that 
those individuals resolve their quarrel to their mutual satisfaction if at all possible, 
while graphai are public suits, prosecuting people for committing wrongs which 
are, in some way, harmful to the polis, and so of course cannot be settled, but must 
be dealt with through proper legal process. This distinction, however, seems to 
have applied only fairly loosely in Athens,79 and often the same wrongful act could 
lead to a variety of responses – some public and some private. Dikai were not 
limited to insignificant matters, but covered a wide range of socially harmful 
 
76 In graphai there was no such pressure and prosecutors could be subject to penalties for 
withdrawing suits before going to trial. Wallace (2006) argues that penalties only applied where 
the suit was withdrawn in exchange for payment, except in the graphē hubreōs and the graphē 
lipotaxiou. Harris (2006d) refutes this, arguing that Wallace makes too much of an argument from 
silence. In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, it seems safer to assume that withdrawing 
a graphē was subject to some sort of penalty.  
77 Hunter (1994) p. 57 on pressure to submit disputes to arbitration. 
78 Arist. Rh. 1374b. It is possible that this demarcation of arbitration away from law applies only to 
voluntary, binding arbitration, since we know that at the compulsory arbitration the litigants were 
required to disclose the laws they intended to rely on at the trial. 
79 See above p. 128. 
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behaviours, including assault, giving false witness in court and theft, as well as the 
special dikai in the homicide courts. 
 
4.3.1.5 Court closures 
 
As well as keeping dikai out of court through arbitration, at times Athens shut 
down its courts altogether. This probably happened immediately after the 
restoration of the democracy in 403,80 then again in the 360s, possibly for some 
years,81 and again in the 340s.82 The shutdown in 403 could have been as a result of 
the need to regain social order after the civil war under the Thirty, but the fourth-
century shut downs were both for economic reasons. These closures almost 
certainly did not affect the usual democratic court processes of euthynai, eisangelia 
and dokimasia, and probably did not affect graphai either.83 It is nonetheless 
remarkable that Athens was willing and able to shut down its courts, and moreover 
that the shut downs receive so little attention in sources. Apart from individual 
litigants complaining about the inconvenience caused to them by the delay in 
prosecuting the case,84 the closures are not remarked upon. There is no evidence 
of any consequent break down in law and order or social relations at the time. This 
at least suggests that the role of the courts, at any rate in judging dikai, was not a 
social priority for Athens, and that without courts to judge according to the law 
Athenians were assumed to be able to settle their disputes in a way that was not 
socially harmful.  
 
 
 
80 Lys. 17.3. Possibly also Isoc. 21.7 – which refers to a litigant having been unable ‘while conditions 
in the city were unsettled and the courts were suspended’ to bring his case regarding return of 
money deposited during the regime of the Thirty. The litigant Nicias would have been unable to 
bring his case to court while the Thirty were in power, not because the courts were suspended 
(Lysias 13.37 complains of what is alleged to be an unjust trial help under the Thirty. Demosthenes 
24.57-9 contrasts the democratic dikasteria of the fourth century with the wrongs done by the 
dikasteria under the Thirty) but because he had deposited the money to hide it from the Thirty. 
The reference to courts having been suspended must therefore relate to the period immediately 
following the restoration of the democracy. 
81 Dem. 45.3. 
82 Dem. 39.17. 
83 Hansen (1991) p. 189. 
84 Dem. 39.17 and 49.99. 
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4.3.2 Law in the courts 
 
4.3.2.1 Jurors’ oath 
 
Even when the courts were functioning, the degree to which court processes 
enforced the law is controversial. Athenian jurors were required to swear an oath 
once a year concerning their conduct as jurors. Though there is no complete copy 
of the oath surviving, there are many references to the oath and it is possible to 
piece together its main terms.85 Concerning the laws, the jurors swear to vote in 
accordance with the laws and decrees of the Athenian people, and to vote with 
their most just judgement about matters for which there are no laws and without 
favour or hostility.86 How far jurors were bound by this oath and what effect it had 
on jury voting behaviour are controversial questions. Harris points out that the 
part of the oath requiring jurors to judge according to the laws is referred to much 
 
85 Fraenkel (1878) first reconstructed the oath to contain four clauses: 1) To vote in accordance with 
the laws and decrees of the Athenian people. 2) To listen to the accuser and defendant equally. 3) 
To vote or judge with ones most just judgement about matters for which there are no laws and 
without favour or hostility. 4) To vote about matters pertaining to the charge. Harris (2013) p. 101-
102 accepts these four clauses and adds a fifth clause applicable after 403; to respect the Amnesty. 
Sommerstein (2012) adopts a version of the oath which includes further provisions which he 
considers to have been aimed at expanding the oath to cover the additional office of nomothetai. 
86 Additionally, jurors swear to vote on the matter to which the prosecution pertains (Dem. 24.151). 
How far this was the case, and how broadly defined this requirement of relevance was, are disputed. 
By taking a broad approach to relevance which allows him to consider character evidence 
pertaining to the likelihood or otherwise of the defendant having committed the alleged wrong, 
and information relating to ongoing disputes that were conducted through litigation, Rhodes 
(2004) is able to conclude that most Athenian forensic oratory was mostly relevant to the charge. 
Lanni (2006) takes a different approach, whereby Athenians are considered to have used material 
which, while legally irrelevant, nonetheless allowed juries to come to decisions which were felt by 
Athenians to be more just. Where Lanni and Rhodes treat this requirement as primarily related to 
litigation, Harris (2013) pp. 114 ff. links it to the role of the law in the Athenian courts. Harris argues 
that the jurors, by swearing διαψηφιοῦ?αι +ερὶ οὗ ἄν ὁ δίωξις ᾖ, (Dem. 24.151) promise to judge only 
on matters included in the engklēma or graphē. Harris further argues that the form of the engklēma 
required the litigant to specify how the acts he alleges the defendant to have done constitute 
breaches of the law. Harris considers this to have meant that all prosecutions brought before the 
Athenian courts had to be brought for acts defined or definable as offences under Athens’ laws. The 
problem with this is that the only check on what could be included within the engklēma is the 
opinion of the archon responsible for that type of suit. Athens was usually resistant to giving a lot 
of discretion to officials, and archons were appointed by lot so cannot be considered to have had 
any specialist knowledge of law, so the effectiveness of this check is doubtful. There are two 
instances in the orators of archons rejecting suits. In Antiph. 6.37-8 the suit is rejected because 
there is no time for the basileus to fulfil all the necessary processes before the end of his term of 
office. The family of the dead boy are able to introduce their suit with his successor. In Lys. 13.86 
the Eleven compel the man requesting the apagogē to add the words ep’ autophoroi to the charge, 
but do not appear to have checked the legitimacy of this charge. The work of the archons in policing 
the charge seems to have been limited to requiring that it be made through the proper processes.   
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more often than the part requiring them to judge by their most just judgement, 
and considers jurors to have generally voted conscientiously in a way which 
applied the laws of the city.87 Scholars such as Lanni88 argue against this that in 
some cases, such as Against Leocrates, Against Boeotus, or Against Athenogenes, it 
is not at all clear that the defendant has actually breached any laws at all. Some 
cases contain little or no legal argumentation89 and it is common for litigants to 
bring in much material which appears irrelevant to the case at hand.90 As Todd 
notes,91 there are even instances of litigants asking jurors to uphold agreements 
which were made in order to exclude the operation of law.  
 
The significance of the clause requiring that jurors judge by their most just 
judgement (gnōmē dikaiotatē) when there are no laws has been studied extensively 
and its application in Athenian courts is disputed. Biscardi identified two schools 
of thought. The first considers gnōmē dikaiotatē to be useable to help jurors 
interpret the law, to fill in any gaps in the legislative system, and to resolve conflicts 
between law and equity in favour of equity. The second takes a much more narrow 
interpretation of the clause, and considers that it was only applicable where no law 
existed on the question at hand.92 Scafuro applies Biscardi’s analysis to Todd’s work 
on the procedural orientation of Athenian law,93 and concludes that the broader 
approach to the gnōmē dikaiotatē must be considered to be correct, since the 
Athenian jury would not have expected, nor had the capacity, to make decisions 
which stuck closely to the letter of the law.94 Mirhady has proposed a different 
approach to the clause on the gnōmē dikaiotatē. He argues that the clause was 
intended to govern decisions on facts, and so was in symmetry with rather than 
 
87 Harris (2013) p. 104. 
88 Lanni (2006). 
89 Of the roughly 100 speeches in the corpus, 44 cite no laws. 
90 See Lanni (2006), Johnstone (1999), Rhodes (2004) for different models of relevance in the courts. 
Wohl (2010) through close reading of certain speeches, argues for a model where apparently 
irrelevant evidence is used as part of a complex rhetorical strategy. 
91 (1993) p. 59, observing that one of these instances, Dem. 48, involves the jury being asked to 
uphold an agreement to commit a ‘crime’. 
92 Biscardi (1970). 
93 Todd (1993) 
94 Scafuro (1997) pp. 50-4. 
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complementary to the clause requiring jurors to judge according to the laws.95 
Harris accepts that the clause governs jurors’ decision on the law, but says that it 
must have been an exceptional measure, to be used only where there truly was no 
law which could be applied to the situation.96 All of these arguments start from the 
presumption that there must be one correct interpretation of the oath, but like the 
rest of Athenian law, Athens lacked any process by which one interpretation of the 
oath could become authoritative. The question of the meaning of this clause must 
accordingly be left open.  
 
Despite it being impossible to select a single correct interpretation for the clause 
requiring jurors to judge by their most just judgement, its existence can tell us 
something about the role of law in Athenian judging. By including a requirement 
that jurors judge by their most just judgement, the oath emphasises the role of the 
court in achieving equitable outcomes. If jurors really did swear to judge cases 
according to the law, and if they upheld this oath in their decision making, 
arguments which fail to dwell on the legal status of the case would appear to have 
been extremely weak. Since we know these speeches to have been written by 
skilled logographers, the evidence we have seems better explained by the 
hypothesis that that, like the ephebic oath, the jurors’ oath, while emphasising the 
importance of the laws in judicial decision making, did not go so far as restricting 
citizens’ liberty to exercise their own judgement. 
 
4.3.2.2 Deterrence 
 
The use of the idea of deterrence in Athenian court speeches at first glance seems 
to suggest some attempt at society-wide enforcement of law. Of the four explicit 
references in Athenian court speeches to deterrence, three come from speeches 
prosecuting in public cases, while the fourth comes from Lysias 1, where the 
rhetorical strategy tries to turn a defence in a private suit for homicide into a 
prosecution under a public suit for adultery.  
 
95 Mirhady (2007). 
96 Harris (2013) p. 104-110. 
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The use of the deterrence argument in Demosthenes Against Neaira looks 
straightforward, until you realise that the behaviour which he is urging should be 
deterred is not the offence for which Neaira is being tried.97 This section of the 
speech actually refers to a law regulating the behaviour of the wife of the archon 
basileus, which Neaira herself never was. Lysias 1 tries a similar move, arguing that 
if the court fails to condone what he presents as his enforcing of the law on 
adultery, homeowners will also no longer be able to protect their property against 
thieves, since the thieves will claim to be adulterers and so claim the supposed 
protection of the court’s decision to punish those who kill adulterers.98  
 
A second use of deterrence in Against Neaira99 is much more interesting in what it 
could tell us about the degree to which Athenians might be expected to conform 
their behaviour to the laws than in its approach to enforcing law. According to the 
rhetoric here, wicked women will no longer have to fear the laws and so will behave 
in all sorts of socially unacceptable ways, knowing that the law has no further 
effect. This idea that failure to enforce the law in a single case will lead to that law 
becoming no longer effective is something Demosthenes makes much more 
 
97 Dem. 59.77 ‘These sacred and holy rites for the celebration of which your ancestors provided so 
well and so magnificently, it is your duty, men of Athens, to maintain with devotion, and likewise 
to punish those who insolently defy your laws and have been guilty of shameless impiety toward 
the gods; and this for two reasons: first, that they may pay the penalty for their crimes; and, 
secondly, that others may take warning, and may fear to commit any sin against the gods and 
against the state.’  
98 Lys. 1.36 ‘So I beg you now to reach the same verdict as the law does. If not, you will be giving to 
adulterers such security that you will encourage thieves to call themselves adulterers too. They will 
realise that if they describe adultery as their object and claim that they have entered another’s house 
for this purpose, nobody will dare to touch them. Everyone will know that we must say good-bye 
to the laws on adultery and take notice only of the jury’s vote— which is of course the most kurios 
over all the city’s affairs!’ (trans. Todd 2007, adapted). 
99 Dem. 59.111-112 ‘At this point [if you acquit Neaira] the most virtuous of the women will be angry 
at you for having deemed it right that this woman should share in like manner with themselves in 
the public ceremonials and religious rites; and to those who are not women of discretion you point 
out clearly that they may do as they please, for they have nothing to fear from you or the laws. For 
if you treat the matter with indifference or toleration, you will yourselves seem to approve of this 
woman's conduct. It would be far better, therefore, that this trial should never have taken place 
than that, when it has taken place, you should vote for acquittal; for in that case prostitutes will 
indeed have liberty to live with whatever men they choose and to name anyone whatever as the 
father of their children, and your laws will become of no effect, and women of the character of the 
courtesan will be able to bring to pass whatever they please’. Cf. p. 166 below on the different way 
Solon’s law-giving for men and for women is imagined in the fourth century. 
143 
explicit in Against Meidias where he asks ‘And what is the strength of the laws? If 
one of you is wronged and cries aloud, will the laws run up and be at his side to 
assist him? No; they are only written texts and incapable of such action. Wherein 
then resides their power? In yourselves, if only you support them and make them 
all-powerful to help him who needs them. So the laws are strong through you and 
you through the laws.’100  
 
This idea that without the law in place and rigorously enforced people will behave 
in socially unacceptable ways reflects the ‘bad man’ model of law. To be under a 
legal duty, for the bad man, is simply to be aware of the likely negative 
repercussions as a result of not complying with the law. This seems to contrast 
sharply with the wide discretion given to Athenian citizens to interpret law, and it 
is not reflected in many of Athens’ judicial institutions. It seems rather to be used 
in rhetoric by prosecutors to give the impression that a failure to convict the 
defendant will lead to catastrophic social ills. Where speakers do try to use 
deterrence arguments, they give as their imagined consequences of not enforcing 
the law the very most serious outcome imaginable. Indeed, they go so far as to look 
almost ridiculous to a modern reader, and this need to exaggerate may be 
indicative of the inherent weakness of deterrence arguments.101 The consequences 
envisioned in these examples, such as the idea that men would, if they could, marry 
only prostitutes, or the preposterous image of a thief caught in the act claiming 
protection on the basis that he is not a thief but an adulterer, is perhaps a sign that 
in questions of enforcement of law, the argument from deterrence is relatively 
weak, and to try to persuade a jury of it the speaker needs to go to the furthest 
possible extreme to give his argument any weight. 
 
 
100 Dem. 21.224. Similar ideas can be seen in Aeschin. 1.192-3 and Lys. 27.6-7. 
101 Lanni (2016) argues that in fact Athenian social order can be attributed to the deterrent effect of 
the fact that Athenians could consider themselves quite likely to need to defend themselves in 
court, and because of Athenian courts’ wide approach to relevance might find any past misdeed 
brought up against them. Though modern studies on deterrence focus more on the effect of 
marginal deterrence (that is, increases to sentencing), the largest meta-study (von Hirsch et al. 
1999) showed that deterrence is primarily effective where consequences are highly certain and 
immediate, neither of which Athens satisfied. Despite this, deterrence is popularly imagined in 
modern society to work, and it is this imagined role of deterrence I am interested in here. 
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4.3.2.3 Praising the laws 
 
As well as asking the jurors to enforce the laws by threatening terrible 
consequences if they fail to do so, orators frequently praise the laws they are asking 
the jurors to enforce. This trope appears 51 times in the corpus of forensic 
oratory,102 of which 20 instances come from graphai paranomōn and nomon mē 
epitēdeion theinai. It appears in both public and private suits, and across the whole 
span of time covered by the forensic orators. Orators will sometimes simply offer 
their own opinion of the law;103 at other times they will offer explanations for why 
this law is good. As such, there is some overlap with the trope of construing the 
intention of the lawgiver,104 but whereas the intention of the lawgiver is used as 
justification for the interpretation the speaker wishes to put on the law in question, 
the trope of praising the laws seems to have as its purpose quite simply to persuade 
the jurors to actually enforce the law.  
 
Of the 51 instances of this trope, 22 offer no justification for the praise at all. In 7 
of the 51 instances the praise includes a claim that the law is democratic, but since 
praise of a law as democratic was likely to be being used as a ‘hurrah-word’ (to use 
Hansen’s term) in this context, some of these 7 are instances where I have treated 
the speaker as offering no justification. 11 of these 51 praise the law for promoting 
justice (understood as fairness), and 2 for promoting justice (understood as 
consistency with other Athenian laws or decisions). 10 praise it for promoting 
expediency, and three praise it for promoting some moral end outside of achieving 
justice. Out of 51 instances, 4 seem to envisage the law as likely to effect 
behavioural change. This pattern of praise echoes the evidence we have explored 
in chapters 2 and 3 of this study that Athenians were as likely to view their laws as 
 
102 Antiph. 5.14, 6.4, Lys. 1.2, 1.31, Andoc. 1.94, 1.107-9, Aeschin. 1.14, 1.16, 1.17, 1.24, 1.27, 1.139, 1.160, 
1.186, 2.87, 3.11, 3.33, Lycurg. Leocr. 102, Hyp. Athenogenes 14, 22, Hyp. Eux. 9, Dem. 20.8, 20.93, 
20.96, 20.104, 20.152, 20.153, 21.9, 21.12, 21.43, 21.48-51, 23.37, 23.44, 23.54, 23.55, 23.60, 23.70, 23.72, 
23.82, 23.86, 24.24, 24.34, 24.43, 24.59, 24.212, 57.4, 57.32, 36.25, 36.26, 47.1, 48.56-8. 
103 e.g. Aeschin. 3.33 ‘This, men of Athens, is an excellent law’.  
104 see Lanni (2006) p. 69 on the use of this trope and chapter 5 for its significance in understanding 
Athenian law. 
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intended to fulfil expedient purposes as to consider them aimed at achieving 
justice. Similarly, it echoes the weak role of morality in interpreting Athenian laws. 
 
The fact that litigants find the need to praise the laws they wish the jurors to use 
in judging the case suggests that the jurors had considerable discretion as to which 
laws they should use, and how far they should base their judgement on those laws. 
Even the praise which comes from graphai paranomōn/nomon mē epitēdeion 
theinai, where a higher degree of praise might be expected given that litigants are 
trying to defend laws from legislation that they claim would contradict them, 
should not be discounted, since the formal legal matter at stake in these cases is 
not whether the older law is better than the newer one, but merely whether it 
existed at all. Even in cases which were supposed to judge legalistic matters, 
speakers could not trust that the jurors would enforce the law.  
 
4.3.2.4 The paragraphē 
 
The reluctance of Athenian juries to enforce law simply by dint of being law may 
be best seen in the arguments used in paragraphē cases. Paragraphē was a process 
introduced following the restoration of the democracy after the regime of the 
Thirty which allowed a person who was being prosecuted for an offence to bring a 
claim that the case against him was inadmissible. What the jurors were asked to 
decide in paragraphē cases is disputed. Wolff argued that paragraphē was a two 
stage process, with an initial vote solely on the admissibility of the case, followed, 
if the case was held to be admissible, by arguments and voting on the merits of the 
case.105 Wolff was arguing against Paoli, who understood there to a be single vote 
on both the admissibility and merits of the case.106  
 
Wolff’s view was accepted by Harrison (1971) and MacDowell (1978), but the 
question remains, why litigants spend so little of their speech-time on the 
technicalities of the admissibility of their case and so much on the merits. This has 
 
105 Wolff (1966). 
106 Paoli (1933).  
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prompted Carawan to argue that Paoli’s view is to be preferred, and we should 
understand paragraphē to have allowed jurors to decide the admissibility and 
merits of a case by a single vote.107 Carawan’s argument against Wolff relies heavily 
on arguments from silence, pointing out that despite the relatively rich evidence 
we have of the process,108 we never see speeches from or explicit reference to the 
second stage. This absence is not entirely surprising, especially if Wolff was right 
that voting on the merits usually took place shortly after voting on admissibility.109 
If this is the case, litigants would not have enough time to commission and have 
prepared a second speech, so, as with timesis speeches, we would not expect to see 
copies of these speeches preserved. It seems more likely that the paragraphē 
speeches we have were intended for hearings on the admissibility of the case, 
where the would-be defendant had the opportunity to have the case against him 
ruled inadmissible by the jurors. If this is the case, there remains the question why 
the speeches are so much wider in content than that would lead us to expect.  
 
Of the seven paragraphē cases in the Demosthenic corpus,110 five are for litigants 
who, had the case gone ahead, would have been defendants, and two for litigants 
who would have been prosecutors. The paragraphē speeches are notably different 
from other speeches in Athenian jury trials. Whereas most speeches start with a 
proem which does not immediately address the law applicable to the case in hand, 
five of the seven paragraphē speeches have as their first paragraph a reference to 
the law on paragraphē.111 Similarly, four of the seven speeches return explicitly to 
the law on paragraphē at the close of the speech.112 This could give the impression 
that the paragraphē speeches show more regard for relevance than Athenian 
forensic oratory in general, but this would be misleading. All the speeches 
examined here are based either on the argument that maritime suits are not 
admissible if there is no written contract, or on the argument that a dispute once 
 
107 2011. 
108 Dem. 32-38 and Isocrates 18. 
109 (1966) 84-5. 
110 Dem. 32-38. 
111 Dem. 32, 33, 36, 37 and 38. Dem. 34 and 35 are the two speeches in which the speaker would have 
been the prosecutor were the case to have gone ahead. 
112 Dem. 34, 36, 37 and 38. The end of Dem. 33 is missing. 
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settled, with valid release given, cannot be reopened in the courts.113 None of the 
speakers rely solely on arguments relating to the admissibility of the suit.  
 
In Demosthenes’ Against Zenothemis, the speaker Demo claims the suit should not 
be admissible because there is no written contract. Although this is the basis of his 
claim that the suit should not be admissible, the bulk of the speech is about the 
material dispute between the parties, with 32.11-19 given over to narrative of 
Demo’s business dealings. A maximum of 10 paragraphs out of 33 are relevant to 
the argument on whether the suit is or is not admissible.114  
 
In Demosthenes’ Against Apaturius, the speaker narrates two entirely separate 
disputes in which he and Apaturius were involved. In the first of these, the speaker 
stood surety for Apaturius regarding a loan and the dispute was resolved.115 In the 
second, Apaturius and Parmenon were involved in a dispute and required 
guarantors for an arbitration. The speaker claims not to have acted as guarantor 
for this, but was subsequently sued as the guarantor for the arbitration.116 Of 38 
paragraphs, 10 are completely irrelevant, and only 13 are directly relevant to the 
paragraphē.  
 
In Demosthenes’ Against Phormio, the case seems to have revolved around 
whether Phormio did or did not pay the money he owed the speaker to the 
speaker’s agent in Bosporus, thus settling his obligations.117 As such, most of the 
events related in the case as presented by the speaker are relevant to his attempt 
to rebut Phormio’s paragraphē claim, but this seems to be because Phormio’s 
paragraphē suit was brought on a daring interpretation of the law on paragraphē 
 
113 32, 33 and (probably) 35 are for absence of written contract; (probably) 34, and 36, 37 and 38 are 
for the case having already been subject to a valid release. Isager and Hansen (1975) pp. 126-129 
categorise the types of objection which could be brought using a paragraphē. 
114 Dem. 32.1-2, 24-31. Though the speech is incomplete. 
115 Dem. 33.4-12. 
116 Dem. 33.13-22. 
117 Isager and Hansen (1975) p. 158. 
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which would allow paragraphē to be brought where one party to an agreement 
claimed to have fulfilled all his obligations under that agreement.118  
 
In contrast, almost all the speech of Demosthenes’ Against Lacritus is irrelevant to 
the question of the admissibility of the case.  The paragraphē is likely to have been 
brought on the basis that there was no written contact between the two parties. 
The speaker loaned money to Lacritus’ younger brother, who has since died. 
Lacritus denies having inherited the estate, but the speaker wants to hold him 
liable for his brother’s debt nonetheless. Isager and Hansen119 consider that of this 
speech, only 35.3, 4 and 44 (out of 54 paragraphs in total) are relevant to the case.  
 
Demosthenes’ For Phormio, which concerns the admissibility of a suit which has 
already been subject to a release, fares little better, with only 14 of 62 paragraphs 
relating to the issue of admissibility.120 Even in a case which is observed by Isager 
and Hansen to have rested on weak grounds were the case to have gone to trial, 
but to have had a strong argument to make at paragraphē,121 we do not see the 
speaker resting on arguments on admissibility. At 36.21, the speaker explicitly tells 
the jurors that he does not want them to think that he is at ‘any disadvantage 
regarding the rights of the matters at issue’, and that accordingly he will go through 
the charges brought against him one by one to show that they are untrue. Even in 
this perfect example of where paragraphē should have worked well for the litigant, 
less than a quarter of the speech is about the admissibility of the suit.  
 
Demosthenes’ Against Nausimachus and Xenopeithes concerns the recovery of a 
debt owed to the estate which the two would-be prosecutors inherited. The 
speaker in the paragraphē claims that all disputes regarding the estate were settled 
many years ago, but Nausimachus and Xenopeithes claim a further debt owed to 
the estate by a third party was paid into the estate but never passed on to them. 
 
118 Isager and Hansen (1975) express their hope that the jury rejected Phormio’s interpretation of 
the law. 
119 (1975) p. 173. 
120 Dem. 36.2-13, 23-25 and part of 60. 
121 (1975) p. 194. 
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The paragraphē claims that all disputes were settled and so the suit is not 
admissible. Of 28 paragraphs, only 8 are relevant to the admissibility of the suit.  
 
Isager and Hansen note that although a time limit for bringing prosecution may 
have been a ground for paragraphē, it is never used as the primary ground.122 What 
they do not note is how it is used in the paragraphē speeches. In three of the seven 
paragraphē speeches in the Demosthenic corpus, time limits are mentioned. In two 
of these, however, they are not mentioned to support the claim for the 
inadmissibility of the suit, but are rather used as evidence that the suit itself is 
baseless.123 In Demosthenes 37.57, even the release which forms the grounds for 
the claim of inadmissibility is used as evidence that there cannot have been any 
real dispute. 
 
Isager and Hansen propose that jurors may have been reluctant to release people 
on the basis of formalities, and this is why we see so much argument in these 
speeches on the substance of the original claim which is being blocked by the 
paragraphē.124 Their interpretation seems plausible, but they do not explore what 
this means for Athenian law more widely. Even in this process which was created 
expressly to allow decisions to be made on formal failures, both prosecution and 
defence acted on the assumption that juries were unwilling to allow their decision-
making to take into account only questions of law.  
 
 
4.3.3 Ideology of law which rejects compulsion 
 
In fourth-century writing about law, there is clear evidence of a line of thought 
which rejected the idea that law could or should be backed by force. One of the 
strongest pieces of evidence for this line of thought comes from Xenophon’s 
 
122 (1975) p. 126, 227. 
123 Time limits are mentioned in Dem. 33.27, 36.26 and 38.17. In Dem. 33 and 36 the time limits are 
used to provide evidence that the suit is baseless. In Dem. 38 they are used to support the argument 
on the admissibility of the suit. 
124 Ibid. p. 130. 
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Memorabilia 1.2.4-46. In this section, the only elenchus in the whole of the 
Memorabilia,125 in the context of showing how Socrates’ pupils (mis)used Socrates’ 
teachings, Xenophon presents Alcibiades as engaging Pericles in philosophical (or 
perhaps sophistic) debate:  
 Tell me, Pericles,” he said, “can you teach me what a law is?” 
“Certainly,” he replied. 
“Then pray teach me. For whenever I hear men praised for keeping the laws, 
it occurs to me that no one can really deserve that praise who does not know 
what a law is.”  
“Well, Alcibiades, there is no great difficulty about what you desire. You 
wish to know what a law is. Laws are all the rules approved and enacted by 
the majority in assembly, whereby they declare what ought and what ought 
not to be done.” 
“Do they suppose it is right to do good or evil?” 
“Good, of course, young man, — not evil.”  
“But if, as happens under an oligarchy, not the majority, but a minority meet 
and enact rules of conduct, what are these?” 
“Whatsoever the sovereign power in the State, after deliberation, enacts and 
directs to be done is known as a law.” 
“If, then, a despot, being the sovereign power, enacts what the citizens are 
to do, are his orders also a law?” 
 
125 Dorion (2000) argues that the reason the Socrates of Xenophon’s Memorabilia does not use 
elenchus arguments is because Xenophon wishes to protect Socrates from Cleitophon’s accusation 
that though Socrates could point out a man’s faults, he could not lead him to virtue. By presenting 
Alcibiades as using elenchus arguments, Dorion suggests Xenophon is criticising Alcibiades. 
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“Yes, whatever a despot as ruler enacts is also known as a law.”  
“But force, the negation of law, what is that, Pericles? Is it not the action of 
the stronger when he constrains the weaker to do whatever he chooses, not 
by persuasion, but by force?” 
“That is my opinion.” 
“Then whatever a despot by enactment constrains the citizens to do without 
persuasion, is the negation of law?” 
“I think so: and I withdraw my answer that whatever a despot enacts 
without persuasion is a law.”  
“And when the minority passes enactments, not by persuading the majority, 
but through using its power, are we to call that force or not?” 
“Everything, I think, that men constrain others to do ‘without persuasion,’ 
whether by enactment or not, is not law, but force.” 
“It follows then, that whatever the assembled majority, through using its 
power over the owners of property, enacts without persuasion is not law, 
but force?” 126 
Alcibiades’ killer argument here is the apparently self-evident fact that force (bia) 
is the negation of law. Unfortunately, Pericles and Alcibiades do not continue their 
conversation or discuss why force should be considered to negate law, instead 
trailing off into congratulating each other on their cleverness, but the use of the 
argument is indicative of an Athenian attitude which rejected the role of force in 
law.  
 
126 Xen. Mem. 1.2.42-47 trans. Loeb, adapted. 
152 
Lysias’ Funeral Oration,127 similarly excludes any use of force from the law, 
claiming that the noble Athenians of the past ‘honoured according to nomos those 
who were good, and punished those who were bad, in the belief that to be ruled 
forcibly (biai) by each other was an ergon for animals, but that it was fitting for 
humans to determine justice by means of nomos, to persuade by using logos, and 
to serve those purposes by their ergon, while being ruled by nomoi and taught by 
logos.’128 It is striking that Lysias here remarks on the use of punishment, which 
necessarily involves force, while denying the role of force in law.  
The idea that rule by law involves logos is echoed to some extent in Plato, who, 
while rejecting existing states’ use of law simply to compel, suggests that law can 
be used either to compel or to persuade people to behave well.129 Though he does 
not go as far as to claim that force negates law altogether, Plato’s emphasis on 
persuasion as preferable to force informs his recommendation that laws should 
have preambles explaining the purpose of the law, in order that citizens should be 
encouraged to comply with the law voluntarily, rather than compelled to 
obedience. For Plato, this emphasis on persuasion is a moral matter, based on the 
assumption that it is morally better for men to choose to obey the law than to be 
forced to do so.  
The rejection of the role of force in law is particularly striking when considered 
against the background of the fifth-century concern with the distinction between 
nomos and phusis. There are a range of fifth-century approaches to the competition 
between law and nature, which Guthrie130 divided into three rough categories. 
Firstly, there are those who presented nomos as a necessary civilising influence on 
base human nature. Next, there are the realists, who recognised the tendency of 
humans to look first to their own advantage, whether this aligns with morality and 
justice or not, and consider that those who have power will make the laws to suit 
their own interests. Finally, Guthrie identifies the upholders of phusis, who think 
 
127 The authenticity of this speech has been doubted, but Todd (2007) tentatively identifies it as a 
speech by Lysias but written as a display piece rather than for delivery. 
128 Lys. 2.19 – trans. Todd (2007). 
129 Pl. Laws 720a. 
130 (1971). 
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that the tyranny of the strong over the weak is right, and that law merely holds back 
those who should rightly hold total power. Guthrie is concerned only with 
arguments marshalled by philosophers and sophists, but enough of their arguments 
seems to have penetrated public consciousness for Aristophanes to successfully 
mock and parody the works of the sophists. In particular, the scene in Clouds where 
Pheidippides beats his father makes exaggerated use of some of the arguments about 
the value of nomos made by the sophists.131 Indeed, Antiphon the Sophist’s treatise 
On Truth even uses as an example beating one’s father.132 
What unites the three approaches distinguished by Guthrie is that they all recognise 
the power inherent in nomoi. Those who consider it a civilising influence see the 
force of the law as successfully holding back man’s baser nature. The realists see law 
as inevitably supporting the position of those in power, but recognise the force that 
lies behind the law in making such support valuable. Finally, those who bemoan 
nomos as holding back phusis recognise its force to such a degree that they consider 
it capable of limiting the actions of even the strongest, albeit in what they consider 
to be an unhelpful fashion. 
The nomos-phusis debate seems to have been particularly active during the last third 
of the fifth century,133 but in the fourth century drops out of view.134 Rather than 
focusing on the contrast between human nature and law, Aristotle and Plato instead 
view law as a part of the nature of humans.135 By doing so, fourth-century philosophy 
denies the significance of force in underpinning the law. This could be considered 
an evasion, but given Athens’ weak enforcement mechanisms and distaste for 
 
131 Aristophanes Clouds 1399-1436. 
132 Antiphon On Truth frag. 44 (a)v lines 4-8 [Pendrick]  
133 Gagarin (2002) p. 66. 
134 Derrida (1992) identifies nomos-phusis debate as an early iteration of positivist/natural law 
debate. This makes it even more interesting that in the fourth century, when Athenian law in some 
ways seems to become more self-consciously positivist (though see chapter 5 on how far this was 
the case) debate on nomos-phusis falls out of fashion. 
135 Long (2005). 
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excessive enforcement of law, it is perhaps more indicative of Athenian society than 
might at first glance be imagined.136  
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
In the absence of professionalised state power, and without forces to compel 
obedience to law, Athens’ laws probably did not have the capacity to become tools 
that a minority could use to oppress the majority.137 As such, Nazi or Soviet models 
of law enforcement need not be considered here. Instead, Athens’ approach to 
enforcement of law raises questions about how far obedience to law was valued in 
Athenian society. A society which expects high levels of obedience is more likely 
to enforce the law against those who do not obey. On the other hand, a society in 
which law is one tool among many for settling disputes is less likely to prioritise 
enforcement of the law where another acceptable response to the dispute has been 
found.138 From our exploration, Athens appears not to have prioritised the 
enforcement of law as law. This supports the evidence that Athenians appear to 
have experienced only a weak sense of obligation to obey laws as laws.  
 
This weak sense of obligation to obey laws as laws is indicative of how Athenians 
understood their laws. As discussed above, where laws are understood to be 
 
136 There may be a hint of this distaste visible in Demosthenes’ complaint 22.51 ‘Let no one 
understand me to say that the money ought not to have been wrung from the defaulters. It ought; 
but how? Even as the law enjoins, for the benefit of the other citizens. That is the spirit of 
democracy. For what you, men of Athens, have gained by the exaction of such paltry sums of money 
in this way, is nothing to what you have lost by the introduction of such habits into political life. If 
you care to inquire why a man would sooner live under a democracy than under an oligarchy, you 
will find that most obvious reason is that in a democracy everything is more easy-going’. 
Demosthenes appears to object that the enforcement of taxation has been excessive. 
137 It must be remembered that the Thirty had access to a Spartan garrison. Xen. Hel. 3.14; Ath. Pol. 
37.2. 
138 In Dem. 47.68-71 we are told of the response to the murder of an elderly freed woman. She is said 
to have been killed by the speaker’s enemies when they were seizing goods from his home. After 
she died, the speaker went to exegetai for advice on what he should do. He tells the jurors that the 
exegetai told him he should not prosecute, because the laws did not allow it because he did not 
have the right relationship to the dead woman, and because if he were to prosecute successfully he 
would be resented. That he might risk resentment for prosecuting the killer of a woman under his 
protection suggests a model of law which is not intended to enforce moral behaviour, but instead 
is supposed to offer a means by which Athenian citizens can manage their disputes. 
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grounded in morality, one should generally expect high levels of obligation to obey 
laws. Despite this, as we have seen in chapters 2 and 3 Athenians could at times 
treat their laws as serving certain moral ends. As we shall see in Chapter Five, this 
weak obligation to obey law does not necessarily point to a society which has 
embraced positive law. Instead, the weak obligation to obey law and the decision 
not to prioritise enforcement of law suggest that Athenians had a radically different 
view of what they expected their law to achieve in their society – they expected law 
to settle disputes, but did not expect it to serve as a general means of social control. 
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CHAPTER 5: LAWGIVERS AND LAW-GIVING IN 
CLASSICAL ATHENS 
 
 
In fourth-century Athens, Solon was recognised as Athens’ lawgiver, and his 
authority and prestige were regularly invoked by speakers in the law courts. Here, 
I explore the role Solon the lawgiver played in fourth-century perceptions of law, 
and contrast that with nomothesia in the fifth and fourth centuries. 
 
The question of where Athenian laws derived their authority is under-researched. 
Sealey raised the question of where Athenian laws derived their authority, but 
concluded that this was a question Athenians did not ask.1 He argued that 
Athenians accepted their laws as having been given to them by Solon and as having 
been from there on ‘static’. Sealey failed to interrogate the consequences of this 
approach for the work of the nomothetai of the fourth century, or the wider 
consequences for Athenians’ understanding of their own law. It is these wider 
questions which I explore here. 
 
 
5.1 Solon 
 
In Athenian oratory of the fourth century, it is common that Athens’ laws are 
attributed to a single lawgiver, usually identified as Solon. The importance of this 
narrative for Athenian political discourse has received considerable scholarly 
attention, particularly in terms of the disputed ownership of Solon and the 
ancestral, or ancient, constitution between oligarchic and democratic thinkers of 
the fifth and fourth centuries.2 The role the attribution of Athens’ laws to Solon 
 
1 Sealey (1982) p. 301. 
2 Finley (1971), Hansen (1989a), Hansen (1991) pp. 296 ff. 
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played in Athenians’ understanding of their legal system has, however, been under-
examined by researchers.  
 
By the fourth century, Solon the historical figure had been obscured to a large 
degree by his myth, but it is this myth which is relevant to attitudes towards and 
perceptions of the law in the fourth century, and accordingly it is on this myth 
which we will focus here.  
 
 
5.1.1 Solon’s fifth- and fourth-century prominence  
 
Solon’s prominence is not a purely fourth-century phenomenon, and if we had 
more fifth-century court speeches it is likely we would see Solon appear in them. 
Solon appears in Herodotus as the man who ‘had made laws for the Athenians at 
their bidding’,3 and in several fifth-century comedies, sometimes taking a leading 
role, as in Eupolis’ Demes and Cratinus’ Cheirons.4 The trope of using Solon’s 
intentions to guide the interpretation of laws is apparently sufficiently familiar by 
the late fifth century for Aristophanes to base a joke in the Clouds on it.5 Although 
it is commonly claimed that the accretion around Solon of all of Athenian law is a 
product of the fourth century, evidence from comedy suggests that by the latter 
half of the fifth century Solon would have been widely recognised by the Athenians 
as at least a lawgiver, even if not as the lawgiver.6  
 
By the fourth century, there are some core elements of the Solon myth which seem 
to have become commonplace.7 The most central of these is that Solon was an 
 
3 Hdt. 1.29.1. 
4 Martin (2015) p. 66-9. 
5 Aristophanes Clouds 1187-1190 ‘Solon was demos-loving by nature’. The joke also depends on the 
idea that certain of Solon’s laws have come to be ignored by the fifth century. 
6 Szegedy-Mazsak (1978 p. 201) thinks that lawgiver myths are a fourth-century phenomenon. 
Hansen (1989a) identifies them as part of a wider tendency in Greek thought to try to identify a 
protos heuretēs. Todd (2007) p. 678 takes a similar approach. Thucydides is not much interested in 
Solon, nor does he appear in tragedy (where Theseus takes the role of lawgiver for the Athenians).  
7 Evidence from the fifth century is too sparse to be able to identify particular tropes. 
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excellent lawgiver, and he created a politeia8 for the Athenians. The excellence of 
Solon as a lawgiver was so established that his legacy came to be disputed between 
those who favoured oligarchy or moderate democracy and those who favoured 
greater democracy, and there is only a hint of any criticism of Solon.9 The use of 
Solon in fourth-century speeches aimed at the Athenian public shows no trace of 
these tensions, and Solon is simply presented as the founder of the democracy, but 
given the tendency of forensic oratory to suppress class differences,10 this is not 
surprising. 
 
 
5.1.2 Reception of original authority of Solon’s laws 
 
Interpreted through a jurisprudential lens, Athens’ stories about the authority of 
Solon’s laws show a confusion of different potential sources of authority. One 
source they do not show, however, is divine authority. Szegedy-Mazsak identifies 
some degree of divine instruction as a common element in myths of lawgivers in 
ancient Greece, but Solon’s laws do not receive any divine authority.11 We are told 
that Solon was chosen and appointed to make laws for the Athenians.12 We must 
assume some sort of quasi-legal appointment, and from this we could be led to 
believe that his laws gained their authority by means of having been passed by a 
person authorised by Athens’ governmental structures to make laws. The story, 
however, is not so simple.  
 
 
8 Though it was widely accepted that Solon created a politeia for Athens, what was meant by a 
politeia is more nebulous. Though studies of Solon’s laws separate ‘constitutional’, or ‘political’ laws 
from other laws, the laws identified by Leao and Rhodes (2015) as Solonian fall, in general, within 
the areas studied by Xenophon in his Lakedaimonion Politeia, which may have significance for 
Hansen’s (1989a) argument for an imagined ‘Solonian constitution’ characterised by moderation. 
9 As observed by Hansen (1989a), Ath. Pol. 9.2 defends Solon against criticism for empowering juries 
too far. Similarly, Aristotle Pol. 1274a claims that the power given to the lower classes through the 
jury courts was an inadvertent result of Solon’s reforms. 
10 Ober (1989a). 
11 (1978) p. 205. Similarly, most lawgivers are said to have learned their skills from other lawgivers, 
such as Lycurgus having learned law in Crete, Egypt and Ionia (Ephorus FGrH 70 f 149), but Solon’s 
travels only occur after he has given laws to the Athenians.  
12 Hdt. 1.29; Ath. Pol. 2.2, 5.2. 
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The stories about Solon make it clear that these laws are not imagined as standing 
on their own authority, subject to the usual structures of Athenian government, 
but were closely tied to the personal authority of Solon. It is for this reason that 
Solon, in the stories, chooses to leave Athens, because otherwise the Athenians will 
ask him to change the laws he has made.13 By leaving Athens, Solon cannot be asked 
to change his laws, and the implication is that no one but Solon could change his 
laws. Here, then, the laws seem automatically to depend on the personal authority 
of the lawgiver.  
 
It is this personal authority that Solon tries to abandon when he has the Athenians 
swear an oath to use his laws.14 Based on this oath, the laws of Solon could be 
determined to rely on a contract-theory model of law, where the law’s authority 
comes about as a result of the agreement, implicit or explicit, we make with others 
in our society to act on the basis of the laws.15  
 
An unusual element of Solon’s myth, compared to those of other lawgivers,16 was 
that Solon was not generally viewed as having created laws in a state which 
previously had none. Whereas other Greek lawgivers are the first named lawgiver 
in their state, laying down laws for communities which are poorly governed or 
experiencing crisis, Solon was remembered as Athens’ second attempt at a 
lawgiver. The Ath. Pol. very clearly regards Solon as replacing an earlier 
constitution drawn up by Draco.17 In popular sources, Solon and Draco are 
 
13 Hdt. 1.29, Ath. Pol. 11.1. 
14 For either 10 or 100 years, depending on the source. Hdt 1.29 records a 10-year oath, Ath. Pol. 7.1-
2, 100 years. 
15 In his study of the linguistic developments in Athens’ terms for its laws, Ostwald (1969) claims 
that the shift from thesmos to nomos suggests that the authority for laws shifted from the personal 
authority of the law-giver to community acceptance of the law in the late sixth or early fifth century, 
possibly under the influence of Cleisthenes. As we shall see, the shift from reliance on the authority 
of the individual to reliance on the law as a system in itself was not as complete as Ostwald would 
claim. Humphreys (1987) p. 217 suggests that the more important divide is between new and old 
enactments, and observes that Athenians called Solon’s laws nomoi long before they were willing 
to apply the term to contemporary enactments. 
16 Szegedy-Maszak (1978 p. 201-3) observes the tendency for lawgivers to make laws in states which 
have none, but does not comment on the fact that Solon does not match this pattern. 
17 Ath. Pol. 7.1 The idea that there genuinely was a Drakontian politeia is generally considered to 
have been a myth, but its reception in fourth-century Athens still has significance. Scholars 
generally identify the idea of a Drakontian constitution (and probably the text alleged to be Draco’s 
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sometimes tied together as lawgivers,18 and at other times in the orators Solon is 
recognised as later than Draco,19 so it seems reasonable to suppose that the Ath. 
Pol.’s report of Solon’s laws replacing those of Draco might have been commonly 
recognised by fourth-century Athenians.  
 
This raises two major areas of interest for his reception in the fourth century. The 
first is that this tradition means that Solon cannot have been understood by fourth-
century Athenians as having formalised existing custom: Solon was replacing a 
constitution, and as such he needs to be recognised as making entirely new laws 
to replace the ones that had been found unsuitable. Solon, viewed in this light, is 
a legal innovator, something which by the fourth century seems generally to have 
been viewed with suspicion.  
 
In narratives about Solon’s laws at the point at which they were made, his laws 
could not depend on long usage or tradition for their authority, which leads us to 
the second area of interest: although Athens’ laws in the fourth century gave 
precedence to older over newer laws, the tradition does not record anything about 
a formal withdrawal of the laws of Draco. The Ath. Pol. simply records that during 
a period of disorder, Solon was chosen to mediate between the interests of the rich 
and the poor.20 Solon seems to be presented as free to work off a blank sheet. 
 
Nevertheless, what we are told about the work Solon did implies a process closer 
to review. Solon is remembered as having inherited an existing lawcode which was 
not serving Athens’ purposes. Solon then replaces most of that lawcode but keeps 
the parts which are still suitable. This, viewed in isolation, looks like a process of 
 
constitution in the Ath. Pol.) to have developed between 415 and 404, so before then Draco may 
just have been recognised as having made certain specific laws, and not to have legislated on what 
we would see as constitutional matters. Dem. 23.62 records what purports to be a Drakontian 
entrenchment clause – ‘You have heard the statute, men of Athens, declaring in plain terms that 
“whosoever, whether magistrate or private citizen, shall cause this ordinance to be frustrated or 
shall alter the same, shall be disfranchised with his children and his property”’. 
18 Andoc. 1.81, Dem, 24.211. 
19 Leao and Rhodes (2015) fr 66/1f= Lex Rhet Cant, ἈΡΓΙΑΣ ∆ΙΚΗ – ‘Lysias in the speech against 
Ariston says it was Draco who enacted the law and Solon again used it’. 
20 Ath. Pol. 5.2 ff. 
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review. This, however, is not how Solon comes to be remembered. Solon is not 
used to legitimate calls for law reform that aim to change Athens’ laws to suit 
current conditions, but only for arguments aimed at returning Athens to ‘the laws 
of Solon’. It is interesting that this element of Solon’s work was not picked up on 
by classical Athenians. It is possible that the idea of law reform was so inherently 
dangerous that there was a reluctance to acknowledge Solon as a legal reformer. 
Although Solon’s life story indicates laws which were created to solve a specific 
crisis, in his presentation in the fourth century, Solon is presented as creating laws 
which were new and which served a specific purpose, but never a purpose that 
could be considered to be historically contingent.21 
 
 
5.1.3 How Solonian is Solonian? 
 
It can be unclear, when orators in the fourth century refer to a law as Solonian, 
how literally they mean this. It has often been observed that fourth-century orators 
describe recent innovations as Solonian. Schreiner22 considered these references 
to be, not to Solon’s original laws, but to the ‘Solonian Code’ drawn up by 
committees at the end of the fifth century. Ruschenbusch, optimistically, 
considered that Athenians successfully differentiated between the new ‘Solonian’ 
laws from the lawcode, and Solon’s ‘old’ laws.23 Hansen doubts this, since speakers 
explicitly use the person of Solon in their discussion of even new ‘Solonian’ laws, 
and as such cannot expect their audience to be aware of these laws as part of a new 
Solonian code, and not associated with the historical Solon.24 Hansen considers 
that although genuinely Solonian laws had survived and may have been accessible 
 
21 This presentation may be an example of the phenomenon identified by Westbrook (2000) 
whereby legislators establish written law which is historically contingent (codification), but by the 
time it later comes to be interpreted it is being used by a society which has radically different ideas 
of law, and so the lawgiver, who was likely working in a casuistic system with little expectation that 
the law might outlast their personal authority (or in Solon’s case, perhaps the lifetime of the oath) 
is then interpreted to fit within a radically different system which expects comprehensive 
legislation independent of the person of the legislator. 
22 1913, as cited by Hansen (1989a). 
23 1966. 
24 Hansen (1989a). 
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to Athenians,25 Solon did not make ‘constitutional’ laws, and up until the reforms 
at the end of the fifth century most Athenian ‘constitutional’ law was oral.26 
Subsequently a consensus emerged as to the Solonian constitution which Hansen 
identifies as being characterised by a removal of power from the Assembly to the 
courts, and a tempering of what could be discussed in the Assembly and of the 
tone of Assembly discussions. This version of Solonian democracy Hansen 
considers to have been a widely recognised ideal of democracy, and he thinks that 
he can identify a law which he considers to have been made in emulation of this 
imagined Solonian constitution. 
 
Fascinating as it would be to identify laws which had been made in emulation of 
an imagined Solonian constitution, the passages Hansen cites in support of this 
claim do not provide sufficient evidence to support it. Hansen identified sections 
in Dinarchus’ Against Demosthenes which refer to the law proposed by 
Demosthenes that gave investigative powers to the Areopagus. At 1.62 the text 
specifies that the boulē is to have authority to enforce the patrioi nomoi, and it 
seems to be on the basis of this reference to the ancestral laws that Hansen makes 
his claim. These ancestral laws, however, are not the ones authorising the 
Areopagus to investigate, but the ones the Areopagus is to use.27 Naturally enough, 
given the thrust of Dinarchus’ argument, the law is clearly and unequivocally 
attributed to Demosthenes in his speech, but the phrasing of the law given by 
Dinarchus indicates not that it was made in emulation of Solonian law, but that 
 
25 The survival of the axones and kurbeis, as well as what these objects were, is controversial. Davis 
(2011) offers a useful summary of the academic work on this issue. Davis proposes that the kurbeis 
were wooden objects which bore laws, some of which were genuinely Solonian and others which 
came to be absorbed into the Solonian tradition, and that these laws were then copied onto axones 
at the end of the fifth century. This mixture of Solonian and non-Solonian legislation on wooden 
objects makes sense of how there could have been confusion about what was and was not Solonian 
despite the apparent evidence that copies of Solon’s laws were present and available for 
consultation in the fifth century. 
26 If Solon’s laws were organised by magistrate, this could suggest that they (at least to some degree) 
did set out the powers and responsibilities of the different magistrates, which could suggest that 
they were constitutional laws in Hansen’s sense of the word, though it is impossible to tell to what 
degree Solon placed his laws into a pre-existing structure of magistrates and to what degree he 
innovated in this area. He is not credited with creating the system of archonships. 
27 χρω?ένην τοῖς +ατρίοις νό?οις. Hansen also cites Din. 1.6, 9, 83 and 112, all of which simply attribute 
the law to Demosthenes.  
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the body of Solonian law was what the Areopagus Council was to use in conducting 
its investigations.  
 
Given the limited access Athenians had to historical records, and the limitations 
seen in other uses of history in Athenian oratory28 it seems likely that orators had 
little real knowledge of what was and was not genuinely Solonian, but Hansen’s 
claim that there was some degree of consensus as to what a Solonian constitution 
should have looked like does seem plausible.29 Nonetheless, it is necessary to 
consider what a claim for a new law as Solonian meant – had Solonian come to be 
simply a synonym of ‘moderate democracy’, so that by claiming a law as Solonian 
one made no claim on the personal authority of Solon? Hansen’s own argument 
would suggest not, since he points out that arguments about the person of Solon 
can be attached to these new Solonian laws. As such, the claim that a new law was 
Solonian must be understood as claiming, at a minimum that this is the sort of law 
of which the man Solon would have approved,30 and at a maximum that this law 
recreates an original law passed by Solon the man.  
 
Both of these mean that this new law is entirely dependent on the personality of 
Solon for its authority, and as such Hansen’s claim for a consensus ‘Solonian 
constitution’ has enormous significance for our understanding of Athenians’ 
perceptions of their own laws. These were, after all, laws passed by and for the 
democracy, and yet rather than claiming their own authority for these laws 
Athenians reach far into their own history, to the personal authority of a single 
man, a man who, no less, put measures in place designed to sever his laws from his 
personal authority.31  
 
 
28 See Nouhaud (1982). 
29 The laws attributed to Solon fall into at least a model of what a politeia looked like, if Xen Lac. 
Pol. and Aristotle Politeia can be considered models - with an emphasis on moral education of the 
citizens, particularly the young, and laws on family arrangements, but not much law on commercial 
arrangements. 
30 Canevaro (2013a p. 159) observes that one line of argument available in a graphē nomon mē 
epitēdeion theinai is that the law in dispute contradicts the ‘aim and spirit of another ancient and 
revered law’. 
31 See Westbrook (2000) and Harris (2006a). 
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5.1.4 Coherent programme of laws 
 
An important element of the myth of Solon in fourth-century oratory is the 
assumption that Solon’s laws formed part of a coherent, and at least somewhat 
comprehensive, programme of legislation.32 This imagined code of laws then 
allows fourth-century orators to engage in reasoning by analogy,33 but on the basis 
of something which, by the fourth century, must be considered to be almost 
entirely fictional.34 Analogies were generally presented and defended, not using 
the inherent authority of the law as a basis for argument, but based on the 
intentions imputed to Solon. The development of the ability to argue from analogy 
with other laws is an important one, as it allows a legal system the capacity to 
become increasingly comprehensive, but because Athenians linked their reasoning 
by analogy to the person of Solon they limited the extent to which their legal 
system could become autonomous. As long as laws continued to be linked so 
closely to Solon the man, Athens would not have been able to develop a legal 
system where the authority of the law was embedded solely in its status as law, and 
therefore the extent of Athenians’ capacity to analogise must be assumed to have 
been limited. If norms of behaviour were to shift further from those Solon and his 
society were imagined to hold, it would become increasingly hard to interpret laws 
in a way that allowed for an outcome that contemporaries would view as just, but 
that could still be presented as according with the intentions of Solon.35  Although 
Solon was by the fourth century more myth than man, the fact that Athens’ laws 
 
32 see Chapter 3. The actual process of formulating archaic law codes is not relevant to their 
reception in the fourth century. Gagarin (1986) offers a useful introduction to archaic law-making. 
33 Something which anthropologist Fernanda Pirie (2013) uses as a definition of legal reasoning. 
Legal reasoning, in Pirie’s analysis, depends on a society being able to develop core principles which 
can be applied across apparently dissimilar disputes and events, in order to achieve some degree of 
fairness.  
34 Harris (2013 p. 270-271) argues that the use of appeals to the intent of the lawgiver shows a concern 
that the administration of justice should be consistent. This risks confusing law and court 
judgements. The appeals to the intent of the lawgiver do not betray a concern that two similar cases 
should be decided the same way, but do demonstrate an assumption that Athens’ laws should be 
consistent. It must also be remembered that the imputing of intentions to the lawgiver was entirely 
fictional, and as such could not in fact have formed a strong basis for predictability or consistency, 
except to the limited extent enabled by shared beliefs as to what Solon would have intended.  
35 As the modern United States of America is demonstrating now, with the determination of some 
judges and legal scholars to limit the application of the constitution to the ethics and beliefs of its 
makers. 
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were and had to be backwards looking would have had an impact on any Athenian 
who wished to persuade Athenians to adopt a self-consciously novel interpretation 
of a law, or indeed as we shall see in 5.4 wanted to pass a radically new law. 
 
The most consistent characterisation of Solon’s laws in the orators is that they were 
made in order to protect the democratic politeia. He is described as having 
instituted swifter punishments for officials in order to protect the constitution36 
and as having legislated with more care for the politeia than for the matters on 
which he was legislating.37 He is said to have made his laws with a recognition that 
force belongs to a few, but law to all alike38 and to have wanted the laws to be 
simple and clear so ordinary citizens should not be at any disadvantage.39  
 
At times, Solon appears to be presented as placing the good of the polis over justice 
to individuals, as when Aeschines explains why Solon made laws against 
cowardice, an inborn defect, that each man should fear the law more than he fears 
the enemy,40 or when the ancient lawgivers are said to have set high penalties for 
even minor crimes on the basis that if a crime became widespread it would be 
harmful to the polis.41 As well as this, Solon’s laws are said to have been intended 
to educate citizens. Aeschines Against Timarchus makes extraordinary use of this 
trope, starting with the laws on the education of young boys, and moving through 
into the laws for adults.42  
 
While Solon’s laws on male sexual behaviour are characterised by Aeschines as 
having had as their purpose the protection of the democratic order from the sort 
of unruly people who would engage in excessive sexual behaviour, the laws 
regulating women’s sexual behaviour are said by Aeschines to have been intended 
 
36 Dem. 26.4. 
37 Dem. 22.30. 
38 Dem. 21.45. 
39 Dem. 20.93. 
40 Aeschin. 3.175. 
41 Lycurgus Against Leocrates 64-66. 
42 See 3.2.2 above. 
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by Solon to disgrace the wrongdoing woman.43 Solon’s laws for men are intended 
to educate the young and protect the polis; only his laws for women are said to 
enforce morality. This idea, that Solon thought that the laws of the polis should 
offer moral education, is by no means confined to the orators; but the extent of the 
use made of it by fourth-century orators, and the way in which arguments can 
hinge on jurors accepting the premise, suggests that this idea was widely accepted 
among fourth-century Athenians.  
 
 
5.1.5 Stability of Solon’s laws 
 
The stability of Solon’s laws came to form a part of his myth, and this stability is 
presented in various ways in our sources. Herodotus and the Ath. Pol. both record 
Solon arranging that the Athenians should use his laws for a certain period of time, 
Herodotus by means of an oath, the Ath. Pol. by his own authority, and both claim 
that Solon left Athens in order not to be asked by people to change his laws.44 
Athenian law gave priority to older laws over newer ones, and in principle in the 
fourth century it should not have been possible to pass any law that contradicted 
an earlier one without first repealing the earlier law.45 The rhetoric used by 
Demosthenes in his prosecution of Leptines gives a taste of the difficulty any 
would-be lawmaker might experience when trying to repeal a law which could 
plausibly be dated back to Solon.46 One aspect of this emphasis on the stability of 
Solonian law that emerges is the difficulty Athenians had with obsolete laws. There 
are numerous references in our sources to laws which were still kurioi, at least as 
far as the writer was concerned, but which were no longer being used by the 
Athenians.47  
 
 
43 Education of boys 1.8-18, young men 1.18-24, women 1.183. For Solon as educator, see also Dem. 
24.106, 26.26. 
44 Hdt. 1.29 oath to use the laws for 10 years, Ath. Pol. 7.2 has Solon ‘make the laws fast’ –katekleisen 
for 100 years. Ath. Pol. 11.2 – Solon leaves to avoid being asked to change his laws. 
45 See Chapter 5.4. 
46 Dem. 20.102-5. See also e.g. Antiph. 6.2. 
47 See Chapter 5.4.3. 
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A further complicating aspect of the emphasis on the unchangeability of Solon’s 
laws is the decision taken in the late fifth century to seek out and republish the 
laws of Solon. This gives Athens a set of laws which have, in effect, two sources of 
authority: first their age and association with Solon, and second the legal authority 
they gained from their republication.48  
 
Not only does a requirement for explicit withdrawal of older laws before new ones 
can be passed create a slow and, most likely, still contradictory system of laws, it 
affected the development of legal thought in Athens. What modern legislative 
committee could challenge the authority and wisdom of Solon? Yet without 
reliable access to Solon’s intentions, or even a reliable Solonian code, juries’ use of 
the intentions imputed to Solon in making his laws meant that Athens, far from 
respecting Solon’s demand that Athens use his laws and do without his person, 
came to rely on Solon’s own personal authority as a lawgiver.  
 
Aristotle was confident that the advantage of an unchanging legal system was the 
authority it gained from long use.49 That opinion is also visible in the orators50 but 
it is mixed up with the emphasis orators choose to place on the person of Solon. 
Nevertheless, this emphasis should not be overstated. Solon was clearly a valuable 
rhetorical tool for orators, and yet there are laws that appear in some sources as 
Solonian, but in other sources are cited either as ancient, or without comment as 
to their origin.51  
 
 
5.1.6 Why did the fourth century need Solon? 
 
Thomas (1994) identified appeals to the intent of the lawgiver (usually, but not 
exclusively, Solon) as extra-legal arguments, and viewed these appeals as 
potentially un- or anti-democratic. While Thomas is right to identify the use of 
 
48 See Chapter 5.3. 
49 Aristotle Politics 1269a12-14. 
50 E.g. Dem. 24.139-141. 
51 Leão and Rhodes fr. 66/1 a-f; fr. 58c, frr. 55-7. 
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Solon made by anti-democrats in the fifth century, by the fourth century Solon’s 
legacy seems to become widely accepted as democratic (see Hansen 1989a). 
Moreover, it would be surprising to see regular use of a trope which risks being 
interpreted as anti-democratic in a genre where speakers generally seek to portray 
themselves as good democrats. As such, it seems unlikely that in the fourth century 
appeals to the lawgiver were still viewed as anti-democratic; nevertheless, Thomas 
is right to identify these appeals as significant for our understanding of Athenian 
law. For Thomas, appeals to the lawgiver’s intentions portray a ‘failure of nerve’ 
within the fourth-century democracy.  
 
Mossé (1979) suggests that the reason why Solon becomes so prominent in the 
fourth century is because of the tradition, supported by Solon’s own poetry, that 
Solon balanced the interests of the rich and the poor. For the democrats who 
needed to reconcile the city after the upheavals of the two oligarchic revolutions 
at the end of the fifth century, this tradition was hugely valuable, and it was by 
using Solon as a proto-democrat that the democratic party were able to restore 
democracy to Athens. It is unclear, however, that the tradition of Solon as 
mediating between rich and poor would have been recognised by most Athenians. 
The trope does not appear in popular fourth-century depictions of Solon, but only 
in the work of historians and philosophers.52 As Thomas suggests, this seems to 
indicate that the reason Solon was needed in the fourth century was because of the 
crisis of legitimacy in Athenian democratic government. The returning democrats 
could not rely on the will of the people as the basis for their laws, and instead 
looked to Athens’ glorious past.  
 
Hansen considers the role of this past in his discussion of the use of Solon in the 
fourth century, arguing that though generally the narrative of progress showed a 
gradual improvement from bestiality towards civilisation, with the introduction of 
 
52 Ath. Pol. 11.2; Aristotle Politics 1274a. Ath. Pol. 12.1 cites poems attributed to Solon which express 
this position. Though elegiac poetry was not necessarily a popular medium, being associated with 
performance at the symposion, Demosthenes does quote a poem by Solon in On the Embassy 
(19.254-6), suggesting that it may have been somewhat familiar to a popular audience. 
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laws an essential element in this progress, by the fourth century there was a 
marked narrative of recent decline.53 He considers, however, the ‘patrios politeia’ 
language of the fourth and fifth centuries to have been just a ‘hurrah-word’ – 
meaningless, yet hard to challenge. There was no set point in history which could 
be pinned down by it, and it could be deployed by both oligarchs and democrats. 
Use of Solon in the fourth century cannot be clearly identified as anti-democratic, 
but Thomas is right to identify the strangeness of a democracy, with its own modes 
of legislating, choosing instead to pin so much of its law on a single lawgiver.    
 
 
5.2 Law-making in the fifth century? 
 
It is not entirely clear whether the Athenians of the fourth century recognised their 
fifth-century54 counterparts as having been makers of laws. Prior to the creation at 
the end of the fifth century of a distinction between nomoi and psēphismata, the 
enactments of the demos could not be unequivocally categorised as laws.55 In 
references to the great politicians of the past in fourth-century oratory, it is rare to 
find them referred to as lawmakers. In total, Themistocles is referenced 24 times, 
Pericles 12, Miltiades 13, Aristeides 13, Cimon 3, Ephialtes not at all (though he had 
appeared in a speech by Antiphon), and Cleisthenes 3 (all by Isocrates).56 Of these 
references, the majority do not treat the men referred to as lawgivers, but play on 
 
53 Hansen (1989a). 
54 For the purposes of this analysis, I have adopted a short fifth century, preceding the changes 
made to the laws at the end of the fifth century, for which see 5.3 and 5.4. For the response of the 
restored democracy to the legislative acts of the Thirty, see chapter 1. 
55 Sickinger (1999) p. 242 n. 45 attempts an estimate of the types of inscriptions published in the 
fifth century. 
56 Themistocles: Dem. 13.21, 13.22, 13.29, 18.204, 19.303, 20.73, 20.74, 23.196, 23.198, 23.205, 23.207; 
Aeschin. 1.25, 2.9, 3.181, 3.259; Din. 1.37; Hyp. Orat. Epitaphius col 12 line 43; Isoc. 4.154, 8.75, 12.51, 
15.233; Lys. 2.42, 12.63, 30.28. 
Pericles: Aeschin. 1.25; Dem. 3.22, 26.6; Isoc. 16.28, 8.126, 15.111, 15.234, 15.235, Lycurg. Frag. 14 [Blass], 
Lysias 6.10, 12.4, 30.28. 
Miltiades: Aeschin. 2.172, 3.181, 3.186; Dem. 3.26, 13.21, 13.22, 19.303, 23.196, 23.198, 23.207, 26.6; Hyp. 
Epitaphius Col 12 Line 42; Isoc. 8.75. 
Aristeides: Aeschin. 1.25, 2.23, 3.181, 3.258; Andoc.  4.11, 4.12; Dem. 3.21, 3.26, 13.29, 23.209, 26.6; Din. 
1.37; Isoc. 8.75. 
Cimon: Andoc. 4.33; Dem. 13.29, 23.205. 
Ephialtes: Antiphon 5.68. 
Cleisthenes: Isoc. 16.26, 7.16, 15.232. 
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other aspects of their legacy. Unsurprisingly, Themistocles and Pericles are most 
often remembered as generals, for their building works, and more vaguely as 
exemplary citizens. Miltiades similarly is mostly referred to in his role as a general, 
rhetor and exemplary citizen. Aristeides is referred to for his work as assessor of 
tribute, as a rhetor, and as an exemplary citizen, and Cimon is referred to only as 
an exemplary citizen. Ephialtes is referenced by Antiphon in a speech delivered 
towards the end of the fifth century, not as a reformer, but only as a notable murder 
victim, while Cleisthenes is referred to only by Isocrates, where he is a political 
leader and the man responsible for re-establishing Solon’s constitution. Since 
Isocrates seeks to create a continuity between the work of Solon and the 
constitution established by Cleisthenes, Cleisthenes cannot, in his analysis, be a 
lawgiver, since it is essential to Isocrates’ argument that Cleisthenes made no 
changes but simply re-established the politeia created by Solon.  
 
The only explicit reference to past leaders as lawgivers comes from Lysias Against 
Nicomachus, where the speakers complains that ‘whereas your ancestors chose as 
lawgivers Solon, Themistocles and Pericles, in the belief that the laws would accord 
with the character of their makers, you have chosen Teisamenus, son of 
Mechanion, and Nicomachus, and other persons who were under-clerks’.57 Though 
here Pericles and Themistocles are explicitly bracketed with Solon and described 
as lawgivers, the narrative of the speech problematises law-giving, and so any 
reference to law-giving in the speech must be treated with caution. This 
comparison is in the form of an accusation against the demos, an accusation the 
demos can only rebut by convicting Nicomachus, and the weight of Lysias’ speech 
strongly implies that all of Nicomachus’ lawgiving was done illegitimately.58 The 
weight of the argument is about the personalities of these former lawgivers, and as 
such the reputation of Themistocles and Pericles as exemplary citizens is what 
 
57 Lys. 30.28. 
58 Lys. 30.17 ἐγὼ δ᾿ εἰ ?ὲν νό?ους ἐτίθην +ερὶ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς is a good example of the problematisation 
of lawgiving in this speech. The speaker casts his enemy’s accusation back at him ‘If I had been making 
laws in relation to a writing-up’. The speaker denies being in such a position of authority, and casts 
doubt on the legitimacy of any law-making done by Nicomachus.   
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drives it.59 Rather than arguing for these men as lawgivers per se, they are presented 
as honourable and high status men, to be contrasted with the under-clerks 
Teisamenus and Nicomachus.  
 
Less explicitly, Miltiades and Themistocles’ legislative work is referred to in 
Demosthenes On the False Embassy 19.303, where Demosthenes reminds the jurors 
of Aeschines’ past speeches opposing Philip, in which speeches Aeschines is said 
to have read out the psēphismata of Themistocles and Miltiades. These legislative 
acts are specifically referred to by Demosthenes as psēphismata, however, and not 
nomoi, so cannot give us any indication of whether the fifth-century political 
leaders could be identified as lawgivers. The only other possible instance in the 
orators of a fifth-century political leader being referred to as a lawgiver is in 
Aeschines’ Against Ctesiphon, where Aeschines asks the Athenians to imagine, 
arrayed as witnesses on his side, the benefactors of Athens; Solon the lawgiver, and 
Aristeides. Though Aristeides here is bracketed with Solon, it is clear from 
Aeschines’ speech that his role is not as lawgiver, but only as excellent citizen of 
Athens. As such, we can see that in fourth-century oratory there is no simple 
reference to leaders subsequent to Solon as lawgivers. 
 
The best-known legislative product of the fifth century is probably Pericles’ 
citizenship law. The Ath. Pol. reports that ‘Pericles proposed, and it was decided, 
not to share citizenship with those who are not born of two citizen parents’.60 The 
measure is never explicitly described as a nomos by the writer of the Ath. Pol., 
either at its introduction at 26.2, or at 42.1, where the writer sets out the 
contemporary state of affairs in Athens. Pericles’ Citizenship Law does not get 
described as a nomos in any fourth-century source, and only acquires that 
description in later references to the law, such as in Plutarch’s account of Pericles’ 
 
59 This may also explain why Draco, unequivocally an Athenian lawgiver, is left out of the list of 
lawgivers. 
60 Ath. Pol. 26.2. 
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request to the Athenians that his son should be exempted from the requirements 
of the law and be allowed to become a citizen.61  
 
A law with the same contents is cited twice in fourth-century speeches, both of 
which treat the law as having been valid only for people born after the archonship 
of Eucleides, but in neither case is the law linked to Pericles.62 In Demosthenes 57, 
there is rhetorical advantage in not linking the law back to Pericles, since the 
speaker Euxitheus is explaining that, even if one of his father’s parents had not 
been a citizen, his father was born prior to the archonship of Eucleides, and as such 
the restriction of citizenship to those with two citizen parents did not apply to him. 
The case may not be as clear-cut as Euxitheus tries to make out, since there is some 
evidence that Pericles’ citizenship law may still have been in force in 414,63 giving 
a maximum period of around ten years of non-use of the law until the law’s 
reinstatement as from the archonship of Eucleides.64 Under these circumstances, 
it is understandable that Euxitheus would have no interest in presenting the law 
as having roots older than the archonship of Eucleides.  
 
The rhetorical use of the law in Isaeus 8 is more difficult to understand. The 
speaker is trying to claim an estate through his mother’s line of descent, and it 
appears that his opponent has made an allegation that the speaker’s mother was 
 
61 37.2-5. 
62 Dem. 57.30, Isaeus 8.43. Lys. frag. 308 col. ii. lines 35-6 and 39-40 [Carey] may show two more 
cases using this law. 
63 Aristophanes Birds 1641-70. 
64 There are different proposers given for the re-instated law. Schol. Aeschin. 1.39 names Nikomenes 
as the proposer of a decree ‘that no one of those [born] after the archonship of Eucleides have a 
part in the state unless he could demonstrate that both his parents were citizens’. Athenaeus 577 
b-c records that ‘the orator Aristophon introduced (eisenegkein) a law (nomos) during the 
archonship of Eucleides that anyone not born of a citizen should be a nothos’. These two 
formulations have generally been taken to refer to a single law. It is unclear from the sources 
whether the renewal of the requirement that citizens be born of two parents was the result of a 
decree or a law (which could otherwise have given some indication of the likely date of the 
enactment) or of who proposed the motion. It may be worth noting that in Demosthenes 57, 
immediately after discussing the law requiring citizen descent on both sides the speaker moves on 
to discuss the re-enacted Solonian law banning foreigners from selling in the agora, the decree re-
enacting which is attributed to one Aristophon. This could indicate a source of confusion for the 
compiler of the Deipnosophistae, but it is too common a name to be conclusive of anything. 
It is likely, given the date of effect of this law, that the law was reinscribed or re-enacted as part of 
the law-reform process which followed the fall of the Thirty (see below Chapter 5.3). Leao and 
Rhodes (2015) identify Dem. 43.51 on inheritance as also having been part of this process. 
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either not a citizen, or not legitimate (or possibly both). The speaker rebuts this 
allegation by claiming that if his mother was not a citizen then, since he and his 
siblings were born after the archonship of Eucleides, they are not citizens either. 
We must presume that the speaker felt secure enough in his obvious status as a 
citizen to be able to play with this (apparently risky) argument so casually. In this 
case, there is no advantage to the speaker in concealing any older roots of the law, 
but there is also no purpose for him to do so, since his argument depends only on 
the law being older than himself and his siblings. Nonetheless, the fourth-century 
references to this law provide no evidence of fourth-century acknowledgement of 
fifth-century law-giving. This, in combination with evidence that fourth-century 
references to the great leaders of the fifth century do not generally treat these 
leaders as lawgivers, suggests that there may have been a belief in the fourth 
century that no new laws had been made for the Athenians in the fifth century. 
 
Against this claim, one could present evidence that the writer of the Ath. Pol. does 
identify some decisions of the fifth-century democracy by their archon year,65 
however none of the measures identified by Sickinger are referred to in that text 
as nomoi, and the writer of the Ath. Pol. is not a good representative of ordinary 
Athenians’ attitudes towards their laws. A stronger argument could be drawn from 
the law of Diocles, which sets down which laws are to be used by the post-403 
restored democracy. The law specifies that laws enacted under the democracy prior 
to the archonship of Eucleides shall be kurioi.66 This does seem to indicate an 
acknowledgement of fifth-century democratic law-making, however as we shall see 
in the following section, there existed no mechanism under the fourth-century 
democracy to recognise these laws as nomoi and treat them accordingly. In the 
fourth century, Rhodes’ argument that this should be considered to refer to the 
laws drawn up by the anagrapheis must have turned out in practice to be correct.67  
 
65 As noted by Sickinger (1999) p. 87, referencing Ath. Pol. 22.5; 26.2-4; IG I3 46, lines 18-21.  
66 Dem. 24.42 τοὺς νό?ους τοὺς +ρὸ Εὐκλείδου τεθέντας ἐν δη?οκρατίᾳ … κυρίους εἶναι.  
67 Rhodes (1991) p. 91 limits ‘the laws enacted under the democracy’ to those created by the first 
commission of anagrapheis which ran from 410-405. Though this might have been the intention of 
Diocles’ law, it seems likely that the work of both periods of republication would have been treated 
together in the fourth century. 
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The record of the decision by the Thirty to remove the laws of Ephialtes and 
Archestratos from the Areopagus could be seen as a recognition by the fourth-
century writer of the Ath. Pol. that these early-fifth century figures had made laws, 
though it also appears that there may have been some disagreement at the time of 
their abolition about the validity of these laws, since the Thirty apparently justified 
the removal of these laws as a rectification (epanorthountes) of the constitution.68 
As discussed above, the writer of the Ath. Pol. created a history of the Athenian 
constitution and was attuned to the reality of legal and constitutional change, 
which may not be representative of wider Athenian understandings of their law.  
 
This failure to engage with the role of the fifth-century democracy in making law 
may help to explain why, following the revolution of the Thirty in 405, Athens 
decided to return to the laws of Solon and Draco.69 By this decision, Athens 
annulled centuries of democratic lawgiving in a moment, apparently without 
significant controversy. Once we recognise how reluctant fourth-century speakers 
are to acknowledge the lawgiving of the fifth century, we can better understand 
how this decision came to be taken.70  
 
 
 
68 Ath. Pol. 35.2. 
69 Andoc. 1.82. Canevaro (2015) supposes that the nomothetai referred to by Andocides 1.84 are a 
different institution to the later bodies of nomothetai (see 5.4.1). He proposes that these nomothetai 
were elected to resolve the crisis in the laws, and that they were the ones to create the fourth-
century process of nomothesia. The evidence from Andocides on this supposedly separate body of 
nomothetai is too scanty to give certainty on this point. If Canevaro is correct, the institution of this 
body of nomothetai further evidences the failure to acknowledge fifth-century democratic law-
making, since even before the creation of a distinction between nomoi and psēphismata, when the 
restored democracy realised there was a need for new laws they did not put these through the 
Assembly but created a separate body to legislate for Athens. This may be further supported by the 
constitutional arrangements of the Five Thousand, the government that briefly took power after 
the fall of the Four Hundred. Thuc. 8.97.2 describes nomothetai being elected, who are apparently 
to fulfil a different role from the Assembly. The Ath. Pol. does not refer to these nomothetai, but 
does explicitly state that the Four Hundred did not have the power to change or make laws (31.2). 
70 Sealey (1982) p. 299 seems to agree with this position: Athenians in the fifth century ‘adhered to 
the increasingly unrealistic supposition that the nomoi of Solon were the whole body of current 
law’. Canevaro (2015) notes that the institution of nomothesia in the fourth century represents the 
first time Athens formally recognises the capacity of the demos to create legitimate legal change. 
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5.3 Republication at the end of the fifth century 
 
At the end of the fifth century the Athenians appear to have made an attempt to 
assess their existing laws. A board of anagrapheis was established, and certain laws 
were republished. This process was not complete at the overthrow of the 
democracy in 405/4, and was recommenced on the restoration of the democracy 
in 403, with at least some continuation in the make-up of the board of 
anagrapheis.71 The extent of the remit of the anagrapheis appears, from a speech 
given in 399 against one of the board,72 to have been contentious even at the time, 
and the debate has not been resolved in modern scholarship.  
 
A great deal of this debate has revolved around whether the anagrapheis were 
empowered to revise the laws or only to republish them. Either claim has inherent 
problems: the revision of Athens’ greatly respected ancient laws must always have 
been a contentious and difficult matter to address, especially when Athens was 
itself experiencing a crisis in the legitimacy of its law; but the simple republication 
of Athens’ ancient laws seems redundant, since those laws were apparently still 
visible and available to the Athenians in some archaic style of publication.73  
 
For our purposes, the question of revision or republication has significance for the 
authority of the republished laws as Athens moved into the fourth century. A 
process merely of republication would suggest that the laws had the same authority 
they had always had, whether we accept that to be the personal authority of the 
lawgiver, or the accumulation of years, or some combination of these. Under a 
process of republication, the perception of the changelessness of Athens’ laws 
would remain unchallenged. Under a process of revision, however, the authority 
of these laws changes somewhat. Rather than holding unquestionable authority by 
 
71 Though the project to re-publish laws was not a solely democratic one; the Thirty were installed 
as a committee to sungrapsousi the patrious nomous (Xen. Hell. 2.3.2) and they removed the laws 
of Ephialtes and Archestratos (Ath. Pol. 35.2), which, since these are identifiably non-Solonian laws, 
could indicate that the Thirty were somewhat serious in their attempt to return Athens to the laws 
of Solon. 
72 Lysias 30. 
73 For a summary of the debate on the axones and kurbeis, see Davis (2011). 
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dint of the age or origin, the authority of laws can be questioned, and even 
removed, by their being assessed as unsuitable for the world as it exists in the 
moment. Laws which survive this revision process gain a different authority, as 
laws assessed as valuable and affirmed as such by the democracy.  
 
The republished law of Draco (IG I3 104) and the republished laws on the Council 
(IG I3 105) show signs of careful and exact copying as seen by the archaic language 
of Draco’s law and copying of ‘first axon’ and ‘second axon’ (see OR 183 notes on IG 
I3 104) and by Lewis’s74 suggestion that the inscriber of IG I3 105 may have copied a 
space where a word was missing off the original stone, rather than amending the 
text. This strongly indicates that the process was one of republication and not of 
revision; the laws are not updated to suit contemporary legal language, nor do the 
anagrapheis attempt to complete damaged sections in laws to make them more 
useable. Similarly, Dow identified rubrics in the sacrificial calendar as identifying 
the sources of the sacrifices listed, further suggesting that the work that went into 
the calendar was intended as republication, and that the authority for these 
sacrifices came not from the new inscription, but from the original sources.75  
 
The process of the publication of these inscribed laws could give more indication 
of the source of their authority. A republication did not always need full, formal 
permission,76 whereas it would be surprising to see Athens, always wary of officials 
taking too much power to themselves, and in the aftermath of 411/10 likely to have 
been more wary than usual, empowering a board of officials to revise law without 
being subject to close oversight. The prescript to Draco’s law seems to suggest that 
the Assembly approved reinscriptions on a case-by-case basis: 
Diocles was archon. 
The Council and the People decided. Acamantis was in prytany.  
Diognetus was secretary. Euthydicus was chairman. –phanes proposed:  
anagrapheis of the laws shall inscribe Draco’s law on homicide,  
 
74 1967. 
75 Dow (1953). 
76 IG II2 6. 
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taking it over from the king, with the secretary  
of the Council, on a stone stele and set it down in front of the  
royal stoa.77 
Here we see a decree which has gone through both the council and the Assembly 
to instruct the anagrapheis to set up the law of Draco, specifying which law the 
anagrapheis are to write up, where they are to find this law, and where they should 
set it up once inscribed. This suggests not only a process of republication (no 
instructions are given as to revision) but a process which is nonetheless being 
closely overseen by institutions of the democracy.78 Robertson assumes that a 
similar process of oversight must have been followed for all of the laws reinscribed 
during this period, even if we do not always see explicit instructions in the 
surviving inscriptions.79 It could be argued against Robertson that if such oversight 
had been exercised over Nicomachus’ work, the speaker of Lysias 30 would have 
 
77 IG I3 104 ll.2-8. 
78 Gallia (2004) argues that the republication of Draco’s law was handled separately from the other 
law reform activities happening at the time. His argument, however, rests on the argument that 
Draco’s original law on homicide must have included a section on tyranny, and this claim cannot 
be supported. He bases his claim on the argument that the tyranny law must have preceded Solon 
since Solon is reported as having excluded from his amnesty those who had been exiled for tyranny, 
but this is not as secure as it might be. Though Solon is subsequently remembered as having 
removed all Draco’s laws besides those on homicide, it seems unlikely that this was the case at the 
time, so cannot be used as evidence that the preserved copies of Draco’s laws contained provision 
on tyrants. Gallia further argues that the law on tyranny should be identified as Drakontian because 
of the self-help nature of the law’s provision that anyone who kills a tyrant shall be hosios. While 
this seems initially more persuasive, the nature of a tyranny inherently requires that the 
punishment for the tyrant should not have to go through the normal courts system, since the tyrant 
will presumably not submit to this. It is this very dependence on the court system which has caused 
scholars to puzzle over the fourth-century law regulating the Areopagites in the event of a tyranny 
IG II3 1 320. Davis (2011 p. 20-21) also proposes a separate publication process for Draco’s law, but 
only inasmuch as it, unlike the other laws collected by the anagrapheis, is to be inscribed on stone. 
As such, the decision by Council and Assembly might only have been the exceptional inscription 
on stone of this particular law. 
79 Robertson (1990). Canevaro (2015) builds on this to suggest that by subjecting the reinscribed 
laws to the approval of the dēmos the post-Thirty democracy was for the first time asserting 
democratic authority over the laws. Canevaro does, however, imagine the anagrapheis to have been 
engaged in reform of laws, so the assertion of democratic authority is a real authorisation of the 
legitimacy of the content of each law. If the anagrapheis were only supposed to be publishing the 
laws, the approval by the Assembly could be an approval just of the expenditure for the inscription, 
or of this law being legitimately Solonian. Draco’s Law on Homicide is the only product of the 
anagrapheis to bear a prescript. Neither the Sacrificial Calendar nor the Trierarchic Law bear any 
prescript. The Trierarchic Law begins close to what appears to have been the top of the monument, 
which at least suggests that though the law is fragmentary, there probably was not a prescript, 
though we know too little about the layout of the reverse of the wall to say for certain that there 
was no prescript. 
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had much less scope to attack Nicomachus personally for the work of the board of 
anagrapheis, though against this one could point out that in a graphē paranomōn 
the individual proposer is found responsible for the errant decision-making of the 
Assembly.  
 
Robertson further argues that there must have been a process which we cannot see 
whereby another board of officials of some kind examined the laws compiled by 
the anagrapheis and decided which of them should be retained and which 
discarded. While he argues persuasively that it would be surprising to see 
anagrapheis entrusted with this responsibility, Robertson has not taken into 
account the degree to which people, at any rate in the fourth century, seem to have 
been unwilling to engage with the law-making of the fifth century. While in 
practice the project of compilation of the laws must be assumed to have required 
the anagrapheis to engage in significant editorial decisions about what should be 
included and what excluded, we cannot assume that this would have been 
recognised by their contemporaries. This then allowed the uncertainty as to the 
extent of the anagrapheis’ role which was exploited by the speaker in Lysias 30.  
 
The remains of the sacrificial calendar provide similarly equivocal evidence on the 
question of whether the work of the anagrapheis was to revise or to republish the 
laws.80 The opisthographic wall bears inscriptions in Attic letters on the side 
believed to be the reverse of the wall, and ionic letters on the side believed to be 
the front. The reverse of the wall bears inscriptions concerning sacrifices and 
fragments of a trierarchic law or decree. The front of the wall bears an inscribed 
sacrificial calendar, and shows signs of having been subject to erasure and 
reinscription. This erasure is open to interpretation. Robertson has argued that we 
should recognise the erasure as a removal of Nicomachus’ sacrificial calendar and 
its replacement with a more conservative one.81 Assuming that the space had 
always contained a sacrificial calendar, the timing of the erasure and re-inscription 
 
80 Lambert (2002) collects, re-examines and translates the surviving fragments of the sacrificial 
calendar. 
81 Robertson (1990). 
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becomes important. The Attic letters of the reverse of the wall suggest it was 
inscribed before 403; probably in the first period of law reform. The ionic letters 
on the front of the wall suggest that the re-inscription took place after 403, but this 
does not give any indication as to whether the re-inscription took place before or 
after the trial of Nicomachus.82 Given that we are informed in Against Nicomachus 
that the new calendar has been in use for two years, and that Nicomachus has 
worked as an anagrapheis both before and after the rule of the Thirty, we must 
presume that under Robertson’s argument the front side of the wall had been kept 
empty until 401 waiting for the calendar, while the back had already been filled. 
This seems unlikely, but cannot be proven either way.  
 
Alternatively, we could consider that prior to 405 a sacrificial calendar83 was 
inscribed on this wall, and this calendar was then removed and replaced with a 
new calendar, which was the one for which Nicomachus found himself prosecuted. 
This implies that Nicomachus’ calendar was consciously intended to be a revision; 
it replaced a pre-existing inscribed calendar with something new and different.84 
Unfortunately, neither alternative can be securely proven from the evidence we 
have.85 
 
Andocides in On the Mysteries suggests that there was a full revision of the laws of 
Athens following 403. He claims  
you elected a commission of twenty to govern Athens until a fresh 
code of laws had been authorised; during the interval the code of 
Solon and the statutes of Draco were to be used. However, after you 
had chosen a Council by lot and elected, you began to discover that 
there were not a few of the laws of Solon and Draco under which 
 
82 Dated by Todd (1996) to 399. 
83 Dow (1953) argues persuasively that the unusual mode of display for these inscriptions must have 
been chosen because it was most suitable for the display of a sacrificial calendar. 
84 Dow (1960) p. 291-2 suggests that Nicomachus’ calendar was self-consciously democratic, and 
that it was intended to divert resources towards festivals celebrated by the mass of the Athenians 
and away from festivals which served smaller, elite groups.  
85 Other interpretations have been offered: Fingarette (1971) suggests the erasure may have been 
the work of the Thirty, in which case Nicomachus could be considered to have been re-constructing 
what had been destroyed; Clinton (1982) considers it the work of the restored democracy.  
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numbers of citizens were liable, owing to previous events. You 
therefore called a meeting of the Assembly to discuss the difficulty, 
and as a result enacted that the whole of the laws should be subject 
to dokimasia and that such as were approved should be written up in 
the Stoa.86 
Andocides tries to link the decision to subject the laws to dokimasia to the amnesty 
that was agreed when the democrats regained control of Athens by claiming that 
the reason for the dokimasia was because ‘there were not a few of the laws of Solon 
and Draco under which numbers of citizens were liable, owing to previous 
events’.87 This claim by Andocides seems unlikely to be true. We know the process 
of republication of the laws to have pre-dated the Thirty, besides which, reforming 
the laws to exclude wrongs committed under the Thirty does not make sense, since 
the Amnesty itself prevented most prosecution for wrongs committed under the 
Thirty. As such, Andocides’ claims about the dokimasia of the laws must be treated 
with caution. Nonetheless, for him to have presented the process of republication 
as a full dokimasia and revision of laws certainly suggests that the scope of the task 
entrusted to the anagrapheis was much wider than the speaker of Lysias 30 would 
lead us to believe.  
 
Lysias Against Nicomachus88 is explicitly premised on the distinction between 
republication and revision. The core of the accusation against Nicomachus is that 
he was supposed to republish some of the laws, but that in fact he took it upon 
himself to revise all of the laws. The speaker claims that Nicomachus ‘usurped the 
place of Solon as lawgiver’, that he ‘inserted some laws and erased others’,89 and 
that ‘although boundaries were set out as to the texts he had to transcribe, he made 
 
86 Andoc. 1.82. 
87 ‘Previous events’ must be taken as a euphemistic reference to the wrongs that took place under 
the Thirty. 
88 Todd (1996) analyses this speech, and suggests it is likely to have been an eisangelia brought in 
399. He suggests that it may have been brought at a time when the courts were being used in an 
unusual way, as evidenced by the trials of Socrates, Andocides and Agoratus in the same year. 
89 Lys. 30.2 +ροσταχθὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ τεττάρων ?ηνῶν ἀναγράψαι τοὺς νό?ους τοὺς Σόλωνος, ἀντὶ ?ὲν 
Σόλωνος αὑτὸν νο?οθέτην κατέστησεν. ἀντὶ δὲ τεττάρων ?ηνῶν ἑξέτη τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐ+οιήσατο, καθ᾽ 
ἑκάστην δὲ ἡ?έραν ἀργύριον λα?βάνων τοὺς ?ὲν ἐνέγραφε τοὺς δὲ ἐξήλειφεν. 
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himself kurios over everything’.90 All of these, however, are framed as accusations 
against Nicomachus. We must assume that there was at least some degree of 
ambiguity in the instructions given to Nicomachus to begin his work as to whether 
he was to republish Athens’ laws, or to revise them, but as discussed above, given 
the fourth-century unwillingness to engage with Athenian lawgiving from the fifth 
century, it is likely that Nicomachus’ work proved to be more complicated than 
had been envisioned. Again, from Lysias Against Nicomachus it is hard to find a 
clear answer on whether the work of the anagrapheis was a republication or a 
revision. It is possible the best answer that can be proposed is that favoured by 
Rhodes,91 that the process was intended as a republication, but quickly became in 
fact a revision.  
 
The ambiguity about what the process of revision of Athens’ laws at the end of the 
fifth century meant for Athens laws was still alive in the fourth century. In around 
the year 345 Euxitheus gave a speech before a jury protesting his exclusion from 
his deme. In the course of that speech he presents a ‘law of Solon’ forbidding 
foreigners to trade in the agora. He first has this Solonian law read to the jury, then 
he says ‘now take also the law of Aristophon; for, men of Athens, Solon was thought 
to have enacted in this instance so wise and democratic a law that you voted for it 
again.’92 This double citation of a law is unique in the orators,93 but it shows 
Demosthenes playing with the possibilities afforded by the double-enactment of 
these Solonian laws. He could invoke the authority for this law not only of Solon, 
 
90 30.4. 
91 (1991) p. 93. 
92 Dem. 57.32. λαβὲ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοφῶντος: οὕτω γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτον ἔδοξεν ἐκεῖνος 
καλῶς καὶ δη?οτικῶς νο?οθετῆσαι, ὥστ᾽ ἐψηφίσασθε +άλιν ἀνανεώσασθαι. It is a little unclear from 
the language used whether this second enactment was in the form of a nomos or a psēphisma. The 
use of ton at the beginning of the sentence refers back to a previous instruction to read ton nomon, 
but the use of epsēphisasthe suggests a decree. It has been supposed that the re-enactment of this 
measure formed part of the republication of laws at the end of the fifth century – Hansen (1979), 
on the basis that he thinks it is a decree and must date to before the distinction between laws and 
decrees was created. Whitehead (1986) 315-6 considers the measure to be undateable.  
93 Though And. 1.94 ‘the law not only existed in the past but exists and is still applied even now 
because it is a good one’ (referring to a law which was valid before the Thirty and has retained 
validity following the restoration of the democracy) and Dem. 24.43 [the law of Diocles] ‘defines 
and shores up the existing laws’ may both explore a similar idea - that those laws which had passed 
through the republication process were in some way more authoritative by having done so. 
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but also of the law’s own adjudged excellence, as evidenced by the decision of the 
Athenians to renew this law. 
 
The re-publication of the laws at the end of the fifth century had a further impact 
on laws in the fourth century, which was in effect to solidify the failure to imagine 
the fifth-century democracy as engaged in law giving. As a result of the failure to 
distinguish between nomoi and psēphismata until the end of the fifth century, 
when the anagrapheis came to republish Athens’ laws they were faced with a 
choice: either to treat Athenian law as solely made up of the laws of Solon and 
Draco and republish only these laws, or to try to sort through all the records of all 
the decisions taken by the Assembly and try to decide which of them should be 
treated as nomoi and which as psēphismata. The reinscription of a law on the 
trierarchy on the pre-403 side of the wall which may be the work of Nicomachus’ 
commission suggests that some attempt must have been made to identify post-
Solonian decisions which could be considered to be nomoi, but equally the 
prosecution of Nicomachus suggests that doing so was not an uncontroversial 
choice to make. In reality, we must presume that a majority of fifth-century law-
making was never identified as such, and as a result the fourth-century democracy 
had no means by which to identify this as law. 
 
This may help us to understand the agreement in the Prospectus of the Second 
Athenian League94 to authorise the Council to destroy any stelai which are 
unfavourable to cities who join the League. It is likely that any such stelai would 
date to the fifth century, since this was the last time Athens was in a position to 
make and record decisions which could be unfavourable to her potential allies. If 
these decisions were to be recognised as nomoi, it seems unlikely that they could 
be removed based only on the provisions of a treaty and bypassing the usual 
process of repeal by the nomothetai. It is unlikely, however, that the decisions 
would have been recognised in the fourth century as nomoi, since they pre-dated 
the distinction between nomoi and psēphismata, so could only be carried forward 
 
94 RO 22 ll. 25-35 dated to 378/7. 
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into the fourth century as nomoi if they were among the fifth-century enactments 
reinscribed by the anagrapheis 
 
 
5.4 Law-making in the fourth century 
 
5.4.1 Fourth-century nomothesia 
 
At the end of the fifth century, Athens adopted a system for legislating which 
distinguished between psēphismata and nomoi and allowed bodies of the Athenian 
democracy for the first time to create new nomoi which would be recognised and 
treated unambiguously as such. The details of how the new process of nomothesia 
worked are disputed among modern historians, as is the reliability of our sources. 
What does seem evident is that Athenians in the fourth century did not pass many 
nomoi. There are only around a dozen surviving inscribed nomoi from the fourth 
century,95 and in the speeches there are references to a further four laws which 
were passed by the demos,96 as well as six laws which were indicted as mē 
epitēdeios.97   
 
The key passages on nomothesia are Dem. 20.89-95 (355), Dem. 24.20-23 (353), 
Dem. 24.33, and Aeschin. 3.38-9 (330). These overlapping and partially 
contradictory provisions have been subject to different interpretations by modern 
historians.  
 
MacDowell divided the processes into what he labelled the Old Legislation Law 
(Dem. 20.89), the New Legislation Law (Dem. 20. 91), the Review Law (Dem. 
24.20), the Repeal Law (Dem. 24.33), and the Inspection Law (Aeschin. 3.38).98 
According to MacDowell’s analysis, the Old Legislation Law was in force from 
about 403/2 until around 370. From 370, there was no longer a requirement that 
 
95 As listed by Lambert (2017) p. 62 n. 31. 
96 Din. 1.62, Aeschin. 1.33, Dem. 57.32 – re-enacting a Solonian law, Dem. 18.102-7. 
97 Dem. 20 and 24, and Dem. 24.138, Aeschin. 1.34, Lys. Frags 96-97 [Carey]. The list is taken from 
Hansen (1974). 
98 MacDowell (1975). 
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nomothetai should have sworn the jurors’ oath and the process of nomothesia was 
simplified and allowed to be faster. Both the Old and the New Legislation Laws 
covered the processes for initiating new laws. The Review Law instructed that there 
should be an annual appraisal of the laws by the ecclesia and if any areas of law 
(bouleutikoi, koinoi, laws for the nine archons, and laws for other officials) were 
decided to be unsatisfactory, any Athenian who wishes should propose 
replacements; these proposed replacements should then go to the nomothetai. 
MacDowell considers the Old Legislation Law and the Review Law to have been 
intended to work together, but when the Old Legislation Law was repealed the 
Review Law was not. The Repeal Law MacDowell considers to have worked in 
conjunction with the New Legislation Law, to have allowed for the repeal of laws 
through a simpler process than an annual vote by the ecclesia. The Inspection Law 
is dated by MacDowell to around 355 and allows for the correction of laws found 
to be invalid, inconsistent or overlapping. MacDowell interprets the Inspection 
Law as allowing for the removal of laws without a decision of the nomothetai, but 
this is not clear from the text. 
 
Hansen considers the process of nomothesia to have remained static throughout 
the fourth century, with the overlapping processes allowing different methods to 
achieve the same outcome, in analogy with the model proposed by Osborne 
(1985).99 He considers there to have existed three laws on nomothesia: the Repeal 
Law, initiated by ho boulomenos, the Review Law, initiated by a vote of the ecclesia, 
and the Inspection Law, initiated by the thesmothetai. According to Hansen’s 
analysis, once the action was initiated all these laws followed the same process: 
approval in the boulē, publication at the eponymous heroes, preliminary debate in 
the ecclesia, election of advocates to argue before the nomothetai, presentation of 
the laws before the nomothetai. Boards of nomothetai are always established by the 
ecclesia and throughout the fourth century are made up of men who have sworn 
the dikastic oath. 
 
 
99 Hansen (1985). 
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Rhodes adopts a subtle approach to the question of the various laws on 
nomothesia, rejecting MacDowell’s Old Legislation Law and New Legislation Law 
and suggesting that the Review Law and Repeal Law had been subject to 
reinterpretation through the course of the fourth century.100 He argues that the 
Repeal Law had originally been intended as a supplement to the Review Law, but 
had subsequently come to be reinterpreted as a stand-alone law, since it allowed 
for more convenient nomothesia.  As such, laws could be made either by the sworn 
nomothetai or by nomothetai appointed from among the whole citizen body.  
 
Arguments that the nomothetai were no longer necessarily chosen from among 
those who had sworn the jurors’ oath are based on Demosthenes’ complaint that 
under the old process the first stage of legislating was ‘in your courts, before men 
under oath’; Demosthenes goes on to list two further requirements (repeal of 
contradictory laws, and display of proposed laws at the eponymous heroes) then 
complains that Leptines’ law is in breach of all of these requirements.101 This claim 
that the nomothetai are no longer drawn from among those who have sworn the 
jurors’ oath is contradicted by the decree of Epicrates from two years later, which 
states that the nomothetai are to be drawn from ‘those who have taken the oath’.102 
It seems likely that nomothetai continued to be from among those who had sworn 
the oath, and Demosthenes’ claim that Leptines had not complied with any of the 
requirements for making a law was an exaggeration.103  
 
Rhodes’ argument that it is unlikely that Demosthenes would have presented a law 
which had been repealed, but that he might well have presented a valid law which 
had fallen out of use, seems persuasive, so this gives us the Review Law, which 
mandates an annual vote on the suitability of Athens’ laws followed by amendment 
 
100 Rhodes (1984). 
101 Dem. 20.93. 
102 Dem. 24.27. 
103 Hansen (1985) considers this claim to be part of Demosthenes’ attempts to conflate graphē 
nomon mē epitēdeion theinai and nomothesia, as part of special pleading to deal with the time limit 
for bringing a graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai having elapsed. The argument that in general a 
graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai could not be brought against a law after a year has not been 
accepted by other scholars. 
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to any areas of law found to be unsatisfactory; the Repeal Law, which initially filled 
gaps in the process for repeal of laws set out in the Review Law, but which was 
subsequently repurposed to allow for the ad hoc repeal and replacement of 
unsuitable laws; and the Inspection Law, which instructed the thesmothetai to 
make an annual examination of the laws.  
 
This has been called into question by Canevaro, who rejects the authenticity of the 
documents inserted into Demosthenes 20 and 24.104 He rejects the Review Law and 
claims that the information in Demosthenes 20 and 24 outside of the inserted 
documents is consistent. His reconstructed process gives an initial vote in the 
ecclesia which Canevaro claims was analogous to the grant of adeia needed before 
the ecclesia could discuss atimoi and public debtors. After this, nomothetai are 
appointed and people can start posting bills at the eponymous heroes, and 
following the display of the bills sunēgoroi are elected to defend the existing laws.105 
Hansen rejects Canevaro’s arguments, on the basis that we do not know enough 
about the initial publication of the speeches to rely confidently on stichometry.106 
Canevaro appears to consider that nomothetai were drawn from those who had 
sworn the jurors’ oath.107 Canevaro’s model gives us a single law governing the 
passing of new laws, and the Inspection Law, which is not drawn from documents 
and so is not questioned  by Canevaro. 
 
Whether Rhodes or Canevaro is correct, it appears that there was a single set of 
laws made at the end of the fifth century governing law-making, which instructed 
that laws should be made by the nomothetai and not the ecclesia, that the laws 
proposed should be displayed for public inspection, and that nomothetai should 
be drawn from people who had sworn the jurors’ oath. In Rhodes’ model, the law 
 
104 (2013b). 
105 Canevaro identifies the use of election as a recognition that this was an office requiring expertise, 
which could suggest an emerging recognition in Athens of law as an expert skill, along with the 
anagrapheis – Todd (1996). 
106 Hansen 2016a + b. 
107 Canevaro (2013b) p. 141, 148. 
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was initially more restrictive, but certain aspects of it fell out of use in the course 
of the fourth century. 
 
The restriction of nomothetai to those who had sworn the jurors’ oath is significant. 
The jurors’ oath could only be sworn by men over the age of thirty, and while the 
precise terms of the oath are disputed, it did specify that jurors swore to vote 
‘according to the laws and decrees of Athens’.108 By limiting the nomothetai to 
those who had sworn the oath, Athens chose to place legislative power in the hands 
of those who were also in charge of administering the law. To modern eyes, 
informed by the model of separation of powers first proposed in the eighteenth 
century by Montesquieu, this might seem unwise, but to Athenians it probably 
made a certain sense. In addition, by requiring the nomothetai to be over thirty, 
Athens removed legislative power from the young men who were considered to be 
more volatile and less thoughtful and made the nomothetai to some extent similar 
to the boulē, which was also made up of men over thirty who had sworn an oath.109  
 
Moreover, by placing legislative power in the hands of the jurors, Athens gave this 
power to those who could be considered the most experienced and invested in the 
usefulness and authority of Athens’ laws.110 Piérart argues that the nomothetai 
should be considered a sort of specialised ecclesia,111 against the prior prevailing 
view that the nomothetai functioned like a jury court. Rhodes is not fully convinced 
by Piérart’s arguments, but acknowledges the nomothetai to be a ‘thoroughly 
hybrid body’ incorporating elements from both the ecclesia and the courts.112 The 
discussion of the nomothetai as court/Assembly is important in the debates about 
where sovereignty lay in the fourth century democracy, but these debates are 
predicated on the assumption that the power to create nomoi was taken from the 
 
108 See 4.3.2.1. 
109 Rhodes (1972) p. 194-9. 
110 With the possible exception of the Areopagus, though bestowing additional powers on the 
Areopagus in the immediate aftermath of the Thirty would have been a contentious proposal, given 
the evidence that the Thirty deliberately expanded the powers of the Areopagus. Concerns about 
the Areopagites’ democratic loyalties appear to have continued into the fourth century, as 
evidenced by IG II3 1 320.  
111 Piérart (2000). 
112 Rhodes (2003). 
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ecclesia and given to the nomothetai. If instead we acknowledge the difficulty 
Athenians seem to have had with recognising the fact of law-making by the fifth-
century democracy, we can understand the creation of the nomothetai, not as a 
removal of power from the ecclesia to the courts, which must then be justified, but 
as a creation of a new body with a new power. The hybrid aspects of the 
nomothetai’s processes make sense in this context, where a body of people 
primarily understood as jurors and accustomed to trying graphai paranomōn are 
given the power to make laws in analogy with the ecclesia’s power to make decrees. 
 
 
5.4.2 Graphai paranomon and nomon mē epitēdeion theinai 
 
Fourth-century Athens possessed two legal processes, often presumed to be 
parallel, for the judicial examination of legislative acts. The graphē paranomōn, 
which was used for the examination of decrees,113 existed during the fifth century, 
though the date of its invention is hard to ascertain.114  The graphē nomon mē 
epitēdeion theinai must have been introduced concurrently with or following the 
introduction of nomothesia. Both processes enabled anyone who wished (ho 
boulomenos) to indict the proposer of the disputed law or decree. Much has been 
published on the form and function of these two processes in Athens’ fourth-
century political system, particularly on the sovereignty of different bodies of 
government,115 but here I intend only to engage with a few features of the two 
processes and their role in illuminating and shaping Athenian conceptions of their 
laws. 
 
 
113 The graphē paranomōn is often compared to the modern practice of judicial review – Hansen 
(1991), Carawan (2007), Lanni (2010a), Schwartzberg (2013). Given the significant differences 
between Athenian constitutional arrangements and those of any modern state, the value of this 
comparison is to be doubted. 
114 Canevaro (2015) suggests that it was created in the late fifth century, and that its establishment 
implicitly recognises law-making by the fifth-century democracy. This conflates its later use with 
its earlier. In a fifth-century mindset in which Solon’s law are imagined to be the laws of Athens 
and are thought of as broadly comprehensive, and prior to the creation of any means by which to 
repeal laws, this does not recognise the capacity of the fifth-century democracy to legitimately 
legislate, it merely recognises that the fifth-century democracy can create enactments which may 
breach the requirements of Athens’ laws. 
115 See Hansen (1974), (1975), (2010); Rhodes (1981); Ostwald (1987); Ober (1989a). 
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The wrongful element in the two offences is disputed in modern scholarship, 
though there is a general agreement that at least procedural irregularities (e.g. the 
measure not conforming to existing law) would render a measure para tous 
nomous or mē epitēdeios. Kremmydas observes that the designation mē epitēdeios 
may have given orators a little more scope for making wide arguments about the 
suitability of a measure, but that wide arguments are also commonly seen in graphē 
paranomōn speeches.116 Understandings of what made a measure para tous nomous 
are of course enormously important for any account of Athenians’ understanding 
of their own law.  
 
Wolff identified paranomia as including not only measures that contravened 
existing laws, but also measures that were in breach of the legal principles 
underlying those laws.117 Hansen considers the dikasterion hearing the case to have 
had both a judicial and a legislative role, so he argues that the jurors’ decision can 
be based either on whether the decree is constitutional or on whether it is 
expedient.118 In this way, Hansen is able to dismiss many of the lines of argument 
in speeches as political and not legal, though nonetheless relevant to the jurors’ 
decision-making. Yunis argues that a decree could not be declared unlawful for 
solely political reasons. While arguments about the suitability and expedience of a 
decree are commonly seen in the orators, Yunis considers these to have been 
insufficient on their own for a finding of paranomia and argues that a decree had 
to be found to breach existing law for it to be considered para tous nomous. He 
does, however, argue that nomos, for these purposes, encompassed not only the 
letter of the law, but also the principles which could be treated by speakers and 
jurors as underlying the law.119 In this way, the nomoi come to be both evidence 
and product of Athens’ imagined democratic constitution, and it is for this reason 
we see the Athenian belief that the graphē paranomōn was the defender of the 
constitution. 
 
116 Kremmydas (2012) p. 48-9. 
117 Wolff (1970) p. 46 ff. 
118 Hansen (1974). 
119 Yunis (1988). 
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Lanni argues that the balance between the significance of legal and political 
arguments was not agreed upon in classical Athens, and that litigants would try to 
persuade jurors that the law on the graphē paranomōn/graphē nomon mē 
epitēdeion theinai should be interpreted in whatever way would best suit the 
strengths of the litigants’ arguments.120 Lanni does not consider juries to have been 
bound to make decisions in accordance with law, and in addressing the mismatch 
between this and the existence of a process for prosecution of a person who 
proposed a measure which did not comply with existing law, Lanni argues that ‘in 
practice only statutes that were perceived to threaten democratic procedures were 
considered paranomos’.121 This may be an overstatement of the case. The graphē 
paranomōn was certainly understood by Athens to have an important role in 
guarding the democracy, and it is likely that the preponderance of speeches 
emphasising the danger to the democracy of the proposed measure was in part a 
reaction to this perception of the purpose of the graphē paranomōn, but in part an 
aspect of the tendency of the orators to exaggerate the dangers posed by the jury 
failing to side with the speaker’s argument.  
 
Wolff’s characterisation of paranomia as including both proposed decrees which 
breached existing written provisions of Athenian law and proposed decrees which 
could be construed to breach the principles underlying those laws seems to fit our 
evidence best, however it must be remembered that like all terms in Athenian law 
there was no single authoritative interpretation of paranomia, and a sufficiently 
clever speaker might be able to persuade the jury that, for his case at least, 
paranomia should be understood to be restricted to clear-cut breaches of Athens’ 
existing, written laws.122 
 
 
120 Lanni (2010a). 
121 Lanni (2010a) p. 242. 
122 Wolff (1970) p. 46 ff. 
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Yunis seems to treat the wrongful act prosecuted in the graphē paranomōn as the 
paranomon legein, the speech-act of proposing the decree.123 Carawan, on the other 
hand, treats the wrongful act as the outcome of such a speech act – namely an 
unlawful decree being passed.124 This may appear a dry argument, but the different 
interpretations lead to different interpretations of the law on graphē paranomōn. 
Carawan treats psēphismata indicted at the probouleutic stage as inchoate 
offences,125 and so is reluctant to admit that their perpetrators might be punished 
where the man who passed an unlawful decree which stood for a year without 
being indicted might be spared punishment. Though in speeches the emphasis is 
often placed on the wrongfulness of the proposed decree, and not on the 
wrongfulness of the individual proposing it, this may be a product of the fact that 
most of our cases of graphai paranomōn and mē epitēdeion theinai are highly 
political and are used as a way to attack more a prominent citizen than the person 
who actually proposed the decree. In Demosthenes Against Androtion, where the 
proposer of the original decree was a prominent citizen, we do see an extended 
attack on the personal character of the proposer.126 Yunis’ model seems to fit some 
structural elements of the process better, in particular the penalty of atimia for 
anyone who is convicted three times in graphai paranomōn.127 If we treat the 
wrongful act as the proposing of the decree, we can see that the wrong has been 
committed whether or not the decree gets as far as being passed by the ecclesia.128 
To fully evaluate the significance of this, it is necessary first to explore the role of 
the time limit for bringing prosecutions against the original proposer. 
 
123 Yunis (1988). This appears to have been one of the points at issue in Demosthenes Against 
Aristocrates. Dem. 23.92-94 Demosthenes warns that Aristocrates will try to argue that he should 
not be punished as, since his decree never came into effect, no harm was done. Demosthenes urges 
the jury to reject this on the basis that the speech-act of proposing the decree was in itself wrongful. 
124 Carawan (2007) p. 35. 
125 That is to say, offences of preparation, for example attempted burglary, where the wrongful act 
has not yet been committed. Contrast going equipped to commit burglary, where the wrongful act 
(acquiring and carrying the tools necessary to commit burglary with the intent of committing 
burglary) has already been committed. Offences with a mental element, for example intentional 
wounding, are not inchoate. The only inchoate offences I know of from Athens are attempting to 
establish a tyranny, (Plut. Sol. 19.3, Ath. Pol. 16.10) and possibly (depending on interpretation – see 
Phillips (2007)) trauma ek pronoias. 
126 Dem. 22.47-78. 
127 Hansen (1974) p. 25 lists instances of atimia for third convictions in paranomōn cases.  
128 This creates a possible analogy with the offence of deceiving the demos – Xen. Hel. 1.7.35, Ath. 
Pol. 43.5. 
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The graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai appears to have been subject to an 
unusual time limit. Cases could only be brought against the proposer of the law for 
the first year after the law is made; thereafter anyone could still indict the law, but 
the proposer would no longer be subject to any penalty if the law was quashed. 
This time limit has been extended by analogy to the graphē paranomōn, though 
this is disputed.  
 
Hansen disputes the possibility of bringing cases against either laws or decrees 
outside of the one-year time limit, and considers Demosthenes Against Leptines, 
where this did happen, to be an outlier permitted only because of Demosthenes’ 
special pleading.129 This seems unlikely, not least because by agreeing to introduce 
the prosecution despite the law’s time limit the thesmothetai put themselves at 
significant personal risk of being attacked by Leptines and his philoi at their 
euthynai. There are enough indications in other paranomōn and nomon mē 
epitēdeion theinai speeches to suggest that the time limit of one year would have 
applied to the graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai and that after the one-year time 
limit had passed the law itself could still be indicted.  
 
Carawan disputes the existence of any time limit for bringing graphē paranomōn 
cases, on the basis (discussed above) that if a person could be punished for 
proposing a decree which never took effect, it would be absurd to allow those who 
proposed decrees which did take effect to escape punishment, and because he 
considers the nature of decrees in the fourth century (as one-off decisions) to 
render the bringing of late graphai against them irrelevant.130 Neither of Carawan’s 
arguments is convincing. As well as the questions around Carawan’s definition of 
what the wrong in the graphē paranomōn was, we must acknowledge that time 
limits on prosecution can lead to uncomfortable results, even today, but are 
valuable to judicial systems all the same, while even long after the fact, a 
democratic decision that a former decision was wrong may have powerful effects. 
 
129 Hansen (1985) p. 350-52. 
130 Carawan (2007) p. 35 ff. 
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Consider, for instance, the impact of a post-hoc decision that a grant of honours 
was unlawful – the recipient of the grant is humiliated, his ongoing pride in the 
stēlē displaying his honours lost. The conventional view that there was a one-year 
period during which the proposer of the decree or law could be subject to 
prosecution, and thereafter the decree or law could be indicted but its proposer 
would not be subject to any penalty, appears to be the correct one. 
 
The intended purpose of this time limit cannot be confidently ascertained. 
Giannadaki accepts the claim of Dem. 36.26-7 (a case about contracts) that time 
limits give adequate time for the wrongdoing to be identified and a case lodged.131 
She fails, however, to engage with the fact that the time limits for the graphē 
paranomōn and graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai still leave the decree/law 
subject to indictment. The limit of one year for prosecution of the proposer seems 
to be indicative of the complicated relationship the fourth-century democracy had 
with contemporary law-making, and in particular whether a contemporary 
Athenian could be identifiable as a lawgiver. The answer suggested by the time 
limit for prosecutions for graphai nomon mē epitēdeion theinai seems to be that for 
the first year, the proposer of the law remains responsible for that defective law, 
but after a year the responsibility becomes diffuse and the law becomes a part of 
the common property of the Athenians. 
 
This can be combined with the evidence that the wrongful act prosecuted in the 
graphē paranomōn appears to be the speech act of proposing the decree and not 
the act of having the decree passed by the demos. The suggestion that the wrong 
lies in the speech and not in the act implies that the proposer is not envisaged as a 
lawgiver. His wrong is not making a bad law, but speaking against the interests of 
the polis. In analogy with the time limit on personal prosecutions for graphē 
paranomōn, the capacity of a fourth-century Athenian to be recognised as a 
lawgiver is lessened. 
 
 
131 2014. 
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Much work has been done on which of Athens’ democratic bodies was sovereign 
in the fourth century,132 and this work has tended to proceed on the assumption 
that when a dikasterion declared a measure to be para tous nomous/ mē epitēdeios 
this amounts to the court having the capability to override the decisions of the 
Assembly. There are some indications that this might be the case, in particular the 
evidence (see Hansen 1987) that where a decree was indicted at probouleutic stage 
but was then approved by the court, the decree did not have to go back to the 
Assembly for ratification, but would have immediate effect. Here, the court’s 
decision does appear to have had legislative effect, though given Athens’ lack of 
any concern about separation of powers it is possible that the court process was 
simply felt to constitute sufficient public approval of the measure.  
 
On the other hand, where a decree which has been approved by the Assembly is 
then indicted and is rejected as unlawful by the dikasterion, it is unclear whether 
that decree is made ineffective by that decision, or whether in principle it might 
be considered always to have been ineffective because of its inherent paranomia. 
There is at least an indication to the latter effect in Demosthenes Against 
Aristocrates:  
For instance, suppose that one of those decrees which have in fact been 
disallowed had never been impeached in this Court. It would certainly 
have been operative (kurios); nevertheless it would have been moved 
contrary to law (para tous nomous). Or suppose that a decree, being 
impeached, was pronounced flawless, because the prosecutors, either 
collusively or through incompetence, had failed to make good their 
case: that failure does not prevent it from being unlawful 
(paranomōn).133 
As such, by declaring a decree to be unlawful the court is, to some extent, not 
rendering it ineffective, but highlighting the fact that it was always too flawed to 
be able to take effect. The Assembly does not lose ‘sovereignty’, but never had the 
authority to create unlawful/mē epitēdeios measures. 
 
132 See Hansen (1974), (1975), (2010); Rhodes (1981); Ostwald (1987); Ober (1989a). 
133 Dem. 23.96. 
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The introduction of the graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai at the end of the fifth 
century may have had a further effect on Athens’ structure of laws. As we have 
discussed above, at the end of the fifth century Athens created a body of laws which 
were linked to Solon and treated as ancient and respected, and which had the effect 
of obscuring fifth-century law-making. At the same time, Athens created a new 
process for democratic law-making. The graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai could 
in principle be used to indict any law,134 but given the respect shown to laws that 
were or could be claimed as Solonian, it seems highly unlikely that it would have 
been used to indict any of the laws that emerged from the late fifth-century 
republication of ‘Solon’s Laws’. As such, the introduction of the graphē nomon mē 
epitēdeion theinai must in practice have given Athens a two-tier body of laws, with 
pre-400 laws respected and safe from challenge, and laws which could be identified 
as post-400 vulnerable to prosecution under the graphē nomon mē epitēdeion 
theinai. Given the limited number of nomoi that appear to have been passed by the 
fourth-century democracy, it is perhaps not surprising that this two-tier structure 
does not appear in our sources. 
     
 
5.4.3 Obsolete laws 
 
In the fourth century, Athens appears to have lacked any structure by which laws 
could be declared to be obsolete. Since older laws had authority over any new law 
which contradicted their provisions, in principle no law could have become 
obsolete. However, this is likely to have led to Athenian law containing laws which 
were, in practice, obsolete. 
 
The only system which could be used for the removal of obsolete laws for which 
we have evidence is the inspection of the laws by the thesmothetai discussed by 
Aeschines in his prosecution of Ctesiphon. Demosthenes, we are told by Aeschines, 
 
134 Provided we accept the claim that after the one year time limit on prosecuting the proposer the 
law itself could still be indicted. 
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will try to claim that there is another law allowing the presentation of crowns in 
the theatre, so Aeschines is attempting to prove to the jurors that Athenian law 
does not permit contradictory laws to exist. He claims ‘[the lawgiver] has expressly 
laid upon the thesmothetai the duty of making an annual revision of the laws in the 
presence of the people, prescribing sharp investigation and examination, in order to 
determine whether any law stands written which contradicts another law, or an 
invalid law stands among the valid, or whether more laws than one stand written to 
govern each action.’135 The part that concerns us here is the instruction that the 
thesmothetai should examine whether ‘an invalid law stands among the valid’. If we 
had evidence that Athenians recognised the possibility that their laws might become 
akuros through obsolescence, this could be considered to be intended to deal with 
the problem of obsolete laws; however, in general Athenian thinking seems not to 
have recognised this. Not only did older laws take precedence over newer, Hansen 
(1979) observes that in contemporary Athenian philosophy an essential difference 
between a law and a decree was that a law should be enacted for something 
permanent, a distinction Hansen considers fourth-century Athenian nomothesia to 
have respected. In this sense, laws should not have any capacity to become 
obsolete.136 
 
Despite this, there are a couple of signs that some capacity for obsolescence in laws 
might have been recognised in Athenian thought. Aristotle Rhetoric 1375b11 
suggests that where the written law is not on the pleader’s side, ‘if the conditions 
which led to the enactment of the law are now obsolete, while the law itself 
remains, one must endeavour to make this clear and to combat the law by this 
argument’. Harris observes that no litigant in the surviving corpus of forensic 
oratory actually uses this strategy.137 In the Rhetoric, laws are obsolete because they 
were created to deal with specific circumstances, circumstances which no longer 
pertain. As such, any nomos vulnerable to this argument should, according to 
 
135 Aeschin. 3.38. 
136 This model may be supported by the evidence that entrenchment clauses, which were common 
in fifth-century Assembly decisions, seem to have fallen out of use in the fourth century – see Lewis 
(1997). 
137 (2006b) p. 163. 
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Hansen, have been passed not as a nomos but as a psēphisma in the fourth century. 
Most of Athens’ older laws had no contextualising information, but as we have seen 
the trope of the intent of the lawgiver was well-recognised in Athenian oratory, so 
imputing some historically contingent intent to the lawgiver might not have been 
impossible for a speaker. This would, however, have been a difficult argument to 
make given the significance given to pre-fourth-century laws, and it is not 
surprising we do not see speakers using it.  
 
In addition, Ath. Pol. 22.1-2 claims that the reason Cleisthenes needed to make new 
laws was because ‘the tyranny had obliterated the laws of Solon by disuse’.138 It is 
hard to make sense of what is meant by this, since Cleisthenes is treated by the 
Ath. Pol. as trying to re-establish a Solonian democracy, so the circumstances for 
which Solon created his laws would be likely to be considered still to be relevant. 
It is possible that the obliteration caused by the disuse could refer to laws being 
lost or forgotten. Rhodes observes that the claim that the tyrants did not use the 
laws of Solon is widely contradicted by other sources, but the factual accuracy of 
the claim is less important here than the idea that a law could become obsolete 
through disuse.139 Despite this, the republication of the laws at the end of the fifth 
century suggests that Athens would go to significant lengths to find and preserve 
old laws, rather than letting them fade into obsolescence through disuse. The idea 
that a law might become akuros through disuse may appear in the orators, such as 
when Aeschines claims that if jurors punish Timarchus their laws will be ‘good and 
kurios’ but if they acquit him their laws will be ‘good, indeed, but no longer 
kurios’.140 As such, it is possible the inspection referred to in Aeschines 3.38 could 
have allowed for the removal of laws that had become obsolete, but there would 
nonetheless have been barriers in place to recognising very old laws as obsolete 
because of the preference given to old laws, while in theory newer laws should not 
have had the capacity to become obsolete.  
 
 
138 Καὶ γὰρ συνέβη τοὺς ?ὲν Σόλωνος νό?ους ἀφανίσαι την τυραννίδα διὰ τὸ ?ὴ χρῆσθαι. 
139 (1981) p. 261. 
140 Aesch. 1.36, though he may only mean that it would no longer have force. 
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There is some evidence to suggest that at least some obsolete laws did remain in 
existence in the fourth century. The clearest evidence of obsolete laws comes from 
the information in the Ath. Pol. about the Solonian groups pentakosiomedimnoi, 
hippeis, zeugitai and thētes. By the time the Ath. Pol. was written it appears these 
groups were more or less obsolete, but we are told that ‘even now when the 
presiding official asks a man who is about to draw lots for some office what rate he 
pays, no one whatever would say he was rated as a thete’.141 Here, then, we see a 
law which is so widely recognised as obsolete that it is habitually ignored by the 
people it should govern, but which nonetheless has not been repealed. 
 
The law on ostracism could be considered to have been obsolete by the fourth 
century. This law, which had been used regularly in the early fifth century, fell out 
of use by about 440.142 Nonetheless, in the fourth century there was still an annual 
vote held on whether to conduct an ostracism.143 
 
No speaker in forensic oratory ever declares a law to be obsolete, but nonetheless 
some laws cited in speeches could be considered to have fallen out of use. The 
speaker of Lysias’ Against Theomnestus cites multiple laws which contain outdated 
language, but it is important for the argument in the case that the laws cited should 
still be valid at the time of the speech. The speaker in Demosthenes’ Against 
Aristocrates quotes extensively from the Drakontian law on homicide, and as in 
Lysias’ Against Theomnestus, encounters archaic language. In Against Aristocrates, 
however, the archaic language does have some effect on the functioning of the law. 
At 23.37-40 he discusses the provisions protecting an exiled killer from retaliation, 
‘as long as he stays away from the frontier-markets’. From the explanation given 
by the speaker of what the frontier markets were, it appears these no longer 
existed. As such, this provision of law could be considered obsolete, but the 
speaker does not appear to consider this obsolescence to impede his case. More 
 
141 Ath. Pol. 7.4 also Ath. Pol. 8.1-2 and 47.1. Rhodes (1981) considers these laws ‘dead letters’. 
142 Apart from a brief, ill-fated resurrection in 416, when Alcibiades and Nicias attempted to use 
ostracism against one another, and instead a third person, Hyperbolus, was ostracised. See 
Forsdyke (2005) on the institution of ostracism and its significance for Athens. 
143 Ath. Pol. 43.5. 
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generally, Carawan has argued that the provisions relied on by Demosthenes in 
this case had been replaced by the more flexible process of apagogē.144 
 
In both Demosthenes’ Against Aristocrates and Lysias’ On the Murder of 
Eratosthenes a law is cited giving a defence to homicide to anyone who kills a 
person who is engaged in intercourse with the killer’s ‘wife, mother, sister, 
daughter, or concubine (pallake) kept for the procreation of eleutheroi children’. 
Getting eleutheroi children from a concubine has generally been considered by 
scholars to have been obsolete by the fourth century,145 though Ogden146 considers 
that it was possible to get children on a concubine who would be free but not 
citizens. As such, it remains unclear whether or not this law was obsolete in the 
fourth century. 
 
Aeschines’ Against Timarchus 22-24 refers to a law which instructs the herald to 
invite men over fifty to address the Assembly first. Lane Fox (1994) considers it 
likely that this law was obsolete in the fourth century, and observes the incongruity 
of Aeschines citing an obsolete law in a speech so concerned with the sovereignty 
of the laws.147 This incongruity only exists, however, in a system which recognises 
that laws can become obsolete. If laws are not admitted to have the capacity to 
become obsolete, citing laws which are no longer in use does not diminish 
Aeschines’ argument so much as strengthen his nostalgic presentation of the good 
order and excellent behaviour of Athens’ forefathers.  
 
If fourth-century Athens possessed a process for recognising and repealing 
obsolete laws, it appears to have left at least some obsolete laws in place. The 
continued existence of these laws seems not to have caused significant disruption 
to Athens’ legal system, and while we see complaints that an old law is no longer 
 
144 Carawan (1998) pp. 313-373 and chapter 2.3.2.8 of this thesis. 
145 Harrison (1968-71) i p. 13-14; Sealey (1984). 
146 (1996) p. 33. 
147 (1994) p. 147-8. 
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being used correctly we see none arguing that old, obsolete laws are holding 
Athens back or causing confusion. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Though Athens had been engaging in democratic law-making throughout the fifth 
century, and by the early fourth century had explicitly recognised this and created 
systems by which new laws could be made for the polis, the laws of Athens 
continued to be closely bound up with the identity of Solon. The laws passed in 
the fourth century were vulnerable to indictment at any time as mē epitēdeios, 
creating in effect two tiers of law in Athens: pre-400 laws, which were deemed to 
be Solonian and likely to have been safe from indictment, and post-400 laws, which 
were vulnerable. Because the figure of the lawgiver became so important for 
Athens’ understanding of its laws, the image of a contemporary Athenian as a 
lawgiver was a difficult one to accept, as can be seen in the process of graphē 
paranomōn. The figure of the lawgiver also meant that Athens’ law could not 
develop to carry its own authority, but remained bound up with the personal 
authority of Athens’ long-dead lawgiver. As such, Athens cannot be said to have 
developed positivist law; in the fourth century, Athens’ law did not, primarily, draw 
its authority from having been made by legally recognised structures and systems.
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CHAPTER 6: RECEPTION OF SPARTAN LAW 
 
 
In this chapter I intend to explore Spartan law though Athenian eyes. It is not my 
intention to try to analyse Sparta’s legal system here, or even to take a position on 
whether it possessed one. Rather I wish to examine how Athenian attitudes 
towards Spartan law may shed light on their underlying assumptions about what 
law was and what role it ought to play in a polis and in people’s lives. Popular 
Athenian sources on Sparta’s law are limited, so in this chapter I have drawn on 
elite sources. Where possible, I have checked against popular sources to explore 
how far these elite perspectives might be considered representative of popular 
attitudes. 
 
 
6.1 Status as law 
 
In 1986 MacDowell published a book focussing on Spartan law. In the reviews of 
his book, reviewers commented that the book suffered from a fundamental flaw 
which MacDowell had not adequately addressed: they were not convinced that 
Sparta possessed law. For Thür this fatally undermined MacDowell’s work.1 
Similarly, Osborne remarks that MacDowell’s decision to treat as law whatever the 
Spartans are reported as having ascribed to Lycurgus ‘elides important distinctions 
between written and unwritten law, between statutes and prevailing, ideologically 
charged custom’.2 In this regard, the first thing to note is that, unlike modern 
academics, Athenians never questioned the status of Spartan law (nomos) as law. 
Sparta’s law was written about in detail by Xenophon,3 Aristotle,4 and Plato5 and 
 
1 (1990). 
2 (1988). 
3 Most extensively in his Constitution of the Lacedaimonians (Lac. Pol). 
4 Aristotle Politics 1269b-1271b. Aristotle also wrote a lost Constitution of the Lacedaimonians. 
5 Spartan law plays a particularly important role in Plato’s Republic and Laws. 
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was mentioned in passing by various other Athenian writers, but the question of 
whether Sparta’s law could be considered law seems not to have troubled any of 
them.  
 
 
6.1.1 Agraphoi nomoi 
 
The degree to which Spartan nomos was entirely unwritten is unclear. Plutarch 
Lyc. 13.1-4 claimed that Sparta forbade the writing of laws, but Millender and 
MacDowell both consider Sparta to have used a combination of written and 
unwritten law.6 Millender points out that there is no evidence pre-dating Plutarch 
that Sparta’s laws were entirely unwritten.7 As noted above, the use by Sparta of 
unwritten law is one of the aspects which have caused scholars to doubt its status 
as law. Athens made a law at the end of the fifth century specifying that unwritten 
law could not be used by magistrates, and as such it is reasonable to assume that 
Athens did distinguish between written and unwritten law.8 Nonetheless, 
Athenian writers examining Sparta’s legal system did not dispute the legal status 
of Sparta’s unwritten laws, but, much like MacDowell, just considered anything 
that was ascribed to Lycurgus, or anything that seemed to govern Spartans’ way of 
life, to be law.  
 
 
6.1.2 Nomothetai 
 
A further concern expressed by Thür about MacDowell’s book is that MacDowell 
does not address how Sparta’s established laws arose.9 Essentially, Thür’s question 
is one of legal positivism – which authority made these laws. Fourth-century 
 
6 Millender (2001); MacDowell (1986) p. 4-5. 
7 (2001) p. 133. 
8 see Ostwald (1973) on agraphos nomos. 
9 (1990). 
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Athenian writers were interested in Sparta’s legendary lawgiver Lycurgus.10 
Herodotus has Lycurgus as lawgiver to the Spartans, as does Plato’s Laws.  
 
The legends of Lycurgus are markedly different from those of Solon. Whereas 
Solon is remembered as having been appointed by some quasi-legal process,11 
Lycurgus appears not to have been appointed at all. Herodotus 1.65 records that he 
was guardian to the infant king of Sparta, and enacted law reforms in that role. 
Plutarch’s Lycurgus, probably drawing from earlier sources,12 reports that Lycurgus 
was initially guardian for the child king, but left Sparta and travelled and learned 
about law. He then came back at the invitation of the Spartans and was welcomed 
back by the kings, but is not clear that he was invited back as a lawgiver. He appears 
to have been invited back as a charismatic leader, not for the express purpose of 
making laws, and then to have appointed himself as a lawgiver.13 In Plutarch’s 
narrative, having decided to make laws he goes first to the Delphic oracle for 
advice,14 and then begins a conspiracy among the Spartans to begin using his laws. 
This conspiracy culminates in the group around Lycurgus going armed to the 
market-place to put down all opposition to Lycurgus.15 When his laws were 
introduced, Plutarch claims that they were resented by the wealthy and a group of 
rich men attacked Lycurgus. This uprising was not resolved by the application of 
the law, however, but by the personality of Lycurgus. When the men saw they had 
injured him they were ashamed and gave up the youth who had caused the injury 
to Lycurgus, but Lycurgus did not punish him and instead the youth became his 
devoted follower.16 According to Plutarch’s narrative, Lycurgus does eventually 
have his laws secured by oath, but not until they were already established and had 
been in use for some time.17 He then tricks the citizens and kings of Sparta into 
 
10 Ollier (1933) p. 106 observes that in the fifth century Lycurgus was little known outside of Sparta 
and Sparta’s laws might be attributed to other figures.  
11 See Chapter 5.1.2 for fourth-century conceptions of the original authority of Solon’s laws. 
12 MacDowell (1986) p. 18 considers it likely that Plutarch drew extensively on Aristotle’s 
Constitution of the Lacedaimonians. 
13 Plut. Lyc. 5.1-2. 
14 Plut. Lyc. 5.3. 
15 Plut. Lyc. 5.4-5. This details fits so badly with the characterisation of Lycurgus in the rest of this 
work it is tempting to presume that this at least came from older sources. 
16 Plut. Lyc. 11. 
17 Plut. Lyc. 29.1-3. 
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swearing an oath of perpetual obedience by having them swear not to change his 
laws until he should return from a trip to Delphi, and then failing ever to return to 
Sparta.18  
 
Where Solon is appointed by a quasi-legal, consensual process, Lycurgus is self-
appointed and uses violence to secure acceptance of his laws. Where Solon’s laws 
depend on no god for their authority, Lycurgus’ are either given by Apollo, or are 
approved by the god. Where Solon’s laws secured obedience in themselves, 
uprisings against Lycurgus’ laws were quelled by the personal authority of 
Lycurgus. Where Solon had the Athenians knowingly swear an oath to abide by his 
laws for a set time, Lycurgus tricks the Spartans. Though, as we have seen, Solon’s 
laws remained closely bound up with the person of Solon, they had some greater 
chance of developing into a full legal system; Lycurgus’ laws were much more 
closely bound up with the person of Lycurgus.  
 
 
6.1.3 Law in the courts? 
 
As well as the concerns raised by Thür and Osborne, there is a further marked 
strangeness in Spartan law, which is that one of its major judicial bodies, the 
ephors, is explicitly reported by Athenian sources to have judged certain cases 
without regard to law.19 Cartledge attempts to argue that the ephors’ power to 
judge without regard to the law was a version of the power of the Athenian jury, 
but this claim is unconvincing.20 An Athenian jury was expected to use the law at 
least to some extent in judging, and the power of the ephors to judge without 
regard to the law is presented by Aristotle as something exceptional and worthy of 
criticism. Law in Sparta, as portrayed by Aristotle,21 did not relate to the judging of 
 
18 Plut. Lyc. 29.4-5. 
19 Aristotle Pol. 1270b. It is not clear from Aristotle whether he objects generally to judging without 
regard to laws, or whether he objects to the ephors, as a body drawn from the general population 
and holding no special wisdom, judging without regard to laws. 
20 (2000). 
21 And maybe by Xenophon Lac. Pol. 8.3-5, who describes the ephors as holding tyrannical power – 
see below for a discussion of the implications of this. 
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cases. Law had constitutional significance, and guided the everyday lives, the 
epitēdeumata, of individuals, but dispute settlement could be done without regard 
to law. This stands in contrast to Athens where, at least in principle, jurors swore 
to judge cases according to the laws.22 
 
 
6.1.4 Conclusion 
 
A number of Athenian writers commented on Spartan law, and some did so in 
considerable detail, but despite the many eccentricities of Sparta’s laws and legal 
structures, no surviving Athenian writer ever denied that Sparta’s laws did 
constitute law. What appear to us to be factors which bring into question its status 
as law – its unwritten character, the absence of clear law-making functions,23 its 
different role in society – to the Athenians appear to have been worthy of 
comment, perhaps, but not fatal to its status as law. The difference between 
modern academic concerns about the status of Spartan law and Athenian 
acceptance of it is instructive. It suggests that fourth-century Athenian 
understandings of law were still easily flexible enough to incorporate a system of 
laws which seems to have been based very largely in tradition.24 Spartan law did 
not depend on having been written, and it was not derived from structures of 
legislative authority. Much like MacDowell, Xenophon seems to have treated as 
law anything which the Spartans attributed to Lycurgus. An example of this can be 
seen in Xenophon’s Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, where Xenophon treats 
as law and attributes to Lycurgus the tradition of shunning cowards.25 This 
 
22 See Chapter 4.3.2.1. 
23 See Chapter 6.2.2. 
24 By contrast, ancient authors seem to have been comfortable dismissing Persia as without law. 
Hdt. 7.104. This is not universal; the fictionalised account of Xen. Cyropaedia 1.16-18 contrasts 
Median and Persian law: while Persia is said to be governed by laws, Media is governed by the will 
of the despot. Cyrus, Xenophon’s hero, seems to favour the type of justice associated with the 
despot. The revolutionary effects of this are noted by Nadon (2001). Salehi-Esfahani (2008) accepts 
uncritically the claim that Ancient Greece had and Persia lacked the rule of law, and seeks to explain 
this through geography. 
25 Xen. Lac. Pol. 9.4. By attributing this to Lycurgus, Xenophon treats it as an enactment made by 
the Spartan lawgiver, and so by extension as a law, rather than as a matter of custom. 
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shunning contains no form of legal sanction or judgement, and more closely 
resembles the forms of Athenian non-legal social control examined by Hunter.26  
 
 
6.2 Excellence of Spartan law 
 
Athenian writers went further than simply acknowledging Spartan law as law; it 
seems to have been a recognised idea27 that Spartan law was particularly excellent. 
This excellence seems to have been so acknowledged that it is often offered 
without any form of justification, and it can be difficult to work out exactly why 
Spartan law was considered by Athenian writers to be so good.28 
 
One simple explanation may be that Spartan law was considered to be good 
because it produced a successful polis. Although Spartan law receives little interest 
until the end of the fifth century, despite Sparta’s long eminence in the Greek 
world, this is not entirely surprising since it matches a general absence of evidence 
of people considering law in the abstract until the late fifth century. From the 
beginning of the fourth century, however, many sources praise Sparta’s laws, and 
continue to do so even after Sparta’s defeat at Leuctra and subsequent decline.  
 
26 (1994). 
27 Though there is little evidence that this preceded the fourth century. Euripides seems to criticise 
Sparta’s laws, according to Tigerstedt (1965) p. 114. This, Tigerstedt attributes to the popular anti-
Spartan feeling among the masses in Athens at the time. Similarly, Tigerstedt comments (p. 135) on 
Thucydides’ characterisation of Spartan and Athenian laws ‘the Spartan… fell into the hubris of the 
tyrant, is contrasted with the Athenian who maintained his balance in all situations since he is not 
dependent on external discipline’. Tigerstedt considers Thucydides to have deliberately resisted 
what Tigerstedt considers to have been a pre-existing tendency to mythologise Sparta. Critias’ lost 
Constitution of the Lacedaimonians is presumed to have praised Sparta. 
28 Many of our sources on Spartan law are from notably laconophile wealthy writers who were 
critical of Athenian democracy. A suggestion that the perception of Spartan law as particularly good 
might have been held more widely is found in Lycurgus Against Leocrates 128 ‘We shall be well 
advised to take examples of just conduct from a city which has good laws’, where Lycurgus feels 
confident to cite a Spartan law before an Athenian jury and assumes that his audience will agree with 
him that Sparta did possess good laws. The perception that Sparta had good laws may have been 
coloured by the association of Sparta with eunomia – see Andrewes (1938) and Ostwald (1969). 
Ostwald considers eunomia to refer not to possessing good laws, but to a state of good order. Raaflaub 
(2006) proposes a sixth-century meaning for eunomia as reflecting a society with well maintained 
status hierarchies and prevention of abuse of the lower classes by the upper classes. In the fourth 
century, Aristotle understands eunomia to mean obedience to law (Politics 1294a), perhaps reflecting 
the fact that eunomia continued to be linked to Sparta, and the most distinctive feature of Sparta’s 
law was the high level of enforcement.  
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Sparta’s decline is portrayed by Xenophon as being the result of Spartans’ failure 
to abide by their own laws.29 How this should be interpreted is a matter for 
considerable debate. Christesen offers a useful summary of the main lines of 
argument, dividing them into three categories: those who take Xenophon at face 
value here; those who think that Xenophon changed his mind on the excellence of 
Sparta; and those who think Xenophon’s admiration of Sparta was always more 
nuanced than has been acknowledged. If Xenophon had changed his mind about 
Sparta by the time he came to write chapter 14, he nonetheless continues in this 
chapter to defend its legal system. Christesen argues that Xenophon identified key 
weaknesses in Spartans, one of which was their lack of willing obedience to law. If 
that were the case, it is possible to construct an argument that Sparta’s decline was 
inevitable. Christesen argues that in Xenophon’s ideal of obedience to law, the 
obedience is inculcated through education and respect for the rulers. In this sense, 
one could argue that though Xenophon criticises the Spartans for abandoning their 
laws, this criticism is a matter of education and the laws themselves remain 
admirable. 
 
Plato’s Laws, meanwhile, completely ignores the changes in Sparta’s fortunes and 
continues to treat Spartan law as one of Greece’s foremost systems of law.30 The 
tendency to continue to admire Spartan law even after the decline of Sparta 
suggests that admiration for Sparta’s laws may have been based on something more 
than the simple fact of Spartan success.31 Even in Isocrates’ attacks on Sparta in the 
Panathenaicus, Isocrates does not attack Sparta’s law directly. Instead he claims 
that while Sparta’s institutions might be praiseworthy, they never did anything to 
help the other Greeks.32 More tellingly, Isocrates adopts Lycurgus’ laws for Athens, 
 
29 Xen.  Lac. Pol. 14 
30 Pl. Laws 625a. 
31 This may be supported in the fact that the other system of laws considered to be excellent was 
that of Crete, which did not enjoy the prominence of Sparta or Athens during the classical period. 
32 Isoc. Panath. 47. 
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claiming that Lycurgus copied Spartan law from the ancient Athenian constitution 
that Isocrates argues should be reintroduced.33 
 
 
6.2.1 Obeying and enforcing the law in Sparta 
 
The main area for which Spartan law is praised is Spartans’ high levels of obedience 
to their laws. This is prominent throughout Xenophon’s Lac. Pol. and appears in 
Aristotle,34 as well as being referred to by Isocrates.35  MacDowell assumes that the 
longevity of Spartan law can be attributed at least in part to a high level of social 
acceptance for it, which would also imply a high level of social adherence.36 Several 
ancient writers, however, seem to claim that Sparta’s reputation for high levels of 
obedience to law can be attributed to high levels of policing in Sparta.  
 
Xenophon Lac. Pol. emphasises the extraordinary degree of control exercised over 
Spartan citizens. In Xenophon’s account, young adult males are subject to control 
by the magistrates and by their families.37 They are subject to the authority of any 
passer-by, and can be punished by the ephors for failing to obey the orders of the 
passer-by.38 Xenophon emphasises the role of fear in Sparta’s system of laws39 and 
Lipka comments on this that Sparta had a cult of phobos which occupied a temple 
next to the syssition.40 Xenophon in the Lac. Pol. twice implies that Spartan 
authorities may have possessed the authority to investigate and uncover breaches 
of the law. Xenophon claims that the ephors had the authority to punish ‘anyone 
whom they perceive to be breaking the law in any way’,41 and suggests that Spartans 
 
33 Isoc. Panath. 153. 
34 Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1102 a 9. 
35 Isoc. Archidamos 61. 
36 MacDowell (1986). Contrast Link (2014) who suggests that Spartan law was unpleasant to abide 
by because, rather than trying to align the interests of the individual with those of the group, it 
instead depended on heavy enforcement.  
37 Xen Lac. Pol. 3.3-4. 
38 Xen Lac. Pol. 4.5-7. 
39 Xen Lac. Pol. 8.1-3. 
40 Lipka (2002) p. 168. 
41 Xen Lac. Pol. 8.3-5. Xenophon compares the power of the ephors to that of tyrants: ‘like tyrants 
and judges at athletics contests, they punish there and then anyone whom they perceive to be 
breaking the law in any way’. The comparison to tyrants is remarkable, even presented here in a 
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may have been subjected to house searches to seek out anyone breaking the law 
by possessing gold or silver.42  
 
In addition, the hippeis, an elite body of young men, appears to have had some role 
in maintaining order within Sparta.43 Figueira considers them to have performed 
some semi-regular policing role, based on Xenophon’s account of a conspiracy that 
was put down.44 First, the conspiracy is reported to the ephors by an informer. The 
ephors then send Cinadon, the lead conspirator, out into the countryside with 
some hippeis, Cinadon thinking he has been sent out to round up some Helots. 
Xenophon writes that Cinadon believes this since he ‘had performed other services 
of a like sort for the ephors in the past’.45 
 
This high level of enforcement of law is portrayed sometimes as praiseworthy, as 
in Xenophon, but at other times as it is criticised. Christesen argues that the failure 
of Sparta to develop willing obedience to law was seen by Xenophon as a weakness, 
and one which inevitably led to Sparta losing its position as hegemon.46 Plato 
accuses Spartans of obeying law only in appearance, and disobeying it in secret, 
‘running away from the law as boys from a father, since they have not been 
educated by persuasion but by force’.47 Thucydides’ observation that outside of 
Sparta, Spartans abandon their own laws may reflect a similar criticism that 
Spartans obeyed law solely in fear of punishment for disobedience.48 This trope 
also appears in Isocrates’ On the Peace 96.  
 
value-neutral way, bracketed as it is with judges at athletics contests. Tyranny was generally 
presented as an unmitigatedly bad form of government, but here Xenophon, who admired Sparta, 
seems to compare the power of ephors positively with that of tyrants. It is possible that the major 
linking factor between all of these figures is that there was no need for them to conduct trials on 
the basis of laws, but instead all possessed the authority to make punitive decisions based solely on 
their personal opinion of the situation. 
42 Xen. Lac. Pol. 7.6. 
43 The krypteia could be seen as a type of police force, but since they were only used against non-
Spartiates (Aristotle fr. 538 Rose), their role is not strictly relevant to a section on Spartan law, since 
the people they terrorised were not subjects of law. 
44 Figueira (2006) 59ff. 
45 Xen. Hel. 3.3.4-11. 
46 Christesen (2016). 
47 Republic VIII 548. 
48 Thuc. 1.77.6. 
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Millender reads Herodotus 7.101-5, where Demaratus explains to the Persian king 
that Spartans are ‘free, but not wholly free; for law is their master (despotes) and 
they fear it more than your men fear you’, as a criticism of Spartan law, observing 
that a defence of Hellenic law delivered by Demaratus would be very surprising, 
given his personal history.49 Millender takes particular note of the use of the word 
despotes, and argues that ‘by using this unusual term to describe the rule of law… 
Herodotus suggests that the Spartans are lawful only under duress’.50 Millender, 
far from seeing Sparta’s dedication to law as an exemplary version of general 
Hellenic patterns, instead claims that the element of compulsion and fear in 
Spartan behaviour link Sparta in Herodotus’ presentation more closely to 
barbarian autocracies, and she contrasts this with Herodotus’ portrayal of 
Athenians as eager for battle. 
 
 
6.2.2 Unchanging laws 
 
Sparta’s laws also receive praise for being unchanging. In the fourth century, law 
being unchanging does seem to have been regarded by Athenians as preferred.51 
Sparta’s reluctance to change its laws therefore fits into a larger narrative of what 
laws should be. It is notable that Xenophon begins his study of Sparta’s 
constitution by claiming that Spartans obey the laws of Lycurgus, and when 
Xenophon does claim that Lycurgus’ laws are no longer used in Sparta, he does not 
claim that the laws have been changed, but instead that those laws are no longer 
enforced.52 In Plato’s Laws the Athenian claims that originally Sparta, Argos and 
 
49 Millender (2002). 
50 ibid. p. 40. 
51 Dem. 24.139 claims that the Locrians were so averse to legal change that any Locrian who wished 
to propose a new law was obliged to do so with a noose around his neck, and that for this reason 
the Locrians have passed only one new law in 200 years. Demosthenes encourages the Athenians 
to adopt this example. Antiph. 6.14 defends the excellence of Athens’ homicide laws on the basis 
that ‘Not only have they the distinction of being the oldest in this country, but they have changed 
no more than the crime with which they are concerned; and that is the surest token of good laws, 
as time and experience show mankind what is imperfect’. 
52 Lac. Pol. 1.2 on Spartans obeying Lycurgus’ laws. Lac. Pol. 14 on Spartans having ceased to enforce 
their laws. See above for discussion of the significance of this claim. 
213 
Messene had all had the same laws, but only Sparta had retained its laws 
unchanged and so only Sparta had been truly successful. This is attributed to 
Sparta’s constitution, which limited the power of the kings and so prevented them 
from disobeying the laws.53 Ollier claims that Aristotle considered the stability of 
Spartan law to be evidence of Sparta possessing good laws, since the stability 
indicated that everyone in the state had an interest in maintaining the laws.54 
Thucydides’ characterisations of Spartans as rigid and too incapable of change 
could be seen as a critique of Spartan reluctance to make changes to their laws, but 
if this is the case, by the fourth century Sparta is criticised not for failing to make 
necessary changes to its laws, but instead for failing to uphold its unchanged laws. 
Though there was some acknowledgement of legal change in Sparta,55 and thus a 
recognition that it was possible, in general the Athenian perception of Spartan law 
seems to have been that it was resistant to change. By treating Spartan law as 
unchanged and unchangeable, Athenian writers remove law from any sort of 
governmental control. In their perception of Spartan law, law is entirely removed 
from other structures of authority within the polis. Law becomes something which 
does not acquire its status through any legislative process, but instead something 
which possesses an unalterable status. Despite the fact that by the fourth century 
Athens possessed complex and well publicised modes of legislating, the perceived 
absence of any such systems at Sparta is not commented on by the ancient writers.  
 
Why unchanging laws are a good thing receives different treatment in our sources. 
While the laws remaining unchanged can be treated as evidence that the laws are 
in themselves good,56 at other times the unchanging nature of the laws can be 
treated as a good in itself.57 Aristotle gives the most nuanced example of this, where 
 
53 Pl. Laws 683 ff. 
54 (1933) p. 312 on Aristotle Pol. 1270b. It should be noted that while Aristotle notes that the ephorate 
is a stable and consistent aspect of the Spartan politeia thanks to its widespread acceptance, 
Aristotle in this section explicitly criticises the workings of the ephorate. This may be usefully 
compared to the Old Oligarch’s attempts to explain the regrettable stability of Athens’ democracy 
Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.1. 
55 MacDowell (1986) pp. 5-8 attempts to show Spartan rules for creating new laws, though all 
MacDowell’s sources on this are drawn from Plutarch. 
56 Antiph. 6.14. 
57 Dem. 24.139. 
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he defends even retaining imperfect laws unchanged, since the damage caused by 
accustoming people to distrust their rulers58 is greater than the damage caused by 
an imperfect law. Aristotle considers that obedience to law is a matter of custom 
and as such can only develop through a long period of time, and for this reason 
laws should as far as possible be left unchanged.59  
 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
Though the material drawn on in this chapter has mainly come from elite, rather 
than popular, sources, these elites are all men who wrote primarily from an 
Athenian standpoint. The aspects of Spartan law they see are remarkable are likely 
to be those they consider to contrast with the laws of Athens. Though the value 
judgements they make on Sparta’s laws might be expected to differ in some ways 
from the opinions of ordinary Athenians, there is some evidence from popular 
sources that ordinary Athenians did consider Sparta to have excellent laws.  
 
Ollier’s observation that Isocrates’ criticisms of Sparta could from another 
perspective be seen as praise is applicable more widely.60 The presentation of 
Sparta’s laws in Athenian sources is remarkably uniform, emphasising high degrees 
of conservatism, obedience and compulsion. The opinion of the writers may vary, 
but a clear picture of how Athenians viewed Spartan law does emerge. Criticism of 
MacDowell emphasised the fact that the writers on Spartan law were all reporting 
what they saw as oddities, but this for our purposes is instructive. Sparta’s high 
levels of social obedience to law and structures for compelling this obedience are 
seen by Athenian writers as something on which to comment, suggesting that, to 
their minds, these are not features of Athens’ system. Meanwhile, Sparta’s failure 
 
58 It is unclear from the Greek whether Aristotle meant by ‘rulers’ the laws, or the lawgivers and 
magistrates responsible for making and administering the laws. In the Politics, Aristotle sought to 
understand all constitutions, not only Athens’ democratic governance. In Athens, the laws are often 
imagined as ruling (though see p. 120 above for the limitations of this), but outside of a democracy 
it is more plausible that the ‘rulers’ might have been individuals. A full exploration of the 
implications of Aristotle’s claim are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
59 Aristotle Pol. 1269a. 
60 Ollier (1933) p. 347-8. 
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to distinguish between written and unwritten law and its lack of legislative 
processes are accepted by Athenian writers and not treated as undermining 
Sparta’s law. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
As has often been pointed out, Athenian law lacked professionals. The implications 
of this for Athenian judging have been studied in detail, but the implications for 
Athenian law have not. Without professionals, every idiotes’ preconceptions about 
what he thought the law should and should not do, where it came from, and what 
set it apart from other rules became of vital importance. It is these conceptions of 
law that I have attempted to explore in this thesis. In doing so, I have framed 
questions about Athenian law through the lenses of modern jurisprudence, in 
order that while questioning the baggage borne by the ancient audience, I can also 
highlight that borne by the modern reader.  
 
In his speech against Leocrates, Lycurgus in a few sentences touches on many of 
the areas that have been explored in this thesis, and it is perhaps returning to him 
here. 
So dangerous is the wrong which has been done and so far-reaching 
that no indictment adequate could be devised, nor have the laws 
defined a punishment for the crimes. What punishment would suit 
a man who left his country and refused to guard the temples of his 
fathers, who abandoned the graves of his ancestors and surrendered 
the whole country into the hands of the enemy? The greatest and 
final penalty, death, though the maximum punishment allowed by 
law, is too small for the crimes of Leocrates. The reason why the 
penalty for such offences, gentlemen, has never been recorded is not 
that the legislators of the past were neglectful; it is that such things 
had not happened hitherto and were not expected to happen in the 
future. It is therefore most essential that you should be not merely 
judges of this present case but nomothetai  besides. For where a 
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crime has been defined by some law, it is easy, with that as a 
standard, to punish the offender. But where different offences are 
not specifically included in the law, being covered by a single 
designation, and where a man has committed crimes worse than 
these and is equally chargeable with them all, your verdict must be 
left as a precedent for your successors. I assure you, gentlemen, that 
if you condemn this man you will do more than merely punish him; 
you will be giving all younger men an incentive to right conduct. For 
there are two influences at work in the education of the young: the 
punishments suffered by wrongdoers and the reward available to the 
virtuous. (Lycurg. Against Leocrates 1.8-10) 
In this short passage, Lycurgus urges jurors to use law to achieve explicitly moral 
ends (‘the greatest and final punishment… is too small’), asserts that this is 
expedient as well as just (‘you will be giving all younger men an incentive to right 
conduct’), questions the source of Athenian laws (‘where different offences are not 
specifically included in the law… and where a man has committed crimes worse 
than these’) and encourages the jurors to take on the role of nomothetai, a power 
they should not formally have in this situation. The passage exemplifies the 
flexibility of Athenian conceptions of law. Despite Leocrates having broken no 
known law, we are told he escaped conviction by only a single vote.1 
 
Unlike most studies of Athenian legal thought, I have focused on popular material 
rather than on the work of the philosophers, since it is that popular material that 
offers an insight into the contradictory and complex set of aims, purposes and 
sources which Athenians held for their own laws. Studying Athenian court 
speeches only with regard to the legal argumentation is, to some extent, inherently 
artificial, but it is this legal argumentation which has been allowed to take a back 
seat in studies of Athenian litigation, and so it is this which needs to be re-
examined with attention paid to the nuances and complexities with which 
Athenian forensic oratory made use of law. The study is incomplete as a study of 
 
1 Aeschin. 3.252 
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Athenian law, since it studies only the law of the polis and disregards both sacred 
and deme law. Both were bodies of law with their own systems of authority and 
interpretation, and their omission is a flaw. It is, however, a flaw which this study 
shares with most other major studies of Athenian law. 
 
By using material from outside of the orators, including the democratic responses 
to the regime of the Thirty and Athenian views of Spartan law, to study Athenian 
attitudes to law, I have been able to offer new insights into how Athenians used 
their laws and what they aspired to for their laws. Studying material from the 
orators through explicitly jurisprudential models has allowed me to highlight the 
dangers and drawbacks of relying too much on our own attitudes towards law 
when studying that of Athens, as well as offering fresh perspective on how 
Athenians used their laws in court decision-making. 
 
I have argued that although the Thirty did purport to make law, the restored 
democracy responded to the attempts at law-making in various ways, treating 
some as void ab initio, but deliberately voiding other legislative decisions, and even 
allowing some to stand. Though the use made of the law by the Thirty could have 
had the potential to trigger a process of questioning the authority and role of law, 
as did Nazi law in post-1945 Europe, the wide effect of the Amnesty served to stifle 
the need for this self-examination.  
 
I have examined Athenian courts speeches through the interpretative method set 
out by Dworkin, trying to understand how Athenians’ used principles to guide legal 
interpretation. I have concluded that Athenians were comfortable treating polis 
expediency as one of the guiding principle underlying Athenian law. This has 
significance for those who would claim that Athenian orators’ appeals to polis 
interest were in conflict with the requirements of a functioning legal order. Using 
this same method, I have explored the extent to which orators treated the 
enforcement of morality as one of the principles for Athenian law, and have 
concluded that although morality could be used in this way, the use of it is 
inconsistent and orators could perfectly well argue that law and morality were 
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entirely separate. This conclusion is reinforced by the evidence that Athenian 
society placed only weak value on obedience to and enforcement of laws as laws. 
This was a surprising conclusion to come to, given the mass of material in speeches 
on values, but this material is rarely used to guide interpretation of laws and is 
more often seen being used either to undermine the trustworthiness of the 
opponent’s story, or to act as mitigating/aggravating evidence in what appear to 
be arguments touching on sentencing.   
 
This evidence has particular importance when considering Todd’s characterisation 
of Athenian law as primarily procedural.2 Once we recognise that Athenian law 
was not unquestioningly accepted as intended to promote or enforce Athenian 
morals, it becomes easier to understand how it can be seen as a system which had 
as its primary purpose the introduction of disputes to a process of authoritative 
resolution.  
 
Moving away from Dworkin, I have examined Athenian attitudes towards law-
making and lawmakers in order to better understand how far fourth-century 
Athenian law can be meaningfully viewed as a positivist system. In Hart’s analysis 
of law, much depends on the rule of recognition; that people should accept the 
status of law as law through the routes by which it is made. By studying the 
attitudes fourth-century Athenians held towards both their ancient and their 
contemporary lawgivers, any idea that Athenians accepted law simply through it 
having been made through the proper processes becomes untenable. Long after 
instituting the nomothesia process, Athenians continued to resist the capability of 
their contemporaries to make truly good, valid law. Athenians preferred their law 
to be old and of long use. These questions have importance for studies of Athenian 
litigation, but also for studies of Athenian legislating and the political order of 
fourth-century Athens. Though the nomothetai had the power to make new laws, 
those laws were to some extent inferior to laws which could be identified as 
Solonian (in practice, pre-403 laws). The preference Athens held for Solonian law 
 
2 (1993) p. 65. 
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and the weight placed on the figure of the lawgiver in popular thinking about 
Athenian law must be taken into account in any study of Athenian law of the 
fourth-century.  
 
The extent to which Athens can be said to have enjoyed the rule of law has received 
outsized academic attention considering how far outside of Athenian interests this 
question seems to have lain, and how contested and difficult a concept the rule of 
law is in modern times.3 By recognising the flexibility of Athenian law and the 
conceptions Athenian held of their laws, questions about the rule of law in Athens 
of the fourth century become even less relevant. When law can be asked to fulfil 
such a range of contradictory purposes, can be seen as drawing its authority from 
so many sources, the question of placing it above, for example, decisions made by 
the demos outside of the guidance of law, becomes even less useful for any study 
of Athenian society or politics. Outside of its technical meaning, the idea that law 
and not the demos ruled Athens in the fourth-century also becomes hard to sustain 
when the evidence of the complexities of interpretation of law in the courts is taken 
into account. 
 
This study in many instances serves to support arguments made by those who have 
taken a law and society approach to studying Athenian law. Its implications for 
identifying Athenian law as primarily procedural have been noted above. The 
evidence that the good of the polis appears to have been an accepted principle for 
legal interpretation gives weight to those who have identified the importance of 
polis good in other court reasoning. By re-centring the nature of law in these 
discussions, I hope to show that for Athenians, making decisions based on the good 
of the polis, or on moral considerations, or interpreting the law in line with the 
imputed opinions of long-dead lawgivers, was not antithetical to good legal 
decision-making. Athens’ laws were sufficiently flexible that a juror could take all 
these considerations into account within his interpretation of the laws, and so 
make a decision which abided by his oath to judge by the laws of Athens which 
 
3 see Introduction. 
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nonetheless incorporated many non-legal considerations. Though the 
maintenance of public order has not been studied in detail, those who would study 
the role of Athenian law in maintaining public order in Athens may consider using 
the methods employed in this study to question how far this was accepted as a goal 
of Athens’ law.  
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